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Introduction
In the OECD employment outlook 2005 (OECD, 2005), a comparison of internal migration
rates1 across countries conﬁrms a well-known stylised fact in empirical economics2: internal
migration rates are lower in European countries than in the US or Australia. Moreover,
eastern and southern Europe have the lowest and western Europe, especially the UK, have
the highest migration rates in Europe, while Germany ranks in between these extremes.
This current level of internal migration in Germany results from rising mobility rates since
the end 1990s after a period of stagnation in western Germany during the 1970s and 1980s
(see Entorf, 1996; Faini, 1999; Haas, 2000). Net migration from eastern to western Germany
peaked around re-uniﬁcation and has been dropping markedly until the mid 1990s (Maretzke,
1998), a trend that has been associated with a rapid wage convergence in the early 1990s
(Hunt, 2000). Since the mid 1990s, however, the pace of economic recovery of eastern
Germany has been slowing down and east-west migration has again started to rise (Werz,
2001; Heiland, 2004).
Understanding the determinants of these observed levels of interregional mobility is of ma-
jor policy concern because the geographic mobility of labour may contribute to higher overall
economic growth as well as a reduction of interregional employment disparities. Higher eco-
nomic growth arises if interregional mobility reduces the regional mismatch between labour
supply and labour demand and thus leads to higher employment levels. Such potential wel-
fare gains from geographic mobility are likely to be substantial for Germany because the
share of unemployment caused by a regional mismatch is estimated to be 20% (SVR, 1994)
1Throughout the thesis, internal migration, interregional mobility and geographic mobility are used syn-
onymously and always refer to the relocation of residence across regional boundaries within a country. The
exact distinction of intraregional and interregional movements is presented in the subsequent chapters.
2See also Eichengreen (1991), De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993), Faini (1999), and Braunerhjelm et
al. (2000).
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or even 45% (Entorf et al., 1990). Moreover, geographic mobility may also foster productiv-
ity and thus economic growth by improving the average matching quality. This is because
the quality of a job match should increase with the size of the labour market, i.e. the number
of accessible workplaces. Since geographic mobility extends labour markets beyond the local
labour market area, it may thus also raise the average matching quality (Kim, 1989).
In addition, internal migration may be an important means of equilibrating regional
employment disparities. According to Blanchard and Katz (1992), an adverse region-speciﬁc
labour demand shock in the US initially raises unemployment and reduces nominal wages
and participation rates. While lower wages stimulate labour demand and thus oﬀset some
of the initial shock, the main adjustment occurs via net out-migration. This adjustment
process responds very quickly so that unemployment and participation rates already return
to the pre-shock level after 5 to 7 years. Similarly, internal migration has also been found
to be a well-functioning means of adjustment in Australia (Debelle and Vickery, 1999) and
in New Zealand (Choy et al., 2002). In contrast, the responsiveness of internal migration to
employment shocks seems to be much less pronounced in Europe. Decressin and Fata`s (1995)
as well as Nahuis and Parikh (2002) examine regional adjustment dynamics in Europe and
ﬁnd that internal migration responds much slower to a negative demand shock than in the US.
Therefore, the main adjustment in depressed regions rather occurs via lower participation
rates. By contrast, Mo¨ller (1995) suggests that participation reacts weakly to a regional
shock in Germany and that migration is a mechanism for regional adjustment at least in the
long run. A common ﬁnding in all these studies is that migration does not seem to respond to
regional shocks in the short run in Europe. This result seems to be in line with Puhani (2001)
who suggests lower elasticities of aggregate migration ﬂows with respect to unemployment
and wage diﬀerentials in Europe and Germany than in the US. As a consequence of such
weak or slow adjustment processes, regional employment disparities are likely to be quite
persistent in Europe. This is conﬁrmed for many European countries (Martin, 1998). The
range between the region with the highest and the lowest unemployment rate often exceeds
ten percentage points. In particular, Italy and Germany are characterised by strong regional
unemployment disparities which coincide with the south-north divide in the case of Italy
and the east-west divide in the case of Germany (OECD, 2005).
A higher level of geographic mobility in Germany could thus result in a number of po-
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tential welfare gains. First of all, the estimated extent of regional mismatch in Germany
indicates some scope for increasing employment levels and reducing unemployment. Sec-
ondly, higher productivity levels in case of an increasing matching quality could additionally
contribute to higher economic growth. And ﬁnally, higher mobility levels could acceler-
ate adjustment processes after region-speciﬁc shocks and thus reduce regional employment
disparities. Removing barriers to interregional mobility is thus an important policy issue
in order to realise these potential welfare gains. However, the degree of heterogeneity in
internal migration rates across diﬀerent labour market segments suggests that identifying
obstacles to the mobility of labour may necessitate a closer look at heterogeneous individu-
als. As an example, Figure 0.1 shows the shares of interregional job movers among all job
movers by educational attainment and type of job change in western Germany. In particular,
less-skilled individuals tend to be less mobile than their high-skilled counterparts. Moreover,
direct job-to-job movers (DJC) are much more mobile than their previously unemployed
counterparts who received unemployment compensation prior to the job move (JCU).
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
year
No vocational training, DJC No vocational training, JCU
Vocational training, DJC Vocational training, JCU
Tertiary education, DJC Tertiary education, JCU
Figure 0.1: Share of interregional job moves by type of job change and educational attainment
in western Germany, 1981-2001 (Source: Own calculation based on IAB-R01 (see chapter 5 for details))
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These diﬀerences across groups suggest that migrants must not be treated as a homo-
geneous group, but rather have to be understood as individuals with a unique disposition
to be mobile. This individualised perception of migrants has ﬁrst been introduced by the
human capital model of migration (Sjaastad, 1962; Shields and Shields, 1989). According to
this framework, potential migrants compare the expected future returns in the destination
area to the expected future returns when staying in the current place of residence and move
if the former exceeds the latter. Since individuals may diﬀer in terms of their time horizon,
their preferences and their potential to increase future returns by migrating, individuals
may be diﬀerently prone to migration. Intervening obstacles or barriers to mobility could
thus be described as institutional factors that reduce the expected returns to migration or
increase migration costs and thus reduce an individual’s probability of migration. As an
example, being unemployed is typically assumed to increase the probability of migration. In
fact, several empirical studies for the US and the UK ﬁnd higher migration propensities for
unemployed compared to employed individuals (Herzog and Schlottmann, 1984; Pissarides
and Wadsworth, 1989; Jackman and Savouri, 1992; Bailey, 1993). The unemployment com-
pensation and welfare system, on the other hand, might increase the costs of migration by
increasing the returns to staying unemployed in the place of residence and might thus gen-
erate an obstacle to mobility for unemployed beneﬁt recipients (Hassler et al., 2005). In line
with this notion, a Spanish study by Antolin and Bover (1997) indicates lower mobility levels
among unemployed beneﬁt recipients than among non-recipients. In addition to composi-
tional eﬀects, lower mobility levels for job movers after an unemployment period in Figure
0.1 may thus also reﬂect the disincentive eﬀect of the unemployment compensation system
because this group diﬀers from direct job movers by the previous receipt of unemployment
compensation.
Other institutional factors that may be considered to shape individual migration propen-
sities and to aﬀect diﬀerent labour segments to a varying extent are, for example, active
labour market policies, housing policies, and collective wage bargaining. Participating in ac-
tive labour market programs, for example, might enable individuals to postpone migration.
An extensive local supply of such programs may thus result in a regional locking-in eﬀect
(Frederiksson, 1999; Westerlund, 1998), especially among those for whom such programs are
an attractive substitute for regular employment. Moreover, individuals may be quite diﬀer-
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ently aﬀected by housing policies. For homeowners, transaction costs in housing markets and
possible capital losses have been associated with increasing migration costs and thus lower
mobility levels among homeowners (van Ommeren, 1996; Henley, 1998; Barcelo, 2003). For
individuals at the fringe of the labour market, however, social housing may be more relevant
as a barrier to mobility because access to social housing may not be easily moved from one
region to the other. Empirical studies conﬁrm such disincentive eﬀects of social housing for
several European countries (Gardner et al., 2001; Barcelo, 2003). In addition, interregional
wage disparities are likely to be small if central wage bargaining restricts the scope for local
wage agreements (OECD, 2004). Such wage rigidities limit the returns to migration with
respect to potential wage gains and thus conﬁne migration. The resulting disincentives to
migration should, however, be less severe for high-skilled individuals who are more likely to
earn an income outside the collective wage agreement.
Institutional factors may thus have a varying impact on diﬀerent segments of the labour
market. If the unemployment compensation and welfare system, for example, proves to be
an obstacle to interregional mobility, this obstacle should be more pronounced for labour
market segments which are highly dependent on transfer payments. Institutional factors may
thus be partially responsible for the relatively low responsiveness of less-skilled individuals to
regional shocks in Spain compared to their high-skilled counterparts (Mauro and Spilimbergo,
1999). Moreover, institutional cross-country diﬀerences may then provide one explanation
why migration rates across skill groups diﬀer across countries. Figure 0.2 shows internal
migration rates by educational attainment for several OECD countries. Note that Figure
0.2 displays migration rates among the total population aged 15 to 64, while Figure 0.1
only referred to job movers. Since job movers are likely to be a relatively selective and
geographically mobile group, this may explain the much higher share of interregional moves
in Figure 0.1 as compared to Figure 0.2. Still, Figure 0.2 again conﬁrms the lower level
of geographic mobility among less-skilled individuals. Moreover, low-skilled individuals in
Europe seem to be even less mobile compared to their high-skilled counterparts than in the
US. Such diﬀerences may reﬂect institutional cross-country diﬀerences not only in the labour
market, but also, for example, in housing policies.
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Source: OECD (2005:94)
Note: Residential change refers to NUTS2 level for European countries and to the state level for the US.
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Figure 0.2: Proportion of persons aged 15-64 who changed residence in 2003
Removing institutional barriers to mobility in order to promote geographic mobility,
however, can never be an end in itself because a higher level of interregional mobility may
also result in welfare losses that need to be taken into account. First of all, social costs from
a higher level of geographic mobility may arise due to a weakening of family and friendship
ties that aggravates the informal organisation of the care for the elderly as well as child care
and may thus also be related to lower fertility levels. Secondly, rising rents in prospering
regions that attract net inward migration may result in a displacement of socially weaker
groups which may intensify social tensions (Heye and Odermatt, 2006). Another negative
consequence of geographic mobility are the induced adjustment costs as the provision of
public goods such as schools, hospitals, public transport etc. needs to be adjusted to a
changed level and composition of local residents. As an example, the continued net loss of
population in eastern Germany necessitates a downsizing of public spending on schools and
public transport as well as a dismantling of vacant housing space (IWH, 2006). Moreover, the
negative selection of those remaining in depressed regions in terms of qualiﬁcation and age
may undermine the future growth potential of a region. This is because the local availability
of a large pool of qualiﬁed workers is vital for regional innovation and thus the endogenous
growth potential of the region (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990). Therefore, even if migration goes
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from high to low unemployment regions and from low to high wage regions, migration need
not necessarily reduce regional disparities as postulated by the neo-classical model. Instead,
the composition of net migration ﬂows in terms of qualiﬁcation and other productivity related
characteristics may strongly inﬂuence whether migration contributes to regional convergence
or rather fosters regional divergence.
The objective of this thesis thus is a twofold. On the one hand, the aim is to shed light on
the determinants of mobility for heterogeneous labour market segments in order to identify
the scope for increasing geographic mobility in Germany. In particular, the thesis focuses on
the determinants of mobility of unemployed individuals because the willingness and ability of
this labour market segment to seek employment elsewhere is of central concern if migration
is to contribute to reducing regional disparities and increasing employment levels. A major
part of this thesis thus looks at the responsiveness of unemployed individuals to regional
labour market conditions and the incentives and disincentives to mobility caused by labour
market institutions such as active and passive labour market policies. The aim is to identify
possible barriers to mobility which may explain the observed low mobility level in Germany,
especially among even less mobile low-skilled unemployed. In addition, another objective
of this thesis is to examine the determinants of the skill composition of migration ﬂows in
Germany. By doing so, the thesis identiﬁes the scope for shaping the selectivity of migration
and thus shows ways how to support the convergent rather than the divergent character of
geographic mobility. It thus provides insights on how to mitigate one possible drawback of
a higher level of geographic mobility.
The theoretical foundation for these analyses mainly comes from two approaches to the
microeconomics of migration. On the one hand, assuming individuals to be heterogeneous
optimisers of their future expected gains is clearly informed by the human capital model
of migration. On the other hand, search theory provides another important theoretical
foundation for the analyses presented in the following chapters. In particular, individuals are
not assumed to have perfect information on all possible job alternatives. Instead, individuals
have to search for jobs by deciding on the optimal spatial search strategy (Herzog et al., 1993).
Both of these theoretical frameworks echo through this thesis.
The thesis consists of ﬁve separate papers, partially written with co-authors. The micro
data used for the subsequent empirical analysis of individual mobility behaviour are the
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IAB employment subsamples regional ﬁles 1975-1997 and 1975-2001 (see 2.3 and 5.3 for
details) as well as the Integrated Employment Biographies V.1 (see 3.4 for details). All
these administrative data allow for a reconstruction of individual employment histories on
a daily basis including information on the workplace location and thus geographic mobility.
This information and the size of the data representing 1-2.2% of the population working in
a socially insured job provide a data base that is well-suited for the analysis of individual
mobility behaviour even for rather small sub-groups of the labour force. One problem that is
common to all these micro data, however, is that workplace locations are coded at the level
of microcensus regions while major labour market attributes that need to be combined with
the micro data for the subsequent analyses are coded at the level of employment agency
districts. Since these two sets of regions are geographically incompatible, i.e. one set of
regions does not in general respect the boundaries of the other set and the two sets are not
nested hierarchically, an appropriate interpolation technique is needed in order to transfer
attributes from employment agency districts to counties and vice versa. Paper (1) presents
a solution to this areal interpolation problem. In particular, paper (1) considers diﬀerent
cartographic interpolation methods such as simple area weighting and dasymetric weighting
both of which are based on estimated intersection areas. The preparatory work in paper (1)
thus builds up a data base for the following empirical papers that combines the micro data
with interpolated region-speciﬁc attributes.
The next three papers focus on the determinants of mobility for unemployed individuals
and examine the responsiveness of unemployed individuals to regional labour market con-
ditions. Since labour market institutions3 such as the unemployment compensation system
are likely to aﬀect mobility decisions of unemployed jobseekers, papers (2) to (4) also explore
to what extent such institutions create barriers to mobility for this labour market segment.
Paper (2) examines mobility decisions of unemployed individuals in western Germany
between 1983 and 1997. Based on a job search model with multiple regional labour markets,
this paper investigates whether unemployed individuals in western Germany choose search
strategies that favour migration away from depressed regions. Moreover, the paper also
looks at the responsiveness to local labour market conditions among diﬀerent labour market
3Since the empirical results in this thesis have all been obtained for a period prior to the latest Hartz
reforms, labour market policies refer to the previous institutional setting.
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segments such as low-skilled and skilled individuals and takes account of some passive and
active labour market institutions that may aﬀect individual mobility decisions. The empir-
ical analysis uses a competing-risk hazard framework of exiting unemployment to jobs in
a local or a distant labour market area. Estimation results are obtained from a stratiﬁed
Cox proportional hazard model that allows for region-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. This approach
reduces biases due to unobserved regional heterogeneity (e.g. unobserved regional amenities)
that aﬀects both the migratory behaviour of jobseekers and the regional conditions of in-
terest. Estimates based on this stratiﬁed approach indicate that at least high-skilled men
are responsive to local labour market conditions and have higher migration probabilities in
regions with unfavourable re-employment opportunities. By contrast, women and low-skilled
men tend to stay in regions despite relatively unfavourable job-ﬁnding prospects and are thus
more dependent on local labour market conditions. The results also indicate that passive
labour market measures seem to be an important determinant of the migratory behaviour of
unemployed jobseekers. In particular, long entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts strongly
reduce mobility among all jobseekers. By contrast, an extensive local supply of work creation
schemes only seems to have a weak regional locking-in eﬀect on women. The interpretability
of this latter ﬁnding is, however, limited since the micro data does not allow for distinguish-
ing exits to the regular labour market from exits to subsidised employment in the context
of those labour market programs.
In several respects, paper (3) supplements the previous paper. Based on the latest gen-
eration of German administrative micro data, regular employment can now be distinguished
from subsidised employment in the context of a labour market program (e.g. work creation
schemes). Compared to the previous paper, paper (3) thus extends the competing risk set
to also include exits to subsidised employment. The objective then is to explore the main
determinants of the length of unemployment and to disentangle the relevance of individual,
regional and institutional factors for exiting unemployment to one of the three competing
exit states. In particular, the paper provides evidence about the extent to which passive
and active labour market policies as well as local economic conditions and job counselling
activities aﬀect the duration of unemployment and the resulting labour market state. Paper
(3) thus diﬀers from paper (2) not only with regard to the set of competing risks, but also
explores the impact of a broader set of regional and institutional factors on the unemploy-
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ment experiences of individuals not only in western, but also in eastern Germany between
2000 and 2004. Moreover, the paper draws speciﬁc attention to unemployment experiences
of individuals with low pre-unemployment wages because this group is likely to be less mo-
bile and to experience a prolonged unemployment period. Distinguishing between regular
and subsidised employment reveals that subsidised employment often cushions unfavourable
local labour market conditions for less mobile labour market segments such as married men
and low-earning individuals whereas well-earning singles rather experience higher migra-
tion levels. In line with the previous paper, there is again signiﬁcant evidence that long
entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts prolong the duration of unemployment and reduce
migration, especially among well-earning unemployed for whom exhausting unemployment
beneﬁts entails some major reductions in transfer receipt. By contrast, other institutional
factors such as active labour market programs and local job placement activities only seem
to have a minor impact.
The previous two papers point towards the role of passive labour market measures in
aﬀecting labour market outcomes of unemployed jobseekers. Long entitlements to unem-
ployment beneﬁts (UB) have been found to prolong unemployment and reduce migration.
Interpreting these ﬁndings as a causal relationship may be misleading, however, if the results
are partially driven by unobserved factors of the working history that determine individual
UB entitlements and also aﬀect individual job-ﬁnding chances. Paper (4) thus re-examines
the eﬀect of unemployment compensation on the migratory behaviour of unemployed job-
seekers by using variation in the length of entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts from a
natural experiment that is provided by a labour market reform in 1997. By comparing
transitions to local and non-local employment in a pre-reform and post-reform period for a
treatment group whose UB entitlements have been cut after 1997 to a control group whose
UB entitlements have been left unaﬀected, it is possible to identify the causal eﬀect of unem-
ployment beneﬁts on migration under reasonable assumptions. As a major contribution to
the literature, paper (4) presents an approach how to analyse treatment eﬀects on competing
failure types in the case of partially missing information on the latent failure times. Par-
tially missing information occurs because unobserved periods in an individual’s employment
record in the German administrative data result in incomplete knowledge concerning the
duration until leaving unemployment to competing failure types such as self-employment or
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leaving the labour force. In the context of dependent competing failure types, bounds for
the treatment eﬀect on the marginal survivor curves may be biased. The paper thus pro-
poses a non-parametric bounds analysis of risk-speciﬁc cumulative incidence curves (CIC) to
bound the treatment eﬀect on the CIC over diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the latent durations. Al-
though this approach does not resolve the non-identiﬁability of competing risks, it provides
a generally applicable and ﬂexible descriptive tool for the observed distribution of competing
failures in the case of dependent competing risks. For high-skilled individuals, for whom the
threat of entitlement loss due to the 1997 reform is likely to be largest, the bounds for the
cumulative incidence of migration are indicative for the mobility-reducing eﬀect of exten-
sive UB receipt. A relatively generous unemployment compensation in Germany may thus
contribute to lower migration levels in Germany as compared with, for example, the US.
The analysis of the migratory behaviour of unemployed jobseekers provides some insights
into the responsiveness of this labour market segment to regional disparities as well as the
barriers stemming from certain labour market institutions. Papers (2) to (4) thus help in
identifying the scope for policy makers to shape mobility levels and to realise some of the
aforementioned welfare gains from a higher level of mobility. As has previously been dis-
cussed, identifying the scope for increasing geographic mobility is only one important aspect
to look at that needs to be complemented by an assessment of its negative consequences and
possible ways to cushion them. The last paper, paper (5), thus wants to shed light on how
to mitigate one particular downside of geographic mobility, namely the possibly divergent
eﬀect of internal migration on the regional system. In the German context, the net migration
of high-skilled individuals from eastern to western Germany raises strong concerns that a
brain drain from eastern to western Germany may undermine the future growth potential
of eastern Germany and may thus reinforce regional east-west disparities. Paper (5) thus
looks at the factors that determine the skill composition of internal job matching ﬂows in
Germany. For this purpose, the analysis examines destination choices of heterogeneous skill
groups. Moreover, the paper investigates whether diﬀerent destination choices of direct job-
to-job changers and job changers after an unemployment period contribute to the observed
spatial job matching pattern by skill group. Based on a sample of job moves between 1995
and 2001, estimates are derived from a nested logit model that takes account of unobserved
interregional heterogeneity. The ﬁndings indicate that spatial job matching patterns by high-
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skilled individuals are mainly driven by interregional income diﬀerentials, while interregional
job matches by less-skilled individuals are mainly aﬀected by interregional diﬀerentials in
job-ﬁnding opportunities. Interregional amenity diﬀerentials only weakly contribute to spa-
tial sorting processes in Germany. Such diﬀerences in destination choices by skill level seem
to be partly modiﬁed by diﬀerent spatial patterns of job-to-job matches and job matches
after unemployment. A simulated economic convergence between eastern and western Ger-
many demonstrates that higher wage levels are the most eﬀective means of attracting human
capital to eastern Germany, but that the net loss of population can only be reversed by lower
unemployment rates. If maintaining the future viability of eastern Germany is a pronounced
policy objective, the ﬁndings thus advocate policies that foster wage convergence without
further increasing eastern unemployment levels. Paper (5) thus provides insights on how
policy can promote integration and convergence between eastern and western Germany.
Finally, the last section of this thesis contains a number of concluding remarks and an
outlook on future research needs.
Chapter 1
An Application of Cartographic Area
Interpolation to German
Administrative Data
joint with Ralf A. Wilke1
Abstract
In many situations the applied researcher wishes to combine diﬀerent data sources without
knowing the exact link and merging rule. This paper considers diﬀerent cartographic in-
terpolation methods for interpolating attributes from German employment agency districts
to German counties and vice versa. In particular, we apply dasymetric mapping as an al-
ternative to simple area weighting both of which are based on estimated intersection areas.
We also present conditions under which the choice of interpolation method does not matter
and conﬁrm the theoretical results with a simulation study. Our application to German
administrative data suggests robustness of estimation results of interpolated attributes with
respect to the choice of interpolation method. We provide weighting matrices for regional
data sources of the two largest German data producers.
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1.1 Introduction
With growing interest in research on the eﬀects of recent German labour market reforms, re-
searchers from both economics and social sciences alike have been increasingly concerned with
combining information from diﬀerent administrative data sources. In particular, researchers
intend to combine information collected by the Federal Statistical Bureau (Statistisches
Bundesamt) which is coded at the level of German counties with data from the Federal
Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit) which is reported for employment agency
districts. Yet, the two sets of regions are geographically incompatible, i.e. one set of regions
does not in general respect the boundaries of the other set and the two sets are not nested
hierarchically. Hence, what is needed is an appropriate interpolation technique in order to
transfer attributes from employment agency districts to counties and vice versa. The purpose
of this paper is to provide a solution to this areal interpolation problem that may facilitate
research based on data from both data sources in Germany.
In the geostatistics literature, interpolation techniques are always necessary if the spatial
support of an attribute, i.e. its association with space, needs to be transformed to another
spatial support. Depending on the type of spatial support involved, areas or points, the
solution to this change of support problem (COSP) involves diﬀerent spatial interpolation
techniques.2 If changing the support involves attributes that have been aggregated to a
particular set of regions, interpolation methods have to solve the modiﬁable areal unit prob-
lem (MAUP). The MAUP arises because there is some arbitrariness in delineating regions
and inference based on aggregated data depends on the level of aggregation and the group-
ing (zoning) of attributes (Openshaw and Taylor, 1981). Arbitrary zoning systems are often
used by agencies for collecting and reporting socioeconomic data. Examples of such arbitrary
zoning systems include German counties and employment agency districts in the case of the
Federal Statistical Bureau and the Federal Employment Agency. Since the disaggregated
data underlying the aggregated data are not available, a solution to changing the support
from one of these zoning systems to the other (area-area COSP) necessitates a solution to
the MAUP. In the literature, there are two distinct approaches to solving this problem:
surface-oriented methods and cartographic methods.
2See Arbia (1989) and Gotway and Young (2002) for a description of the COSP and a review of diﬀerent
interpolation techniques.
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Surface-oriented methods aim at a spatial smoothing of the aggregated data in order to
re-construct the underlying disaggregated distribution of the attribute. For this purpose,
Tobler (1979) proposes the so called smooth pycnophylactic interpolation. This method
minimises curvature on the surface under the constraint that data from a source region can
only be allocated to an intersecting target region (”pycnophylactic criterion”). Alternatively,
inverse distance weighting uses a distance-decay weighting function for known values at
centroids in order to interpolate attributes to unobserved positions (Bracken and Martin,
1989; Bracken, 1993, 1994). Kriging may also form part of the solution to the COSP by
predicting attributes at unobserved positions based on an empirical semivariogram that
gives the spatial autocorrelation between observed values (Cressie, 1993; Gotway and Young,
2002). All of these methods estimate a continuous surface representation from attributes that
are known only for some source region and thus allow for calculating target area attributes
by integrating this smoothed estimate over the target area. Since the resulting target values
are based upon the underlying disaggregated distribution of the attribute, this approach
solves the MAUP of the area-area COSP. Smoothing methods do, however, critically rely on
knowing the central location of the source area and an adequate spreading function.
Cartographic approaches to the area-area COSP exploit information on the overlap of
source and target areas to arrive at target area estimates. In the case of simple area weighting,
attributes for target areas are estimated based on the intersection of source and target areas
by assuming a uniform distribution of the attribute in the source zone (Goodchild and
Lam, 1980). Simple area weighting thus solves the MAUP by reconstructing the underlying
disaggregated distribution of the interpolated attribute based on a homogeneity assumption.
Since this assumption is not always plausible, intelligent interpolation methods such as
dasymetric mapping and statistical regression modelling have been proposed. Contrary to
simple area weighting, these interpolation methods relax the homogeneity assumption by
using auxiliary information on the source, target or some control zones, but still assume an
even distribution within some subzones.
Dasymetric mapping or dasymetric weighting uses auxiliary information such as satellite
images of populated and unpopulated areas to reﬁne density estimates within the regions be-
fore allocating attributes to the target regions (Fisher and Langford, 1995). As an extension
to this binary approach, it is also possible to distinguish more than two types of land use.
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In this case, dasymetric mapping is only straightforward if the densities of diﬀerent land
use classes are known or somehow pre-deﬁned (Eicher and Brewer, 2001). Alternatively,
statistical regression modelling has been proposed to derive population density estimates
for sub-regions by regressing the population of the source region on the diﬀerent areas of
land use (Flowerdew and Green, 1989; Langford et al., 1991; Yuan et al., 1997). Instead of
using auxiliary information on the source or target region, Goodchild et al. (1993) develop a
more general approach by using an external set of control zones for which uniform densities
can be assumed. In a ﬁrst step, control zone densities are estimated in a way similar to
the procedure described by Flowerdew and Green (1989). In a second step, the estimated
control zone densities are used to estimate target zone densities.
Approaches based on regression techniques all have to deal with a number of estimation
issues such as the required non-negativity of estimated densities and the need to meet the py-
cnophylactic criterion. Moreover, count data such as population (”spatially extensive data”)
and proportional data such as average income or unemployment rates (”spatially intensive
data”) have to be treated diﬀerently (Goodchild and Lam, 1980). For spatially extensive
data, Poisson regression has been proposed (Flowerdew and Green, 1989) as an alternative to
constrained OLS regression (Judge and Yancey, 1986). In particular, Flowerdew and Green
(1989) suggest an iterative Poisson regression using an EM algorithm to derive target area
estimates. While this approach was ﬁrst developed for spatially extensive data and binary
auxiliary information only, extensions to continuous auxiliary data and spatially intensive
data followed (Flowerdew and Green, 1992). Recently, Bayesian hierarchical models have
been used to model Poisson responses with covariates that are spatially misaligned and thus
unknown. Unlike the earlier approaches, the Bayesian approach allows for full inference of
the distributions of estimated target zone attributes (Mugglin and Carlin, 1998; Mugglin et
al., 2000; Best et al., 2000).
To sum up, ever more sophisticated methods have been applied to deal with the areal
interpolation problem and to reduce the error involved in any interpolation exercise. Several
authors have addressed the reliability of diﬀerent methods and typically conclude that simple
area weighting performs poorly compared with more sophisticated methods such as dasy-
metric mapping using regression frameworks (Goodchild et al., 1993; Fisher and Langford,
1995). Moreover, Fisher and Langford (1995) ﬁnd some evidence that dasymetric approaches
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may even yield better results than more elaborate methods based on statistical regression
modelling. One reason for this latter ﬁnding may be that regression models ﬁt global es-
timates that do not take into account the spatial heterogeneity in the link between the
auxiliary information such as land-use type and the interpolated attribute. Thus, localised
dasymetric mapping may perform better than more sophisticated methods and are typically
easier to implement.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a solution to the areal interpolation problem
between German counties and German employment agency districts. As a contribution to
the areal interpolation literature, this paper considers an extended variant of dasymetric
mapping that uses information on a local control variable that is available for both source
and target region and that does not necessitate the use of regression techniques in order
to arrive at reﬁned estimates for target areas. We compare this dasymetric approach to
simple area weighting as proposed by Goodchild and Lam (1980). Surprisingly, target area
attributes for both interpolation methods are remarkably similar when interpolating data
from German employment agency districts to German counties. We therefore introduce the
concepts of local homogeneity and local similarity to explain this ﬁnding. Due to a high
degree of local homogeneity and similarity, the choice of interpolation method does not have
much inﬂuence on interpolated attributes for German counties. Thus, from a practitioner’s
point of view, even simple naive weighting seems a feasible solution in this speciﬁc case. A
sensitivity analysis of the use of interpolated attributes as covariates in an economic analysis
conﬁrms that estimation results are not strongly aﬀected by the choice of interpolation
method.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents the framework for areal interpo-
lation and suggests several interpolation methods. This section also derives conditions under
which the choice of interpolation method does not have much inﬂuence on interpolated at-
tributes. Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we demonstrate the eﬀect of such conditions on
the proposed methods of interpolation. Section 1.3 contains the application to German coun-
ties and employment agency districts including a sensitivity analysis. Section 1.4 summarises
the main ﬁndings.
CHAPTER 1. AREA INTERPOLATION 27
1.2 A framework for area interpolation
This section considers several cartographic areal interpolation methods for transferring at-
tributes from a source to a target region and presents a simulation study in order to inves-
tigate the performance of the suggested methods in real world situations.
1.2.1 Polygon overlay and spurious polygons
Suppose we have two maps and each map contains a diﬀerent disjoint regional classiﬁcation
of the same country. Denote {Dj}j=1,...,n and {Ri}i=1,...,m as two sequences of disjoint regions
which are the elements of the two regional classiﬁcations. Let us denote µ as a measure of
land area with the usual properties3. In an application the areas of intersection between Dj
and Ri (µ(Dj ∩ Ri)) are typically unknown and have to be estimated by intersecting the
two maps with a GIS procedure called vector polygon overlay based on the GIS software
package ArcView. Some of the resulting intersection polygons are, however, likely to be
spurious. Such spurious polygons result from polygon overlay if boundaries between the two
regional layers are coincident in reality, but diverge due to digitising errors or diﬀerences in
cartographic generalisation.4 In this case - see Figure 1.1 - τ+j is an area which is misleadingly
assigned to region Dj. τ
−
i is a part of Dj which is misleadingly assigned to another region
Di. For simplicity, we assume absence of spurious polygons on the border of Ri.
Figure 1.1: Map generalisation and spurious polygons
In order to avoid such spurious polygons in the ﬁnal map after polygon overlay, such
slivers can, for example, be removed by either adding these slivers to the adjacent areas on
3See for example deﬁnition 4.1. in Elstrodt (1999).
4See Veregin (1989) and Chrisman (1989) for a discussion of error sources in map overlay. Recently, there
has been some work on introducing general frameworks for error analysis in measurement-based GIS. See
Goodchild (2004) for a motivation and Leung, Ma and Goodchild (2004) for a theoretical model.
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a random basis or by connecting the end points of these slivers and dissolving the spurious
polygon at both sides (Burrough, 1996). For the purpose of areal interpolation, spurious
polygons have typically been neglected by erasing any entries in the intersection matrix below
an arbitrary threshold. Due to the arbitrariness of this approach, we decided to keep spurious
polygons since these spurious entries should leave the resulting interpolation unaﬀected as
long as the induced measurement error is random and thus balances out. This should be the
case if the error in digitised lines does not result from a misregistration that creates a uniform
shift in the location of every point in the map, but instead is rather due to the uncertainty
involved in hand digitising or diﬀerences in the degree of generalisation. Moreover, in most
applications, the partitioning of the regions into sub-regions as a result of the intersection
between Di’s and Rj’s does not systematically depend on the topology of the border lines.
In the real world this is because border lines between sub-regions are typically established on
the basis of administrative considerations. For this reason, digitising errors, which are more
severe when digitising complex curves than straight lines, should not introduce a systematic
error component to the areal interpolation. For the exposition of the following framework of
areal interpolation, we therefore assume that the induced measurement error is random and
balances out, i.e. µ(τ−j ∩Ri) ≈ µ(τ+j ∩Ri) for all i, j. This implies µˆ(Di ∩Rj) ≈ µ(Di ∩Rj)
with µˆ(Di ∩ Rj) as an estimate of the true intersection µ(Di ∩ Rj). This also requires that
there is only a minor misregistration error.
1.2.2 Cartographic interpolation methods
Without loss of generality, let us now consider diﬀerent interpolation methods for transfer-
ring attributes from Dj, the source region, to Ri, the target region.
5 For this purpose, car-
tographic interpolation methods require weighting matrices that may be constructed based
on the available estimates of areas µˆ(Dj), µˆ(Ri) and µˆ(Ri ∩ Dj). Note that there are two
diﬀerent kinds of attributes which have to be treated diﬀerently, i.e. for which diﬀerent
weighting matrices need to be used: frequencies (F), i.e. spatially extensive data, such as the
number of job vacancies, participants in certain employment policies etc. and proportions
(P), i.e. spatially intensive data, such as an unemployment rate.6
5Note that the opposite case is not considered but that our framework directly carries over.
6Goodchild and Lam (1980) introduced the terms spatially extensive data for frequencies and spatially
intensive data for proportions in the context of areal interpolation.
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Let us denote fi,j and pi,j as weights with the usual properties: fi,j and pi,j ≥ 0,
∑
i fi,j =
1 and
∑
j pi,j = 1 for all i, j. The general rule for interpolating data from Dj to Ri is
FRi =
∑
j
FDjfi,j for i = 1, . . . , n
where fi,j is an appropriate weight for frequency FDj , j = 1, . . . ,m and
PRi =
∑
j
PDjpi,j for i = 1, . . . , n
where pi,j is an appropriate weight for proportion PDj , j = 1, . . . ,m. Depending on the
underlying assumptions, there are several ways in which the weights fi,j and pi,j can be
constructed. Apart from simple area weights, we focus here on two alternative approaches:
naive binary weights7 and some special form of dasymetric mapping (or dasymetric weight-
ing) that reﬁnes the simple area weights by using an auxiliary variable such as the population
density that is known for both source and target regions.
Naive binary weights
When interpolating proportions we allocate a weight of one to region Dj that shares the
largest common area with Ri among all other intersecting regions. Thus,
pi,j =


1 if µ(Ri ∩Dj) = supDlµ(Ri ∩Dl)
0 otherwise
for all i, j. These binary weights may be considered as a rule of thumb and can be obtained
by simple visual inspection. They are a crude approximation and only yield reliable results
if the attribute of the largest intersection area is representative for the entire target area. We
include this naive binary weighting despite the much more sophisticated methods available
because this rule of thumb is still being used by practitioners who are not familiar with
the areal interpolation literature. Therefore, it is worthwhile to compare these weights to
more sophisticated methods for our application to German counties and employment agency
districts. Note that these binary weights cannot be used for the interpolation of frequencies
because they typically violate the pycnophylactic constraint.
7These weights are also considered by Goodchild and Lam (1980), see their equation (13).
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Naive weights can be estimated by replacing the true area sizes µ with their empirical
counterparts µˆ, i.e.
pˆi,j =


1 if µˆ(Ri ∩Dj) = supDlµˆ(Ri ∩Dl)
0 otherwise.
(1.1)
for all i, j. This estimator yields the true pi,j if the ordering of the µˆ(Ri ∩Dj) is same as for
µ(Ri∩Dj), i.e. diﬀerences in size of the intersection areas are greater than the measurement
errors. If the maps are precise, this condition is likely to hold. Furthermore we assume for
a given i that supDlµˆ(Ri ∩Dl) is only attained for one Dl, i.e. for each Ri the intersection
areas with Dl have diﬀerent sizes if they are positive.
Simple area weighting
Following the proposed method by Goodchild and Lam (1980), simple area weighting assumes
a homogeneous source zone density. Under this assumption, the simple area weights can be
written as
fi,j =
µ(Ri ∩Dj)
µ(Dj)
for all i, j
in the case of frequencies and as
pi,j =
µ(Ri ∩Dj)
µ(Ri)
for all i, j
in the case of proportions using information on the intersection and area size of Ri and
Dj only. Simple area weights can be estimated by replacing the true area sizes with their
empirical counterparts:
fˆi,j =
µˆ(Ri ∩Dj)∑
i µˆ(Ri ∩Dj)
, (1.2)
for all i, j and for pˆi,j analogously. If all µˆ(Ri∩Dj) are almost their theoretical counterparts,
it will likely give a precise estimate of the true value. In an application, however, fˆi,j may
be aﬀected by the random measurement error of the map intersection.
Dasymetric mapping with local control variable
As a special form of dasymetric mapping, simple area weights can be reﬁned by using a
region-speciﬁc attribute that is known for source or target regions. Denote this control at-
tribute as SRi and SDj . Under the assumption that the spatial distribution of this known
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control attribute is highly positively correlated to the spatial distribution of the attribute
to be interpolated to the target areas, one can use this information to re-estimate attribute
densities of the intersection areas between source and target area. Thus, instead of assuming
homogeneous source zone densities, we only assume a homogeneous density for intersection
areas. In an application, one may use any known region-speciﬁc information that is highly
positively correlated to the attributes to be interpolated. When using population, for exam-
ple, SRi should be spatially intensive, i.e. SRi = pop(Ri)/µ(Ri) where pop(Ri) is the number
of individuals in µ(Ri). For frequencies we suggest
fi,j =
µ(Ri ∩Dj)SRi∑
i µ(Ri ∩Dj)SRi
for all i, j
with an appropriately deﬁned SRi . For the merger of proportions we suggest
pi,j =
µ(Ri ∩Dj)SDj∑
j µ(Ri ∩Dj)SDj
for all i, j
with an appropriately deﬁned SDj . These weights include the special case in which the
region-speciﬁc variable does not contain any information, i.e. SRi = SR or SDj = SD for all
i, j. In this case, the information is uniformly distributed across area space8 and the weights
simplify to the simple area weights by Goodchild and Lam (1980). Assuming SRi and SDj
to be known numbers, dasymetric weights can be estimated similar to simple area weights
by replacing the true area sizes with their empirical counterparts and, again, if spurious
polygons are of minor importance, the estimates will be precise.
1.2.3 Misspeciﬁcation of area interpolation
Area interpolation based on the proposed weighting schemes may not only be aﬀected by the
random measurement error induced by the polygon overlay. The construction of weights,
i.e. interpolation method itself, may be misspeciﬁed if underlying assumptions do not hold.
In particular, naive weights are misspeciﬁed unless there is a homogeneity of the attribute to
be interpolated across all source zones that intersect with the target region. Somewhat less
restrictive, simple area weighting assumes a uniform density distribution within the source
region while dasymetric weights assume a uniform density distribution within the intersection
areas. Clearly, none of the proposed interpolation methods needs to be appropriate if there
8For a given region i this requirement could be relaxed since it is only necessary that SRi does not vary
in the neighbourhood of i.
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is further local heterogeneity within the source or intersection regions. Among the proposed
interpolation methods, dasymetric weighting should yield the least misspeciﬁed interpolation
results. The question thus arises under which conditions misspeciﬁcations implied by naive
binary weighting and simple area weighting result in large diﬀerences between the estimated
frequencies FRi and proportions PRi across interpolation methods and under which conditions
all methods yield very similar results. For this purpose, we introduce the concept of local
homogeneity and global heterogeneity with respect to information S.
Deﬁnition 1: Local homogeneity with respect to information contained in Si induces that
Si ≈ Sj for all i and all j in the direct neighbourhood of i.
Deﬁnition 2: Global c−heterogeneity corresponds to
supi infj |Si − Sj| ≤ c
for all regions i and all regions j in the direct neighbourhood of i and any c ≥ 0.
It is then evident that a small c implies local homogeneity for all regions i. Having this
in mind, it is easy to show that local homogeneity implies that simple area weighting and
dasymetric weighting using the auxiliary information S yield very similar results.
Deﬁnition 3: Similarity of the regional entities Ri and Dj is deﬁned by
supRi|µ(Ri)− supDjµ(Ri ∩Dj)| < 
for all i, j and any  > 0.
Similarity of the regional entities suggests that weights are similar across all weighting
schemes. Clearly, if for all intersections i, j there is one large intersection that almost com-
pletely covers the reference region, diﬀerences between the interpolation methods tend to be
small. In practice, a combination of local homogeneity and similarity of the two regional
entities may yield very similar results for all interpolation methods and should also mitigate
any remaining misspeciﬁcation of the dasymetric approach.
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1.2.4 Monte Carlo Evidence
It is interesting to examine the performance of naive and simple area weights as compared
with dasymetric weights in the case of varying c-heterogeneity of the auxiliary information
S and in case of varying similarity of regional entities.9 For this reason, we perform a
series of simulations for the prediction of proportion PR. In order to make the simulation
results comparable with our application in the following section, we use the same regional
classiﬁcation here for R and D. The number of sets Ri and Dj and the set of intersections
is therefore identical to the empirical framework.10 The remaining simulation framework is
chosen as follows:
• We consider two diﬀerent scenarios for the similarity of regional entities:
– a) maximum dissimilarity of regional entities conditional on the set of intersec-
tions. This implies equal intersection areas for a given Ri, i.e. µ(Ri ∩ Dj) =
µ(Ri ∩ Dl) for all l s.t. µ(Ri ∩ Dl) > 0, while we randomly add a very small
number to one of the intersection areas such that one intersection area is largest.
– b) the intersection areas of our empirical framework. The two regional entities
are similar and in many cases (80%) one single intersection area covers more than
95% of the target area.
• PD ∼ U [5, 25] is an independently drawn random variable from a uniform distribution,
i.e. no autocorrelation in PDj .
• SD is drawn according to three diﬀerent designs of spatial autocorrelation:
– i) SD = 1, i.e. no variation in the region-speciﬁc information.
– ii) SD is drawn element by element from U [5, 25]. If there is already a SD assigned
to the direct neighbourhood of SDi we compute SDi = 0.2Di + S¯Di , where D ∼
U [−10, 10] and S¯Di is the average over all neighbouring and already assigned SDi .
This simulation design induces a weak positive spatial autocorrelation.11
9See also Fisher and Langford (1995) for an extensive Monte Carlo study for the comparison of diﬀerent
weighting schemes using data derived from a part of Leicestershire, England.
10In fact, we restrict the simulations to the case of western Germany. There are 327 target regions Ri and
635 source regions Di. For further details see the application in the subsequent section.
11A Moran’s I statistic conﬁrms signiﬁcant clustering of similar values of the region-speciﬁc information
SDi .
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– iii) SD ∼ U [5, 25], random variation in the region-speciﬁc information.
Simulation designs i-iii allow for evaluating the relevance of the information SD in an ap-
plication. While we also vary the degree of similarity of regional entities, we keep the
distribution of PD constant over all designs. Since PD is drawn independently, we consider
here a framework without spatial autocorrelation in the source variable. In the case of spa-
tial autocorrelation in the regional data that needs to be interpolated (PD) and a very high
degree of similarity of the regional entities, all three interpolation methods produce similar
results.12 Simulation results are presented in Table 1.1 where we relate the interpolated
target variable, denoted by PˆR, using naive or simple area weights to the benchmark inter-
polation of PR using dasymetric weights. We assume that the latter is also the true value of
the target variable. Any biases and higher moments of the distribution are therefore due to
the misspeciﬁcation of the weighting schemes compared with dasymetric weighting.
As expected, Table 1.1 conﬁrms that naive binary weighting performs worst in our simula-
tion framework. It has the greatest bias and the largest standard deviation in all cases. This
suggests that similarity of regional entities alone does not suﬃce to make naive weighting a
comparably reliable alternative. We also observe that ignoring region-speciﬁc control vari-
ables in the case of simple area weighting biases results and the variance increases slightly
(see ii) and iii)), especially if regional entities are dissimilar (see a)). Moreover, the mis-
speciﬁcation is more severe in the case of a random variation in S (iii) than in the case of
spatial autocorrelation (ii), i.e. less c-heterogeneity. In the case of similar regional entities
and spatial autocorrelation of S (see b)ii)), the bias almost disappears. As expected, it is
less important to include the region-speciﬁc information in this case. In the case of ran-
dom variation in S, however, a higher degree of similarity between regional entities does not
appear to have much of an inﬂuence (see b)iii)).
We conclude that without any precise information on the spatial distribution of the
data and the degree of similarity of the regional entities, there is no way to tell how strongly
research results are aﬀected by the choice of interpolation method. In empirical applications,
a sensitivity analysis may be useful to investigate the robustness of research results based on
diﬀerent interpolation approaches. Simulations in Fisher and Langford (1995) suggest that
a dasymetric method gives better estimates than simple area weighting. This is in line with
12These cases are not presented but results are available on request.
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Table 1.1: Monte Carlo evidence for the distribution of (PˆR − PR)/PR
a) maximum dissimilarity b) case of Germany
Mean Sd MSE Mean Sd MSE†
Simulation i - uniform distribution of S
Naive weights 0.0558 0.3917 0.1565 −0.0149 0.2287 0.0525
Area weights‡ 0 0 0 0 0 0
Simulation ii - positive autocorrelation of S
Naive weights 0.0619 0.3974 0.1618 −0.0167 0.2270 0.0518
Area weights‡ 0.0047 0.0328 0.0011 −0.0005 0.0370 0.0014
Simulation iii - random distribution of S
Naive weights 0.0597 0.4018 0.1650 −0.0103 0.2414 0.0584
Area weights‡ 0.0022 0.0550 0.0030 0.0045 0.0589 0.0035
†Mean squared error
‡Area weights refer to simple area weighting with SDi = 1.
our simulation results. Due to a high degree of similarity, however, we expect diﬀerences
between area weighting and dasymetric mapping in our application to Germany to be rather
small.
1.3 Empirical application
The purpose of the empirical application is to identify an appropriate cartographic interpo-
lation method in order to transfer attributes from German employment agency districts to
German counties. As has been discussed in the introduction, these administrative agencies
report data for diﬀerent zoning systems which are spatially incompatible. In particular,
both agencies provide important data for researchers in labour economics, other ﬁelds of
economics and social sciences alike. Typically, German micro data include the county but
not the employment agency district location of the individual or the household observa-
tion. Since current research on German labour market reforms often necessitates combining
both data sources, solving this areal interpolation problem is thus of some importance and
urgency.
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Figure 1.2 shows a map of German counties (Kreise) and a map of Federal Employment
Agency districts (Arbeitsamtsdienststellen). Think of the German counties as the Ri tar-
get regions with i = 1, . . . , 440 disjoint entities. The Federal Employment Agency districts
correspond to the Dj source regions with j = 1, . . . , 840. We estimate county areas Ri and
district areas Dj using the software package ArcView.
Figure 1.2: The German counties (left) and the German Federal Employment Agency dis-
tricts (right)
Since intersection areas that form the basis of any cartographic interpolation method
are not readily available for German counties and German employment agency districts,
we estimate county areas Ri, district areas Dj and their intersections µˆ(Ri ∩Dj) using the
GIS procedure of polygon overlay provided in the software package ArcView. Since the
map of employment agency districts comes with a stronger generalisation than the map of
German counties, intersecting both maps by polygon overlay results in spurious polygons,
i.e. nonzero entries in the weighting matrix that are spurious due to digitising errors and the
degree of generalisation.13 Figure 1.3 to the left shows the resulting map from intersecting
counties and districts. This intersection results in more than 3, 600 subregions, some of
which are certainly spurious due to the measurement errors involved in intersecting the two
maps. Spurious polygons can be seen at the border line of the Berlin area (see Figure
13In our particular case, map D was not available electronically. We therefore scanned the map in a raster
data format. The raster data was then converted to vector data by digitising. Thus, in addition to smoothing
errors due to cartographic generalisation, digitising errors may be another source of measurement error and
spurious polygons.
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1.3 to the right). In addition to a random measurement error due to digitising errors or
cartographic generalisation, this ﬁgure suggests that there might also be a minor non-random
misregistration error. Since the spurious entries in the intersection matrix seem to be trivial,
however, even the slight misregistration error should not strongly aﬀect the interpolation
results.14
Figure 1.3: The intersection of German counties and German Federal Employment Agency
districts (left) and stochastic measurement error at the Berlin border lines (right)
Based on these area estimates, we compute the three interpolation methods proposed
in the previous section. More speciﬁcally, we perform a sensitivity analysis in order to
test the robustness of estimation results with regard to the choice of interpolation method.
This sensitivity analysis is of practical importance for researchers in Germany who work
with micro data coded at the county level, but want to include regional socioeconomic data
released by the Federal Employment Agency in their analysis.
We conduct a sensitivity analysis of the eﬀect of certain regional labour market character-
istics on the job-ﬁnding hazard of unemployed individuals in western Germany (excluding
the Berlin area) between 1981 and 1997. We run the same estimation three times, each
time including an area covariate that has been interpolated by one of the three proposed
14For German counties, we compared area estimates µˆ(Ri) with their exact area size µ(Ri) which is
oﬃcially released by the Federal Statistical Bureau (Statistische A¨mter des Bundes und der La¨nder, 1999).
On average, the measurement error induced by generalisation and digitising error is less than 0.1% of the
true area size. This may be considered some evidence that the measurement error is negligible, even though
for the intersections the measurement error should be larger.
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methods, and discuss the results in light of the above theoretical considerations. The micro
data set used for the analysis is the IAB15 employment subsample 1981-1997 - regional ﬁle
(IABS-REG) which is described in detail in Bender et al. (2000). The data set contains daily
register data of about 500,000 individuals in western Germany with information on their em-
ployment spells as well as on spells during which they received unemployment compensation
transfers from the Federal Employment Agency. The data set is a representative sample of
employment that is subject to social security contributions and excludes, for example, civil
servants and self-employed individuals. All individual information is coded at the level of
the so called microcensus regions. These regional sub-divisions lump together up to four
counties. There are 270 microcensus regions in western Germany. Based on this data set, we
want to test the eﬀect of two regional labour market indicators, namely the unemployment
rate (PDj) and the ratio of unemployed individuals to vacancies in the region (FDj
16) on the
job-ﬁnding hazard of unemployed individuals. Both indicators are proxies for labour market
tightness and may be expected to have a signiﬁcant negative eﬀect on the job-ﬁnding haz-
ard of unemployed individuals in western Germany. More importantly, since these regional
indicators are reported for employment agency regions only, they need to be interpolated to
microcensus regions. Employment agency regions lump together three to four employment
agency districts. Therefore, we can use the estimated intersections of employment agency
districts and counties for an interpolation between the 270 microcensus regions and the 141
employment agency regions by aggregating the intersections to the level of microcensus and
employment agency regions. Intersecting these two regional entities yields a total of 1,149
sub-regions.
Based on these intersections, we interpolate the two regional attributes, the unemploy-
ment rate and the ratio of unemployed individuals to vacancies, for the three proposed
interpolation methods. As discussed in section 1.2, there are two possible reasons why es-
timated weights might not diﬀer substantially between the alternative weighting schemes.
First of all, there may be a high degree of local homogeneity in the region-speciﬁc informa-
tion that is used for the dasymetric weighting approach. Here, we use regional labour force
15Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufsforschung in Nuremberg
16Instead of interpolating the ratio, we interpolate the number of unemployed individuals and vacancies as
frequency data before calculating the ratio based on these interpolated attributes. As an advantage, this also
allows for using the naive weight because the ratio of the interpolated frequencies equals the interpolation
of the ratio and thus does not violate the pycnophylactic property.
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densities as the region-speciﬁc information S because the distribution of the labour force
should be highly positively correlated to other labour-market related attributes. Using a
Moran’s I statistic17, we ﬁnd evidence in favour of positive spatial autocorrelation, i.e. areas
with high (low) labour force densities tend to be close to other regions with high (low) densi-
ties. Apparently, there is a high degree of local homogeneity or a low level of c-heterogeneity
in the underlying region-speciﬁc control variable S. As a consequence, diﬀerences between
area and dasymetric weighting should be rather small. Note also that the intersected spa-
tial frameworks do show a high degree of similarity. In fact, almost 80% of all microcensus
regions have an areal overlap of more than 95% with only one employment agency region
(see also Figure 1.2). Thus, in most cases microcensus regions only have minor intersections
with additional employment agency regions.
Due to a high degree of similarity between the two spatial frameworks and a high degree
of local homogeneity, diﬀerences between simple area weighting and dasymetric weighting
may expected to be rather negligible. Indeed, we ﬁnd that the resulting weights do not
diﬀer substantially on average. In fact, with an average value that diﬀers only in the 10th
decimal place, dasymetric weights show an extremely similar distribution to simple area
weights that assume a uniform distribution of the region-speciﬁc information. Standard
deviations, percentiles as well as minima and maxima are also quite similar. For some sub-
regions for which there is a low degree of local homogeneity within the neighbouring area,
however, weights diﬀer substantially across interpolation method. Table 1.2 looks at an
extreme example - the Bremen metropolitan area - to demonstrate this point. Bremen is a
large city in the north of Germany with about 500,000 residents and a relatively high labour
force density compared to the surrounding rural areas (Diepholz, Wesermarsch, Osterholz,
Rotenburg, Verden). Thus, while around 31 % of the area of the Bremen employment agency
region intersects with the microcensus region of the same name, taking account of the fact
that most of the labour force of the employment agency region works in this intersecting
area results in a weight of almost 84 %.
We conclude that, on average, dasymetric and simple area weights do not diﬀer sub-
17We calculate Moran’s I using diﬀerent weights for the spatially lagged vector based on the grid position.
Using a weight of one for regions within a 0.4 degree radius of the grid location of the county, we get a test
statistic of 0.21 (z = 5.3). Using a 0.8 degree radius the test statistic falls to 0.16 (z = 8.9) but again is
highly signiﬁcant. 0.1 degree correspond to 11.1 km along the longitude and between 6.5 to 7.5 km along
the latitude.
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Table 1.2: Weights fˆi,j for the Bremen employment agency region for three interpolation
methods
Employment agency region Microcensus region Area Dasymetric Naive
Bremen Bremen 0.313 0.838 1
Bremen Diepholz 0.002 0.000 0
Bremen Wesermarsch 0.014 0.002 0
Bremen Osterholz 0.652 0.157 1
Bremen Rotenburg 0.016 0.002 0
Bremen Verden 0.003 0.001 0
stantially because of a high degree of similarity between the two spatial frameworks and a
high degree of local homogeneity. However, the choice of interpolation method may have
an important inﬂuence for some selective regions with a high degree of heterogeneity in the
auxiliary information within the local neighbourhood. We therefore look at two diﬀerent
samples for the sensitivity analysis, a full and a selective sample. The full sample includes
all 255,100 unemployment spells18 generated by 126,189 individuals and beginning between
1981 and 1997 in any microcensus region in western Germany.19 The selective sample in-
cludes only unemployment spells from those microcensus regions whose estimated weighting
schemes diﬀered substantially.20 Given the above results, we expect the analysis based on
the full sample to be less sensitive with respect to the chosen interpolation method than the
heterogeneous subsample. Even for the selective sample, however, estimation results may be
quite robust across interpolation methods if the regional data to be converted, FDj and PDJ ,
18Periods of registered unemployment cannot be identiﬁed easily given the data structure of the IAB
employment subsample because there are gaps in an individual employment record whenever the individual
neither works in a socially insured employment nor receives unemployment compensation from the Federal
Employment Agency. As a consequence, labour market states such as self-employment, being out of labour
force or being unemployment without being a beneﬁt recipient are unobserved and indistinguishable (see
Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004). We therefore use a proxy for registered unemployment that is closely related
to the receipt of unemployment compensation. Interruptions of these transfer payments may not exceed
four weeks (six weeks in he case of a suspension period). Moreover, transfer receipt has to start within 10
weeks after the end of employment. If there is a gap of more than 12 weeks after the receipt of transfers, the
unemployment spell is treated as censored to ensure that unobserved labour market states are not considered
as an unemployment period.
19The sample has been restricted to individuals aged 18-52 at the beginning of the unemployment spell.
20A microcensus region belongs to the selective sample if the absolute deviation between the simple and
the dasymetric weights is above the 99th or below the 1st percentile for either spatially intensive or spatially
extensive data.
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does not vary signiﬁcantly between adjacent and nearby regions. In this case, even naive
weights may produce reliable interpolation results. Indeed, a Moran’s I statistic for both
regional indicators ﬁnds signiﬁcant spatial clustering of similar values.21 As a consequence,
even for a selective sample of regions for which weighting schemes diﬀer signiﬁcantly, inter-
polated unemployment rates (PRi) and unemployment-vacancy ratios (FRi) might be quite
similar across interpolation methods.
Table 1.3: Summary statistics of interpolated unemployment rate PˆD and u/v ratio
FˆD
a for the full and the selective sample by interpolation method
Unemployment rate Unemployment-vacancy ratio
Method Obs. Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Full Sample
Naive weights 270 7.873 2.864 270 8.544 5.484
Area weights 270 7.864 2.833 270 8.371 5.121
Dasymetric weights 270 7.890 2.848 270 8.372 5.109
Selective Sample
Naive weights 14 9.227 3.809 14 11.549 8.178
Area weights 14 9.226 3.646 14 9.833 6.788
Dasymetric weights 14 9.245 3.679 14 10.064 6.625
a The unemployment-vacancy ratio is treated as a spatially extensive attribute by in-
terpolating the number of unemployed and the number of vacancies separately before
calculating the unemployment-vacancy ratio.
Indeed, summary statistics of PˆRi and FˆRi at the level of microcensus regions in Table 1.3
conﬁrm that diﬀerences between interpolation methods are levelled out. Even for the selec-
tive sample of 14 microcensus regions for which weights diﬀered the most (see footnote 20),
there is not much variation across the interpolated attributes. There is some more variation
in the selective sample for the unemployment-vacancy ratio than for the unemployment rate,
a result that is probably due to the fact that the auxiliary information used for the dasymet-
ric weight of spatially extensive data, SRi , refers to employment agency regions. Since there
21See footnote 11 for details on the test statistic. Using a weight of one for regions within a 0.4 degree
radius of the grid location of the county, we get a test statistic of 0.85 (z = 16.3). Using a 0.8 degree radius
the test statistic is 0.72 (z = 31.4) which again is highly signiﬁcant.
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are fewer employment agency regions than microcensus regions, the corresponding dasymet-
ric weighting should yield a coarser reﬁnement of source zone densities than in the case of
interpolating spatially intensive data. Still, summary statistics in Table 1.3 suggest that
the choice of interpolation method even for the selective sample should not strongly aﬀect
regression results for these interpolated attributes.
For the sensitivity analysis, we estimate a proportional hazard model where the baseline
hazard includes common ﬁxed eﬀects for individuals in the same labour market region.22 This
may be estimated using Cox’s partial likelihood estimator (Cox, 1972). Including location-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects in this estimator removes a potential bias of individual and labour
market related variables that may result from omitting important regional labour market
characteristics (Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice, 1980; Ridder and Tunali, 1999). In addition to
the location-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects we also take account of the fact that some individuals have
repeated unemployment spells. Thus, we use the modiﬁed sandwich variance estimator to
correct for dependence at the level of the individual (Lin and Wei, 1989).
Table 1.4 summarises estimation results for the unemployment rate and the unemployment-
vacancy ratio for the full sample and the three interpolation methods. We control for educa-
tion, sex, age, marital status, occupational status, economic sector, a set of year dummies as
well as some indicators of prior employment history including total previous unemployment
duration, tenure in the previous job and an indicator variable of whether there has ever been
a recall from the previous employer. Summary statistics and estimation results using the
full and the selective sample can be found in Appendix A23.
As expected from the discussion above, the eﬀect of the unemployment rate and the
unemployment-vacancy ratio on the job ﬁnding hazard is extremely robust across the diﬀer-
ent interpolation methods for the full and the selective sample. In our empirical application,
the eﬀects of interpolated attributes on the estimated hazard ratios do not diﬀer up to the
4th decimal place for the full and up to the 3rd decimal place for the selective sample. This
even holds for naive binary weighting.
22We use labour market regions instead of microcensus regions because labour market regions are likely
to be the relevant regional context in which individuals mainly seek employment. There are a total of 180
West-German labour market regions.
23Since estimation results across the various speciﬁcations are very similar, Appendix A only includes
detailed results for the Cox model using the unemployment rate as a region-speciﬁc covariate. Moreover the
estimation results only show the case of merging the unemployment rate based on a uniform distribution of
the region-speciﬁc information.
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Table 1.4: Cox PH model estimates for regional indicators by interpolation method and
sample, IABS-REG, 1981-1997
Full Sample Selective Sample
Merging Scheme Haz. Rat. Std. Err. Haz. Rat. Std. Err.
Unemployment-vacancy ratio
Naive weights 0.989∗∗ 0.000 0.987∗∗ 0.001
Area weights 0.989∗∗ 0.000 0.986∗∗ 0.001
Dasymetric weights 0.989∗∗ 0.000 0.985∗∗ 0.001
Unemployment rate
Naive weights 0.967∗∗ 0.001 0.976∗∗ 0.005
Area weights 0.967∗∗ 0.001 0.971∗∗ 0.005
Dasymetric weights 0.966∗∗ 0.001 0.973∗∗ 0.005
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
We conclude that in the speciﬁc case of interpolating data between German employment
agency regions and microcensus regions the choice of interpolation method does not sub-
stantially aﬀect our estimation results. It even seems safe to take the simplest approach
available to the researcher: an interpolation based on simple binary weights. Due to a high
degree of local homogeneity in S, a high degree of similarity of the regional entities and a
strong positive spatial autocorrelation of the data to be interpolated, this is likely to be a
result that is unique to this particular application. Hence, researchers applying the above
approach to a diﬀerent set of regional entities should be aware that these factors have an
important eﬀect on the robustness of their results. Also, they should check the degree of
spatial autocorrelation of the spatially misaligned data. If there is spatial clustering of dis-
similar values, interpolation is likely to be much more sensitive to the choice of interpolation
method than in our particular application. Therefore, researchers are advised to examine
the conditions of local homogeneity, similarity of regional entities and positive or negative
spatial autocorrelation in detail before choosing an interpolation method. If there is evidence
that even the dasymetric weighting approach may be seriously misspeciﬁed and no positive
spatial autocorrelation of the attributes to be interpolated mitigates this misspeciﬁcation,
other more sophisticated methods might be necessary to arrive at satisfactory results.
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1.4 Conclusion
This paper presents several cartographic methods for interpolating spatially misaligned data
from German employment agency districts to German counties. We compare interpolation
results from naive binary weighting, simple area weighting and a more sophisticated dasy-
metric weighting approach that makes use of auxiliary regional information. In particular,
we use a control variable that is available for both spatial frameworks and that is highly
positively correlated to the spatially misaligned data in order to reﬁne the source zone den-
sity estimates. Dasymetric weighting thus necessitates less strong assumption concerning
the spatial distribution of the the spatially misaligned data than simple area weighting to
solve the modiﬁable areal unit problem (MAUP).
Furthermore, we identify conditions under which all interpolation methods including
naive binary weighting yield comparable and reliable results. Under a high degree of local
homogeneity in the auxiliary information used for the dasymetric weighting approach and
under a high degree of similarity between the two regional classiﬁcations, the choice of in-
terpolation method does not matter. We conﬁrm these theoretical results with a simulation
study. As a sensitivity analysis for the area interpolation between employment agency regions
and microcensus regions, we compare the eﬀects of interpolated attributes on the job-ﬁnding
hazard of unemployed individuals using all three interpolation methods. Our application
suggests robustness of estimation results with respect to the choice of interpolation method.
In addition to a high degree of local homogeneity in the auxiliary information and a high de-
gree of similarity between microcensus and employment agency regions, local homogeneity in
the attribute to be interpolated further mitigates any diﬀerences between the three methods.
We conclude that in our particular application even the naive binary weighting yields reliable
results. Moreover, even in the case that the dasymetric approach does not solve the MAUP,
i.e. the underlying assumptions do not hold, the remaining misspeciﬁcation should be of mi-
nor importance due to the spatial autocorrelation of the attributes that need to be interpo-
lated. Our interpolation techniques thus allow for combining data from the two largest Ger-
man data producers, the Federal Employment Agency and the Federal Statistical Bureau and
thus provides an important preparatory work for the empirical analyses in chapter (2) and
(5). The estimated weighting schemes are freely accessible to the research community and
can be downloaded from ftp : //ftp.zew.de/pub/zew−docs/div/arntz−wilke−weights.xls.
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Appendix
A - Summary statistics for the full and the selective sample of
unemployment spells, IABS-REG, 1981-1997
Full Sample Selective Sample
Mean SE Mean SE
Unemployment duration (in days) 293.24 443.86 285.55 407.46
Female 0.41 0.49 0.44 0.50
Married 0.46 0.50 0.44 0.50
Married female 0.21 0.41 0.21 0.41
Age < 21 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26
Age 21-25 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41
Age 31-35 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.35
Age 36-40 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.32
Age 41-45 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
Age 46-49 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
Age 50-53 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.27
Low education 0.38 0.49 0.36 0.48
Higher education 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.23
Low education x female 0.16 0.37 0.17 0.37
Higher education x female 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.15
Apprenticeship 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.25
Low skilled worker 0.34 0.48 0.32 0.47
White collar worker 0.25 0.43 0.30 0.46
Part-time work 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28
Agriculture 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.13
Inv. goods industry 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.38
Cons. goods industry 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.28
Construction 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.33
Services 0.31 0.46 0.38 0.49
Tenure in previous job (in months) 27.20 38.09 26.88 38.64
Previous recall 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22
Total unemp. duration (in months) 8.43 15.03 8.29 14.70
1983-1987 0.32 0.47 0.32 0.47
1988-1991 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.39
1992-1997 0.34 0.47 0.34 0.47
Unemployment ratea 9.70 3.38 9.34 3.56
Number of spells 255,100 83,104
Number of individuals 126,189 24,674
% right-censored 28.4 29.7
a Regional information has been merged using the uniform distribution of the region-speciﬁc informa-
tion SDj = 1.
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Cox PH model estimates (hazard ratios) using the full and the
selective sample, IABS-REG, 1981-1997
Full Sample Selective Sample
Variable HR (SE) HR (SE)
Female 1.112∗∗ (0.011) 1.127∗∗ (0.035)
Married 1.219∗∗ (0.008) 1.227∗∗ (0.031)
Married female 0.539∗∗ (0.013) 0.583∗∗ (0.022)
Age < 21 1.217∗∗ (0.010) 1.281∗∗ (0.045)
Age 21-25 1.103∗∗ (0.008) 1.141∗∗ (0.029)
Age 31-35 0.985† (0.009) 1.001† (0.029)
Age 36-40 1.000 (0.011) 1.002 (0.031)
Age 41-45 1.001 (0.011) 1.011 (0.035)
Age 46-49 0.968∗ (0.013) 0.930∗ (0.037)
Age 50-53 0.831∗∗ (0.015) 0.823∗∗ (0.037)
Low education 0.883∗∗ (0.009) 0.847∗∗ (0.023)
Higher education 0.792∗∗ (0.020) 0.779∗∗ (0.044)
Low education x female 0.968∗ (0.013) 1.035∗ (0.041)
Higher education x female 1.149∗∗ (0.030) 1.120∗∗ (0.089)
Apprenticeship 1.082∗∗ (0.013) 1.136∗∗ (0.045)
Low skilled worker 0.798∗∗ (0.009) 0.845∗∗ (0.023)
White collar worker 0.752∗∗ (0.010) 0.805∗∗ (0.023)
Parttime work 0.806∗∗ (0.016) 0.829∗∗ (0.035)
Agriculture 1.317∗∗ (0.020) 1.333∗∗ (0.092)
Inv. goods industry 0.927∗∗ (0.010) 0.926∗∗ (0.027)
Cons. goods industry 0.925∗∗ (0.011) 1.029∗∗ (0.036)
Construction 1.221∗∗ (0.010) 1.347∗∗ (0.041)
Services 0.984† (0.009) 1.024† (0.025)
Tenure in previous job 0.995∗∗ (0.000) 0.994∗∗ (0.000)
Previous recall 0.781∗∗ (0.012) 0.756∗∗ (0.031)
Total unemp. duration 0.995∗∗ (0.000) 0.997∗∗ (0.001)
1983-1987 1.245∗∗ (0.008) 1.252∗∗ (0.033)
1988-1991 1.332∗∗ (0.009) 1.365∗∗ (0.039)
1992-1997 1.085∗∗ (0.009) 1.122∗∗ (0.032)
Unemployment ratea 0.967∗∗ (0.001) 0.971∗∗ (0.005)
Log-likelihood -1,217,399.365 -121,004
χ2(30) 18,724.774 1,961.91
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
a Using the merging scheme with SDj = 1.
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Chapter 2
The Geographical Mobility of
Unemployed Workers. Evidence from
Western Germany
Abstract
Using a competing risks framework of exiting unemployment to jobs in a local or a dis-
tant labour market area, this paper investigates whether unemployed individuals in western
Germany choose search strategies that favour migration away from depressed regions. Em-
pirical results are obtained from a stratiﬁed Cox proportional hazard model that allows for
region-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. This approach reduces biases due to unobserved regional hetero-
geneity that aﬀects both the migratory behaviour of jobseekers and the regional conditions
of interest. Estimates based on this stratiﬁed approach indicate that at least skilled men
are responsive to local labour market conditions and are more likely to leave regions with
unfavourable re-employment opportunities. Without region-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, no such
evidence can be found. The implied downward bias from omitting region-speciﬁc eﬀects
is consistent with the idea that pleasant living conditions compensate for higher regional
unemployment.
Keywords: migration, unemployment duration, competing risks, unobserved re-
gional heterogeneity
JEL: J61, J64, R23
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2.1 Introduction
It has often been argued that interregional mobility plays a crucial role in equilibrating re-
gional employment and wage disparities. The underlying notion is that unemployed workers
leave depressed regions in order to ﬁnd employment in regions that oﬀer better employment
prospects. For the US, Blanchard and Katz (1992) ﬁnd this adjustment mechanism to be
quite eﬀective. In European countries including Germany, however, interregional labour
mobility lags behind mobility levels in the US, Canada, Japan and Australia (Eichengreen
1991, Braunerhjelm et al., 2000). More importantly, even though unemployment and wage
diﬀerences are important factors in determining migration in Europe, recent ﬁndings suggest
that the elasticities of aggregate migration ﬂows with respect to unemployment and wage
diﬀerentials are lower than in the US (Puhani, 2001). Decressin and Fata`s (1995) examine
regional adjustment dynamics in Europe and ﬁnd that the adjustment process following an
adverse regional employment shock takes much longer than in the US. A study by Mo¨ller
(1995) also suggests that interregional mobility in Germany is an important means of equi-
librating regional employment disparities in the long run, but that it takes 2-3 years before
interregional mobility begins to respond to an adverse regional employment shock.
The eﬀectiveness of migration as an equilibrating mechanism ultimately depends on the
migratory decisions of individual people. In particular, given the high level of unemployment
in Germany, the willingness and ability of unemployed workers to seek employment in more
prosperous regions and to migrate away from depressed areas is of central concern if migra-
tion is to contribute to reducing regional disparities. Recent empirical evidence on internal
migration in western Germany is rather mixed. Decressin (1994) looks at migration ﬂows
between states in western Germany and ﬁnds that these ﬂows tend to go from high to low
unemployment regions. In contrast, a recent study by Windzio (2004) on the determinants
of individual mobility between the southern and northern states in western Germany even
suggests that individuals in high unemployment regions have lower migration probabilities.
These mixed results are not untypical when compared to international ﬁndings. While Her-
zog and Schlottmann (1984) for the US and Tervo (2000) for Finland ﬁnd evidence that
high regional unemployment encourages individuals to migrate out of the region, UK studies
by Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) and Hughes and McCormick (1994) suggest that high
regional unemployment levels even discouraged mobility during the 1970s and 1980s.
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One explanation for these mixed results lies in the duration dependence of the mobility
decision. As suggested by Goss and Schoening (1984), not controlling for search duration
may bias estimation results due to unobserved heterogeneity of migration probabilities across
search time. Therefore, recent research explicitly models the migratory behaviour adopted
by unemployed individuals within a hazard model speciﬁcation of unemployment durations.
By distinguishing between the competing risks of exiting unemployment to diﬀerent regional
labour markets, this approach provides information on the actual search strategy of un-
employed workers. The few existing studies, however, show contradictory results. Using a
Gompertz proportional hazard model with gamma distributed unobserved individual hetero-
geneity, the Finnish study by Kettunen (2002), for example, does not indicate any signiﬁcant
eﬀect of local labour demand on the migration hazard, i.e. the hazard of ﬁnding employment
via residential mobility. Based on a Cox proportional hazard analysis, the US study by
Yankow (2002) ﬁnds that higher employment and wage levels signiﬁcantly reduce the migra-
tion hazard, while the unemployment rate and regional employment growth do not exert any
signiﬁcant inﬂuence. One reason for this contradictory evidence might be that neither study
takes account of unobserved regional heterogeneity. If the unobserved heterogeneity in the
attractiveness of a region as a place for living, i.e. its level of regional amenities aﬀects both
the migratory behaviour of jobseekers as well as regional labour market conditions, omitting
such factors may seriously bias estimation results. According to the compensating diﬀeren-
tials theory, individuals in regions with unpleasant living conditions must be compensated
in some way for the implied disutility - either by lower unemployment rates, lower rents or
higher wage levels (Roback, 1982; Marston, 1985; Elhorst, 2003). Thus, unemployment and
wage diﬀerentials may reﬂect individuals’ underlying preferences for certain regions.1 Sev-
eral studies conﬁrm these compensating diﬀerentials in the USA where workers are willing
to accept lower wages in regions oﬀering more attractive living conditions (Blomquist et al.,
1988; Gyourko and Tracy, 1991; Greenwood et al., 1991). The evidence for compensation
of unemployment diﬀerentials is less clear-cut. While some US studies do not indicate that
local amenities contribute to unemployment diﬀerentials (Vedder and Gallaway, 1996; Par-
tridge and Rickman, 1997), some recent European studies conﬁrm the expected relationship
1At a given point in time, the cross-sectional variation of unemployment and wage levels reﬂect both
equilibrium and disequilibrium forces. Amenity diﬀerentials are considered an equilibrium force that results
in persistent regional wage and employment disparities.
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(Aragon et al., 2003; Lopez-Bazo et al., 2005). If labour market conditions are related to
the attractiveness of a region as a place for living and also aﬀect the migratory behaviour
of jobseekers, omitting such factors in a model of migratory behaviour may bias estimation
results.
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to contribute to the literature by re-examining the
migratory behaviour of unemployed job-seekers in the context of western Germany using a
competing risks hazard model framework that takes account of unobserved heterogeneity at
the regional level. In particular, I estimate a stratiﬁed partial likelihood estimator (Ridder
and Tunali, 1999) that introduces region-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects to the Cox partial likelihood
estimator (Cox, 1972). This approach mitigates biases due to omitted regional characteristics
that may be correlated with the variables of interest such as the level of regional amenities.
The inclusion of region-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects is possible because the analysis is based on the
employment subsample 1981-1997 - regional ﬁle of the IAB (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und
Berufsforschung). This register data set is well-suited to the proposed analysis because
the sample contains a suﬃcient number of relatively rare interregional mobility events and
thus facilitates the analysis of the migratory behaviour of unemployed individuals. More
importantly, the data set allows mobility events to be observed over a long time period
providing suﬃcient time variation to identify the model with region-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects. The
proposed analysis thus allows the responsiveness of search strategies to be re-examined using
less restrictive assumptions than earlier studies by Kettunen (2002) and Yankow (2002). In
particular, my aim is to investigate whether unemployed workers in western Germany adopt
search strategies that favour migration away from regions with unfavourable re-employment
opportunities. I also look at the responsiveness to local labour market conditions among
diﬀerent labour market segments such as low-skilled and skilled individuals and take account
of some passive and active labour market programs that may aﬀect individual mobility
decisions.
The ﬁndings of this study indicate that controlling for unobserved heterogeneity at the
regional level inﬂuences estimation results. While there is signiﬁcant evidence that men ex-
perience higher migration hazards in regions with unfavourable job-ﬁnding conditions when
using a stratiﬁed partial likelihood estimator, there is no such evidence when using an un-
stratiﬁed estimator that is subject to unobserved regional heterogeneity. The implied down-
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ward bias from omitting region-speciﬁc eﬀects is consistent with the idea that pleasant living
conditions compensate for unfavourable job-ﬁnding conditions. Looking at several labour
market segments reveals that low-skilled men are less responsive to local labour market con-
ditions than their skilled counterparts. Moreover, unemployment beneﬁts seem to reduce
mobility among all individuals, while active labour market measures only exert a minor
regional locking-in eﬀect on women.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section introduces a model of job search
across space. This job search model predicts that various region-speciﬁc factors, including
job-ﬁnding conditions as well as regional amenities, will aﬀect the job search strategy of
unemployed jobseekers. The institutional background, data and methodological approach
are discussed in section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents estimation results. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 A search model with search across space
The theoretical framework adapts the two-sector framework by Fallick (1992) to the case of
job search across two regional labour markets by introducing mobility costs between regions.
In this stationary framework, individuals search simultaneously2 across a local labour market
l and a distant labour market d. The framework can be described as follows:
• Jobseekers are risk-neutral and maximise the expected present value of job search V u,
discounted over an inﬁnite horizon at rate r.
• Real wage oﬀers from each labour market k (k=l,d) are drawn from known distributions
fk(w) and arrive according to a Poisson process with job oﬀer rate αkσ(ek). αk captures
the exogenous job oﬀer conditions in the labour market and σ(ek) is an increasing and
concave function of the endogenously determined search eﬀort devoted to labour market
k. This framework implies that the instantaneous probability of receiving more than
one job oﬀer at a time is zero.
• Searching the two labour markets comes at cost ck(ek) which is an increasing and
convex function of the search eﬀort in market k. As an assumption, the returns to
2This is a generalisation of the systematic search literature that considers the job searcher to sequentially
sample regions, ﬁrms or sectors according to the expected returns from searching on these sub-markets (see
Salop, 1973; McCall and McCall, 1987).
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searching labour market k exceed the search costs and thus there is always a positive
amount of job search in each labour market.
• The jobseeker additively derives utility from income and regional amenities ak. In
the context of this paper, regional amenities apply to a rather broad concept of natu-
ral amenities (e.g. climate, landscape), consumer amenities (e.g. theatres, diversity of
consumption possibilities) as well as housing prices and cost-of-living diﬀerentials that
aﬀect the welfare of an individual living in a particular region. Recent research has
shown that regional amenities signiﬁcantly aﬀect migration decisions and should thus
be included in a job search framework across space (see Hunt and Mueller (2004) and
chapter (5) of this dissertation). The framework thus allows for amenity diﬀerentials
across space, an extension of the search model that has also been discussed by Damm
and Rosholm (2003).
• Accepting a job oﬀer from the distant labour market entails ﬂow-type and lump-sum
type moving costs. Flow-type moving costs pcd capture the permanent utility loss
(e.g. psychological costs, loss of social capital) related to the residential move, while
lump-sum moving costs mcd cover the once-only costs of relocation. By assumption,
moving costs always exceed utility diﬀerences of unemployed job search in the local
and the distant labour market so that jobseekers never move to d due to amenity or
cost-of-living diﬀerentials that may also aﬀect the real value of transfer receipt. As
a consequence, the framework only allows for contracted migration, a restriction that
can be justiﬁed by the marginal relevance of speculative migration in European labour
markets (Molho, 1986).
According to this framework, the unemployed jobseeker chooses the reservation wage wrk
and the allocation of search eﬀort across k that maximises the expected present value of
continuing job search in the local area V ul :
rV ul = bl − cl(el)− cd(ed) + al (2.1)
+αlσ(el)
∫ wmax
wrl
(V el (w)− V ul )dFl(w)
+αdσ(ed)
∫ wmax
wrd
(V ed (w)− V ul )dFd(w)
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This ﬂow value consists of the instantaneous utility of being unemployed locally (i.e. the
real value of transfer payments bl and local amenities al minus search costs), the expected
surplus of a local job multiplied by the probability of receiving a job oﬀer locally and the
expected surplus of a distant job that involves interregional residential mobility multiplied
by the probability of receiving a job oﬀer in this market. Assuming, for simplicity’s sake,
that a worker keeps his job forever, the value of employment in the local market V el (w) may
be written as
rV el (w) = w + al (2.2)
with r as the discount rate. The corresponding value of employment in region d is given as
rV ed (w) = w + ad − pcd − rmcd. (2.3)
with rmcd as the ﬂow value of the lump-sum moving cost. The unemployed jobseeker
accepts a job oﬀer from region k if the value of being employed at the oﬀered wage equals or
exceeds the value of continuing job search in the local area. Noting that r(V ed (w) − V ul ) =
w+ad−pcd− r mcd− r V ul , the reservation wage for the distant labour market that equates
V ed (w
r
l ) and V
u
l is
wrd = r V
u
l − ad + pcd + r mcd. (2.4)
The corresponding reservation wage for the local region is
wrl = r V
u
l − al (2.5)
= bl − cl(el)− cd(ed)
+
αlσ(el)
r
∫ wmax
wrl
(w − wrl )dFl(w)
+
αdσ(ed)
r
∫ wmax
wrd
(w − wrd)dFd(w)
Note that the reservation wage in the distant region may be expressed in terms of the local
reservation wage:
wrd = w
r
l + (al − ad) + pcd + r mcd. (2.6)
Thus, wrd diverges from w
r
l in order to compensate the job mover for the relocation costs
and the amenity diﬀerential between both regions. It follows that individuals with high
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permanent relocation costs due, for example, to strong family ties to the local region, are
less likely to accept a job oﬀer from a labour market that involves migration than others. The
reservation wage for the distant region must also compensate for the ﬂow value of the lump-
sum moving cost. However, because an inﬁnite time horizon is assumed for the jobseeker,
this eﬀect is relatively minor. In a search model with a limited time horizon, the eﬀect of
the relocation costs may instead be severe. Kettunen (1994) has shown that in the presence
of moving costs, the reservation wage for the distant labour market increases dramatically
as the end of the working life approaches.3 As a consequence, the hazard of moving to the
distant region may be close to zero for individuals who enter unemployment during their
ﬁnal years in the labour force. In the subsequent empirical analysis, such age eﬀects thus
need to be taken into account.
Comparative statics in Appendix A indicate that reservation wages for both local and
distant jobs increase with improving job oﬀer arrival rates and a shift of the wage oﬀer
distribution to the right anywhere in the economy. Both reservation wages also rise with
transfer payments and decrease with higher search costs. By contrast, higher relocation
costs and changes in amenities aﬀect both reservation wages diﬀerently, as can easily be seen
from equation (2.6). While higher relocation costs reduce the local reservation wage due to
the reduced choosiness of the individual, the reservation wage for the distant labour market
increases since higher costs have to be compensated by higher wages. The increase is less
than unity, however, because the individual is less picky anywhere in the economy. The
same qualitative results hold for both types of relocation cost. The magnitude of the eﬀect
is much smaller, however, in the case of the once-only costs mcd. Finally, an increasing level
of local amenities reduces the local reservation wage and increases the reservation wage for
the distant region.
Besides determining the reservation wages for both markets, the job searcher endoge-
nously allocates search eﬀort across the two labour markets. Optimal search eﬀort e∗k is
derived by diﬀerentiating V ul with respect to ek
c′k(e
∗
k) = αkσ
′(e∗k)
∫ wmax
wrk
(w − wrk)dFk(w) ∀k = d, l (2.7)
3The opposite is the case in a ﬁnite-horizon search model without any relocation costs (Gronau, 1971).
The reservation wage decreases and the hazard of leaving unemployment increases because the value of
continuing search decreases.
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Thus, optimal search eﬀort for any regional labour market equates the marginal beneﬁt with
the marginal costs of searching this market. Comparative statics in Appendix B indicate
that deteriorating conditions in one region shift search eﬀort towards the other region. In
particular, a higher local job-oﬀer arrival rate, an improvement in the local wage oﬀer dis-
tribution and a higher level of local amenities raise the local search eﬀort while reducing
search eﬀort in the distant region. More generous transfer payments reduce search eﬀorts in
all labour markets. By contrast, higher relocation costs unambiguously raises the local and
reduces the distant search eﬀort.
The probability that an individual i with characteristics x who is unemployed at the
beginning of period t makes a transition to employment in k during this period is now given
by the probability of being oﬀered a job in k and the probability of accepting it:
hk(t|xi) = αk(e∗k|xi) ∗ [1− Fk(wrk(xi))]
From the above framework, it follows that the local employment hazard hl(t|xi) and the
migration hazard hd(t|xi) depend on conditions in all regions by aﬀecting the search strategy
of the jobseeker. While the eﬀect of changing labour market conditions in the distant region
on the migration hazard reﬂects both the direct eﬀect that stems from changing exogenous
conditions and the induced eﬀects of a changing search strategy4, changes in local labour
market conditions should aﬀect the migration hazard only via the induced changes of the
search strategy. A two-region model thus allows for some inferences on the search strategy
of unemployed jobseekers. In a one-region model such inference is not possible because the
direct eﬀect on the exit hazard and the induced indirect eﬀect cannot be separated. For a
detailed discussion see also Fallick (1993). The two-region framework thus allows for testing
whether unemployed jobseekers are sensitive to labour market conditions and adjust their
search strategies accordingly. This responsiveness to labour market conditions is highly
desirable if labour mobility is to contribute to reducing regional disparities. Empirically
testing whether local labour market conditions have the expected and desired eﬀect on the
migration hazard may be diﬃcult though, if there are unobserved factors such as regional
4A higher job oﬀer arrival rate αd or a rightward shift of the wage oﬀer distribution µd should attract
search eﬀort to the distant region and increase reservation wages in both markets. The positive eﬀect of
improved exogenous conditions and higher search eﬀorts on the migration hazard thus contrast a negative
reservation wage eﬀect. The direction of the eﬀect is thus theoretically ambiguous. See Mortensen (1986) for
a detailed discussion. However, the stronger the shift of search eﬀort to the distant region, the more likely
should be a positive eﬀect on the migration hazard.
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amenities that may aﬀect both an individual’s search strategy and the observed interregional
wage and employment diﬀerentials. Previous studies such as Kettunen (2002) and Yankow
(2002) did not account for unobserved heterogeneity at the regional level. The following
section therefore proposes an alternative approach that allows for region-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects
and that should thus be better suited to test the predictions of the above framework.
2.3 Data and Methodology
This section presents the data as well as the methodological approach and discusses the
choice and deﬁnition of covariates used in the subsequent analysis.
The IABS-REG 1981-1997 The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample
1981-1997 - regional ﬁle (IABS-REG) which is described in detail in Bender et al. (2000).
The IABS-REG contains spell information on a 1 % sample of the population working in
jobs that are subject to social insurance contributions. As a consequence, the sample does
not represent self-employed individuals and life-time civil servants. For western Germany,
the sample includes spell information on about 500,000 individuals for whom employment
histories can be reconstructed on a daily basis including the microcensus region of the work-
place. In addition, the data contains spell information on periods for which the individual
received unemployment compensation from the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur
fu¨r Arbeit). During the period of analysis, unemployment compensation (UC) in Germany
consisted of unemployment beneﬁts UB (Arbeitslosengeld) and unemployment assistance
UA (Arbeitslosenhilfe). The former is an insurance beneﬁt with limited eligibility. Whether
someone is entitled to receive UB and the maximum entitlement length depends on previous
job tenure and age. By contrast, the less generous unemployment assistance is tax-funded
and is paid indeﬁnitely if entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts have been exhausted. Since
unemployment assistance is means-tested, however, it only applies to those who lack other
ﬁnancial resources such as spouse income. As a consequence, there is a gap in the IABS-REG
record whenever an individual continues to be unemployed after the exhaustion of unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and does not receive any unemployment assistance. Since such a gap in the
IABS-REG record is indistinguishable from other unobserved labour market states such as
being out of the labour force or self-employed, it is necessary to deﬁne unemployment spells
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according to a suitable bound (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004). In the following analysis,
unemployment spells are deﬁned according to a bound introduced by Lee and Wilke (2005)
and which is shown in Figure 2.1:
Figure 2.1: Bounding unemployment in the IABS-REG
This unemployment proxy5 imposes the following restrictions:
• The receipt of transfer payments has to begin within four weeks after the end of
employment (EMP). This restriction tends to exclude voluntary unemployed since
voluntarily quitting a job results in a suspension period for the receipt of unemployment
compensation of four to six weeks. Thus, individuals included in the analysis should
mainly be displaced workers.6
• Gaps between periods of transfer receipt may not exceed four weeks. In the case of a
suspension period due to rejecting an acceptable job oﬀer, the gap must not be longer
than six weeks. Otherwise, the unemployment spell is considered right-censored since
individuals with long gaps are likely to have left unemployment for an unobserved
labour market state.
• Unemployment spells are considered right-censored if the gap between the end of trans-
fer receipt and the beginning of employment exceeds four weeks. This restriction tends
to treat spells of long-term unemployed who are not entitled to receive unemploy-
ment assistance as censored, but at the same time censors spells of individuals who
are no longer actively seeking employment. The resulting sample of unemployment
spells therefore is not representative for unemployed people who are not eligible for
5For comparison, I also did the subsequent estimations for an alternative proxy of unemployment using all
non-employment periods with an initial period of transfer receipt. Estimation results for the two deﬁnitions
are very similar so that I show results only for this unemployment proxy.
6There is some imprecision in the exact length of the suspension period. Thus, there may still be some
voluntary unemployed included in the analysis.
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unemployment assistance because they have other sources of income, but should still
represent the majority of unemployment spells in Germany.
Non-censored spells of unemployment exit to employment that is subject to social insur-
ance contributions. Since participating in certain active labour market programs involves a
socially-insured job (e.g. work creation schemes, long training measures), the exit to employ-
ment observed in the data may be either an exit to a regular or to such a subsidised job. The
exit hazard therefore includes a program participation hazard which should be taken into
account in the econometric analysis by controlling for the local availability of such programs.
Exits to employment may occur either locally or outside the local labour market. Since
the IABS-REG includes information on the microcensus region of the workplace, interre-
gional mobility can easily be identiﬁed.7 I deﬁne interregional mobility as movements be-
tween non-adjacent labour market regions (Arbeitsmarktregionen). Labour market regions
(LMRs) comprise typical daily commuting ranges such that for the majority of individuals
the workplace is located within the LMR. Finding employment in a non-adjacent LMR,
i.e. outside a 50 to 80 km radius, therefore usually necessitates residential mobility. In west-
ern Germany, there are 180 labour market regions (LMR) that lump together 326 counties.
I restrict the analysis to spells of unemployment starting between 1983 and 1995 in
western Germany (excluding West Berlin). Excluding the latter two years ensures that for
each spell of unemployment we observe at least two years before the end of the observation
period. Earlier years are excluded due to missing information on major covariates. The
sample includes individuals aged 26 to 60 years at the time of job loss. Applying the above
unemployment deﬁnition, these restrictions yield a sample of 137,845 unemployment spells.
33.1% of these unemployment spells are right-censored, while 59.9% exit to a local job within
the extended local labour market region and 7.0% exit to a job in a distant labour market
region. Table 2.1 shows that exit types and the median unemployment duration strongly
diﬀer by sex and educational attainment. In particular, women remain unemployed longer
than their male counterparts, a result that likely reﬂects the weaker labour force attachment
among women. Another interesting ﬁnding from Table 2.1 is that individuals who lack any
7During the unemployment spell, the actual whereabouts of the individual are not known, however.
This means that it is not possible to distinguish between contracted and speculative migration. Contracted
migration as modelled by the theoretical framework is much more common than speculative migration,
however (Molho, 1986).
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vocational training have longer unemployment durations and are less mobile geographically.
Given the high level of unemployment among low-skilled individuals, the responsiveness
of this sub-group to local labour market conditions may be particularly important for the
equilibrating role of migration. The following analysis thus runs separate estimations not
only by sex, but also by skill-level.
Table 2.1: Unemployment duration and exit types by sub-samples, IABS-REG 1983-1995
Men Women
All LSa Sa All LSa Sa
% exit to
local 65.3 63.1 65.8 50.6 45.7 52.3
non-local 7.8 4.0 8.7 5.8 2.6 6.9
censored 27.0 32.9 25.6 43.7 51.7 40.8
Unemployment spells
Median duration (days) 114 134 109 181 209 167
Number of spells 87,260 16,562 70,698 50,585 13,144 37,441
a LS - Low-skilled without vocational training; S - Skilled with vocational training or tertiary
education
A stratiﬁed Cox proportional hazards model The econometric analysis focuses on two
competing hazard rates, the hazard of ﬁnding a job within the extended LMR (hl) and the
hazard of ﬁnding a job in a distant LMR (hd), i.e. the migration hazard, as a function of time
spent in unemployment. Since the focus of the analysis is not on the shape of the hazard
function, a competing risks form of the semi-parametric Cox proportional hazard model
(Cox, 1972) is an appropriate choice for the proposed analysis. A clear advantage of the
semi-parametric Cox estimator compared with parametric speciﬁcations is that the baseline
hazard is speciﬁed fully ﬂexible. This avoids any biases that result from misspecifying the
shape of the baseline hazard in parametric speciﬁcations (Lancaster, 1990).
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Assuming that the two competing risks are independent conditional on all covariates
included in the model8, the exit-speciﬁc hazard rate of the Cox proportional hazard model
for individual i may be written as
hk(ti|xi) = hk(ti)exp(xi(t)βk)
where ti is the elapsed duration of unemployment for individual i, hk(t) is the exit-speciﬁc
baseline hazard with k = d, l and xi(t) is a vector of both time invariant and time-varying
covariates. βk is the vector of parameters of interest.
As a caveat of this approach, estimation results based on this speciﬁcation may be bi-
ased due to unobserved individual and unobserved regional heterogeneity. To account for
individual heterogeneity, I include a large number of individual covariates as described in
detail in the next section. Moreover, in a model with a non-parametric and thus fully ﬂexi-
ble baseline hazard, unobserved individual heterogeneity has been found to have little eﬀect
on the estimated coeﬃcients (Meyer, 1990). In fact, when comparing the estimates to a
parametric log-logistic accelerated failure time model with gamma distributed unobserved
individual heterogeneity, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences could be detected.9 To account for unob-
served regional heterogeneity, I modify the speciﬁcation by estimating a fully ﬂexible baseline
hazard for each local labour market (LMR) j. This stratiﬁed Cox partial likelihood estimator
(SPLE) removes any biases that result from unobserved, time-invariant characteristics of the
local labour market region (LMR) such as unobserved regional amenities. A competing risks
form of the SPLE may be written as:
hkj(tij|xij, νj) = hkj(tij, νj)exp(xij(tij)βk)
with tij as the duration of unemployment of individual i in LMR j. hkj(tij, νj) is the baseline
hazard in LMR j and is allowed to depend on an unobserved location-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect νj.
8This is a critical assumption since estimation results will only be consistent estimates of the true pa-
rameters if this independence assumption holds. The latent durations for the two exits may, however, be
dependent if there are unobserved factors that aﬀect both exit hazards (Gordon, 2002). To account for
relevant factors, the analysis includes a broad array of factors that aﬀect general job-ﬁnding chances (see
detailed discussion in the next section) as well as factors that aﬀect migration probability (e.g. marital status,
children). Unfortunately, there is no information on home ownership, an important aspect of the migration
decision. Thus, I cannot rule out some stochastic dependence between both exit types, but stick to the
approach to ease comparability with previous studies that also use independent competing risks without
taking account of unobserved regional heterogeneity. Alternatively, generalised dependent risk models relax
the assumption of independent competing risks (Gordon, 2002). Moreover, Honore´ and Lleras-Muney (2006)
describe methods to bound the eﬀect of covariates in the case of dependent competing risks.
9Estimation results for the alternative parametric model are available from the author upon request.
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This nuisance parameter along with the baseline hazard cancels out of the likelihood func-
tion. The possibility of removing stratum-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects has already been discussed by
Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice (1980) and Chamberlain (1985). Ridder and Tunali (1999) discuss
the conditions under which such an approach is appropriate when using time-varying covari-
ates. In particular, covariates have to be weakly exogenous, i.e. an explanatory variable xt
may not depend on observed exits from unemployment in the same labour market region in
period τ ≥ t. Due to the discrete nature of the data, this exogeneity condition may be prob-
lematic for some contemporaneous regional indicators. I therefore use lagged variables for
those regional indicators for which such an simultaneity issue is likely to arise (see Appendix
C). Moreover, the inference is based on robust standard errors that take into account the
clustering of individuals within labour market regions (see Lin and Wei, 1989). Otherwise,
standard errors of covariates at the regional level may be biased downward (Moulton, 1990).
Individual-level covariates Following the theoretical framework, individual covariates
should include factors that determine an individual’s relocation costs. The empirical lit-
erature on mobility decisions typically ﬁnds individuals with local family ties, older, less-
educated individuals and homeowners to have higher moving cost. The subsequent analysis
thus includes marital status, children10, educational attainment and age as important covari-
ates. Controlling for age eﬀects is particularly important given the zero migration hazard
that is likely to occur when approaching the end of the working life (Kettunen, 1994). Un-
fortunately, the IABS-REG does not include information on housing tenure. On the other
hand, the data structure of the IABS-REG allows the employment history of the unemployed
jobseeker to be constructed which should capture some heterogeneity across individuals in
terms of their job-ﬁnding chances and mobility costs. The previous job status and the pre-
vious sector of activity, for example, may capture diﬀerent job-ﬁnding chances. Previous
unemployment experiences are likely to reduce general re-employment chances due to a de-
preciation of human capital and possible stigma eﬀects. Moreover, ﬁnancial resources to bear
moving costs may have been depleted during a long unemployment period, thus reducing
the migration hazard. Lower migration hazards may also occur in the case of a long job
tenure and thus residential immobility. Similarly, having been recalled from the previous
10The information on whether someone has children is likely to contain some measurement error as em-
ployers do not always report the current household context of their employees reliably.
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employer may increase a person’s local attachment due to waiting for another future recall.
The analysis also includes previous wage income to capture heterogeneity in an individual’s
productivity level that is not reﬂected by their formal education. Since the literature on
the returns to migration typically ﬁnds a positive selection of migrants with regard to abil-
ity, an individual with higher previous wage income for a given educational attainment is
likely to have higher returns to migration and should thus have higher migration propensities
(Greenwood, 1997).
Another set of indicators included in the analysis concerns the unemployment compensa-
tion system. As discussed previously, individuals may either receive unemployment beneﬁts
(UB) or the less generous but indeﬁnitely paid unemployment assistance (UA). Whether
someone is entitled to receive UB and the maximum entitlement length depends on previ-
ous job tenure and age. During the 1980s, maximum entitlements became more generous,
especially for older unemployed (see Appendix E). Moreover, the income replacement rate,
i.e. the share of the previous wage income that is substituted for by unemployment com-
pensation, has increased successively from 60% to 68% for unemployment beneﬁts and from
50% to 58% for unemployment assistance. According to the theoretical framework, more
generous transfer payments - either in terms of a longer entitlement period for unemployment
beneﬁts or higher replacement rates - should reduce search intensities and reservation wages
everywhere. Consistent with these notions, Hunt (1995) ﬁnds evidence that the increasing
generosity of unemployment compensation in Germany throughout the 1980s increased the
duration of unemployment. Moreover, more generous unemployment beneﬁts may also be a
means of postponing migration decisions which would reduce the migration hazard (Hassler
et al., 2005). Including the income replacement rate and the maximum entitlement period11
is thus meant to control for these institutional changes throughout the study period.
Regional-level covariates According to the theoretical framework, jobseekers are ex-
pected to shift search eﬀort towards other regions if local labour market conditions are bad
relative to conditions in other regions. Since the observation period encompasses almost
15 years, however, the same relative labour demand conditions, for example, may occur for
11The maximum entitlement period is computed from the IAB-REG information on previous job tenure
within a 7-year period prior to the beneﬁt claim and age. This estimate is likely to be an upper bound
of the true entitlement length because previous unemployment periods may partially have exhausted these
entitlements.
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diﬀerent levels of aggregate labour demand. Deteriorating overall employment prospects,
however, should aﬀect both exit hazards similarly and leave the allocation of search eﬀort
between the local and the distant labour market unaﬀected. In order to separate the eﬀect
of aggregate conditions and relative conditions between local and distant regions, I therefore
choose the following type of speciﬁcation for capturing the eﬀect of labour demand conditions
XLM :
βkXLM = βk1Ul/Vl + βk2
Ul/Vl
Ud/Vd
(2.8)
with k = d, l and Uk/Vk as the unemployment-vacancy ratio (uv-ratio) in region k, and
Ul/Vl
Ud/Vd
as the relative uv-ratio.12 Due to this speciﬁcation, βk1 reﬂects the eﬀect of dete-
riorating overall labour demand conditions because relative labour demand conditions are
held constant, i.e. ∂hk
∂Ul/Vl
| Ul/Vl
Ud/Vd
. Moreover, changing relative labour demand conditions while
holding the local labour demand conditions constant, i.e. ∂hkUl/Vl
Ud/Vd
|Ul/Vl , reﬂect changing condi-
tions in the distant labour market. Following the discussion on the possible inference with
respect to the search strategy in a two-region model in section 2.2, βd2 thus captures both
the direct eﬀect of changing labour market conditions and the indirect eﬀect of a changing
search strategy. By contrast, βl2 allows for some inference on the search strategy as changing
conditions in distant regions should aﬀect hl mainly
13 via a response of the search strategy.
In particular, the theoretical framework suggests that improving labour demand conditions
in the distant region (while keeping local conditions constant) raise reservation wages in all
labour markets and result in a shift of search eﬀort from the local to the distant region.
A deteriorating relative uv-ratio should thus result in a decreasing local exit hazard. In
addition, we should also observe an increasing migration hazard if the positive direct eﬀect
of improved job oﬀer conditions plus the positive eﬀect from a shift of search eﬀort to the
distant region outweigh the negative reservation wage eﬀect.
In addition to local job-ﬁnding conditions, the theoretical framework suggests that in-
come prospects should be another major concern for those searching for a job. Similar to
equation (2.8), the analysis includes the local wage level and the relative wage level, i.e.
12Unfortunately, neither the uv-ratio nor the unemployment rate are available at a high level of regional
disaggregation for diﬀerent skill groups. Thus, only an average regional indicator for all sub-segments of the
labour force can be used.
13As an underlying assumption, conditions in both regions need to be independent. Otherwise changes in
the labour market conditions of one region may partially reﬂect changing conditions in the other region.
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the expected local wage level for individual i relative to the expected aggregate wage for this
individual.14 in order to capture the eﬀects of both relative wage conditions and diﬀerent
wage levels on the transitions to local and non-local employment. Unfortunately, regional
cost-of living indices are not available for Germany so that wages have been deﬂated by
the aggregate German Price Index (1985 = 100) which is released by the Federal Statistical
Bureau. Since interregional wage disparities should be related to unobserved interregional
disparities in cost-of-living and amenities, the included wage measures are likely to be bi-
ased. Similarly, estimates for relative labour demand conditions may be biased if amenities
compensate for unfavourable job-ﬁnding conditions as discussed in the introduction. Al-
though both rent and amenity conditions may have changed during the period under study,
including ﬁxed eﬀects should capture average diﬀerences between the regions and should
thus mitigate such biases. In addition, changes in the population density may to some
extent reﬂect changing amenity and rent conditions as an increasing population density may
come with additional consumer amenities as well as with disamenities that result from a lack
of housing space and higher housing prices.
Furthermore, I use several indicators to further characterise local labour market con-
ditions which may have an impact on transitions to either local or non-local jobs. For
these local labour market conditions, signiﬁcant impacts on the migration hazard indicate
a changing search strategy in response to these local conditions, while eﬀects on the local
employment hazard should always be a mixture of such induced eﬀects and the direct eﬀect
of changing local conditions. One important covariate included in the following analysis is
the local accommodation ratio, i.e. the ratio of individuals in work creation schemes to
individuals who are either unemployed or participating in such programs.15 Not including
such a measure could bias the estimated eﬀect of local labour demand conditions because
14Wages have been estimated separately for each region and for the economy as a whole based on the
IAB-R01, a data set that is closely related to the IABS-REG (see Appendix C). Estimates from Mincer-type
wage regressions have been used to predict wage levels for each individual in the sample in his home region
and in the economy as a whole.
15In Germany, active labourmarket programs (ALMP)mainly consist of either public employment schemes
or training measures with an emphasis on the latter. In 1997, almost 270,000 people entered training
programs, while around 75,000 people entered work creation schemes in western Germany (Caliendo et al.,
2003). Unfortunately, a time series encompassing the years between 1983 and 1995 is only available for work
creation schemes. The eﬀect of training measures cannot therefore be tested. However, since regions with
extensive work creation also tend to oﬀer extensive training measures, the accommodation ratio may also
proxy for the general accommodation of ALMP.
CHAPTER 2. MOBILITY OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS 66
such programs typically try to cushion adverse labour market conditions and exits to regular
employment and to subsidised employment in the context of such labour market programs
are indistinguishable in the IABS-REG. Moreover, an extensive local supply of work creation
schemes may reduce interregional mobility.16 Such regional locking-in eﬀects may occur if
joining such programs substitutes for regular non-local employment. In this case, the exten-
sive availability of such programs may reduce search eﬀorts in the regular labour market,
especially in distant regions. The attractiveness of local versus distant job search may also
depend on whether job-ﬁnding conditions tend to improve or worsen. For this reason, local
employment growth in individual i’s skill group is used to capture such eﬀects. Job-
ﬁnding conditions may also be aﬀected by employment concentrations in particular sectors.
Sectors may diﬀer, for example, by their cyclical sensitivity which may aﬀect local job-
ﬁnding chances. In order to capture such eﬀects, I include employment shares by sector,
distinguishing between agriculture, the consumption goods industry, the investment goods
industry, construction, services and retail. In order to control for interregional diﬀerences
in the educational composition of the workforce, I include a measure of the employment
share of individuals with a tertiary education. The average quality of the workforce
may aﬀect local job-ﬁnding prospects for jobseekers of diﬀerent educational background de-
pending on the production technology and the degree of competition between skill groups.
Conditions that may aﬀect local job-ﬁnding chances may also be captured by the share of
male unemployed. A high share of male unemployed typically prevails in regions with
declining male-dominated industries and may thus reﬂect an additional congestion eﬀect on
the labour market for men that is not captured by the uv-ratio. Finally, I control for the size
of the labour market by including the employment level. If there were increasing returns
to job matching in large markets, the local employment hazard should positively depend on
the labour market size (Petrongolo, 2001).
Finally, annual ﬁxed eﬀects are included to measure aggregate cyclical eﬀects and capture
possible changes that are due to the re-uniﬁcation of West and East Germany in 1990. A
detailed description of the data, its sources, deﬁnitions and summary statistics are shown in
Appendix C. All regional indicators are coded at the level of labour market regions which
16Fredriksson and Johansson (2003) and Lindgren and Westerlund (2003) present evidence that mobility
is lower among Swedish participants of ALMP. Moreover, Westerlund (1997, 1998) also ﬁnds evidence that
an increasing number of participants in ALMP reduces ﬂows of out migration in Sweden.
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are likely to be the most relevant for the job search behaviour of unemployed jobseekers.
Moreover, in order to ensure comparability across estimates, all regional covariates have
been standardised at the level of labour market regions, i.e. an increase of a covariate by one
refers to an increase by one standard deviation compared with the average labour market
region in the period 1983-1997.
Marginal eﬀects on interregional mobility As discussed previously, the estimated co-
eﬃcients are of direct interest when it comes to testing the predictions of the theoretical
model that job searchers adjust their spatial search strategies in response to changing labour
market conditions. These coeﬃcients do not say anything, however, about the qualitative
or quantitative eﬀect of the covariates on the probability of leaving unemployment via mi-
gration. This is because, in an independent competing risk model, the likelihood of exiting
via a speciﬁc type of exit depends on covariate estimates for all exit-speciﬁc risks (Thomas,
1996). In particular, the probability of an unemployed person with characteristics x leaving
unemployment for a job in a distant labour market, i.e. the cumulative migration probability
is given by
Πd(t|x) =
∫ t
0
hd(t|x)S(t|x)dt
with hd(t|x) as the migration hazard and S(t|x) as the overall survival function. Thus, this
probability is also a function of the covariate parameter for the local employment hazard so
that the qualitative eﬀect on migration probability may even be positive if the estimated
eﬀect of covariate xi is negative for both hd and hl. In addition to the estimated coeﬃcients,
the following analysis thus also looks at the marginal eﬀect of a covariate on Πd(x):
κk(t|x) = ∂Πk(t|x)
∂xi
I simulate these marginal eﬀects by calculating the diﬀerence between the probability of ex-
iting via migration within two years Πk(730|x¯) for a reference worker with average individual
and regional characteristics and the respective probability that is due to a marginal change
of a covariate17. Due to the stratiﬁcation technique, I obtain separate simulated marginal
17For all continuous variables, I simulate the marginal eﬀect of increasing xi by a standard deviation. For
all dummy variables the eﬀect refers to the diﬀerence between zero and one. Thus, note that the marginal
eﬀect for dummy variables does not exactly refer to the base probability Πk(730|x¯) that is included in the
subsequent result tables.
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eﬀects for each local labour market region. I thus calculate the average marginal eﬀect across
all strata κ¯k by averaging across all j labour market speciﬁc marginal eﬀects κkj . Based on
500 repetitions, I determine the 2.5% and the 97.5% percentiles of the conditional marginal
eﬀects bootstrap distribution.
2.4 Estimation Results
The ﬁrst subsection discusses estimation results for men and women to detect major result
patterns and to compare the results across speciﬁcations with and without unobserved re-
gional heterogeneity. Next, we look at the heterogeneity of these eﬀects across skill groups.
Given the high level of unemployment among low-skilled individuals in Germany, the re-
sponsiveness of this labour market segment to labour market conditions may be particularly
important for the equilibrating role of migration.
2.4.1 Mobility eﬀects when accounting for unobserved regional
heterogeneity
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 show estimation results for the local employment and migration hazard
for males and females, respectively. Successively expanding the set of regional covariates
did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the ﬁndings so that results are shown only for the full set of
covariates.18 Each table contains estimated hazard ratios for both the unstratiﬁed and the
stratiﬁed partial likelihood estimator. According to the clustering test statistic proposed by
Ridder and Tunali (1999), the inclusion of labour-market speciﬁc strata is highly signiﬁcant
in all speciﬁcations. Moreover, taking into account unobserved regional heterogeneity af-
fects the estimation results for some regional covariates and suggests serious biases in the
case of unobserved regional heterogeneity. Thus, marginal eﬀects are only displayed for the
stratiﬁed model. Before looking at the eﬀects of regional covariates in more detail, however,
some individual level covariates also deserve some discussion. In fact, individual character-
istics dominate unemployment experiences of unemployed jobseekers while labour market
characteristics often have a comparatively small eﬀect only.
18Estimation results for an expanding set of covariates are available from the author upon request.
CHAPTER 2. MOBILITY OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS 69
Individual level covariates The family background of the jobseeker has quite diﬀer-
ent eﬀects on the unemployment experiences of men and women. Married women have a
signiﬁcantly lower employment hazard both locally and non-locally than their male coun-
terparts and thus experience longer unemployment periods. Similarly, with an increase in
the cumulative migration probability of 27.7%, having children strongly enhances geographic
mobility among men, but has the opposite eﬀect on women (−36.0%). These gender diﬀer-
ences are likely to reﬂect the lower labour force attachment of women as well as child-rearing
responsibilities. Moreover, the mobility-enhancing eﬀect of having children on the mobil-
ity of men may to some extent reﬂect weekly long-distance commuting which due to data
limitations cannot be distinguished from residential movements.
The employment hazard for individuals above the age of 50 strongly decreases. The
probability of leaving unemployment via migration even decreases by around 70% for men
and women. This is in line with much lower exit rates at the end of the working life in
the presence of high mobility costs (see Kettunen, 1994). In Germany, such an eﬀect may
have been reinforced by the institutional framework. During the observation period, older
unemployed often were entitled to a very long receipt of unemployment beneﬁts. These
transfers in addition to compensation payments by their previous employers enabled older
unemployment to retire early without really seeking a new employment (see Lu¨demann et
al., 2004). The extremely low exit rates for individuals with UB entitlements of more than
two years are in line with such disincentive eﬀects, especially for geographic mobility. In
the case of men, UB entitlements that exceed two years signiﬁcantly reduce the migration
probability by 29.3% compared with 5.4% for local exits. Lower exit rates for individuals
with short or no entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts may thus seem at odds with the
theoretical expectations. However, this is likely to reﬂect unobserved negative selection of
this group because short or zero entitlement periods only occur if someone has not been
working continuously during the last years. Similar result patterns for the eﬀect of the
length of UB entitlements on transitions to employment with the same data set have been
found by Biewen and Wilke (2005). Moreover, in line with the theoretical expectations, a
higher income replacement rate decreases the employment hazard for both men and women.
As expected from the literature on migration, abler individuals as reﬂected in higher
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formal education and higher pre-unemployment wages19, have higher probabilities of leaving
unemployment via migration. Compared with individuals who have vocational training,
having only a high school degree, for example, decreases the likelihood of migration for men
(women) by 41.3% (38.0%) while a tertiary education increases the likelihood of being mobile
by 30.5% (13.4%). Concerning the eﬀect of the pre-unemployment wages, Biewen and Wilke
(2004) ﬁnd shorter unemployment durations among previously well-earning unemployed.
The estimation results for the competing risks model suggest that this eﬀect is due to a
higher migration hazard rather than due to a higher local employment hazard of individuals
in a higher wage quintile. This is in line with the migration literature that often ﬁnds a
positive selection of abler migrants since these individuals are more likely to beneﬁt from
migration in terms of wage gains (Greenwood, 1997). On the other hand, the percentage of
homeowners should be higher among previously well-earning unemployed which would rather
suggest lower migration rates. The mobility-enhancing eﬀect of high pre-unemployment
wages, however, clearly dominates since the cumulative migration probability even increases
by 36.3% for men and 42.9% women, respectively.
Previous unemployment periods increase the local employment hazard and leave the
migration hazard unaﬀected. This might reﬂect lower reservation wages of previously unem-
ployed individuals, but a lack of willingness to invest in geographic mobility. By contrast,
long previous unemployment periods signiﬁcantly decrease both the local employment and
the migration hazard and thus prolong current unemployment. Moreover, prolonging previ-
ous unemployment by three months has a stronger eﬀect on the migration hazard and thus
reduces the cumulative migration probability by 2.7% for men. This may reﬂect a combina-
tion of exhausting ﬁnancial resources and the discouraging eﬀect of a precarious employment
history on investing in geographic mobility. Finally, as expected, having ever been recalled
from the previous employer approximately halves the cumulative migration probability but
increases the local employment hazard.
19Of course, simultaneously controlling for previous wage income captures some diﬀerences between skill
levels. Still, I decided to also include the previous wage income because it reﬂects some of the heterogeneity
in ability and productivity that is not captured by the formal education.
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Regional covariates The theoretical framework predicts that unemployed jobseek-
ers choose search strategies that favour leaving regions with unfavourable re-employment
opportunities or lower wage levels compared with other regions. Moreover, the relative at-
tractiveness of the local area with respect to its living conditions may also aﬀect job search
strategies. Since amenities are mostly unobserved, estimation results for the unstratiﬁed
estimator (UPLE) that is subject to unobserved regional heterogeneity could be biased if
amenities compensate for unfavourable labour market conditions. Consistent with the idea
that relatively unfavourable labour market conditions may be compensated for by relatively
high regional amenities, the estimated eﬀect of the relative unemployment-vacancy ratio on
the migration hazard seems to be downward biased when omitting unobserved regional het-
erogeneity. While UPLE ﬁnds no evidence that men have higher migration hazards in regions
with a relatively poor labour demand, the stratiﬁed estimator (SPLE) that mitigates biases
from omitting unobserved regional heterogeneity suggests that men experience both a sig-
niﬁcantly lower local employment hazard and a higher migration hazard. As a consequence,
an increase in the relative uv-ratio by one standard deviation signiﬁcantly increases the cu-
mulative migration probability by 12.2% and reduces the cumulative probability of exiting
locally by 2.4%. By contrast, women experience only a reduced local employment hazard as
a response to a higher relative uv-ratio. The missing positive eﬀect on the migration hazard
suggests that the shift of search eﬀort to the distant region is too weak to counterbalance
the negative eﬀect of higher reservation wages that is induced by a higher relative uv-ratio.20
This would be in line with the notion that women often are mobility constrained due to
being a tied mover whose mobility decisions strongly depend on the situation of the male
breadwinner. Compared to men, women thus are more dependent on local labour market
conditions. In a region with a one standard deviation increase of the relative uv-ratio, the
cumulative probability of leaving unemployment to any kind of employment within two years
of job search decreases by around 2pp for women while the corresponding decrease is only
around 1pp for men. For men, a higher migration probability partially compensates for a
relatively weak local labour demand. Thus, at least for men, we can conclude that contrary
20As discussed in section 2.3, a higher relative uv-ratio reﬂects improving labour demand conditions in the
distant region while keeping the conditions in the local region constant. This may raise reservation wages
in all labour markets and may shift search eﬀort to the distant labour market. The eﬀect on the migration
hazard is thus indeterminate as a negative reservation wage eﬀect contrasts a positive direct eﬀect and a
positive search eﬀort eﬀect.
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to the ﬁndings by Windzio (2004) regarding mobility between north and south Germany
and in line with ﬁndings by Decressin (1994) on interregional migration ﬂows in western
Germany, unemployed individuals in western Germany choose search strategies that favour
leaving regions with relatively weak labour demand. These results contradict the competing
risk studies by Kettunen (2002) and Yankow (2002) who ﬁnd no evidence that unemployed
jobseekers react to local job-ﬁnding conditions.21 The comparison between the UPLE and
the SPLE estimates suggest, however, that their results may be subject to biases due to
unobserved regional heterogeneity.
In contrast to the relative uv-ratio, the eﬀect of the relative wage level is quite robust
across both model speciﬁcations. This may be because central wage bargaining in Germany
leaves little scope for local wage agreements. As a consequence, unemployment rather than
wage diﬀerentials might compensate for diﬀerences in living conditions in Germany and
unobserved regional heterogeneity may not have much of an eﬀect. In any case, both model
speciﬁcations indicate that the migration hazard is signiﬁcantly lower in regions with a high
relative wage level so that the cumulative probability of migration decreases by 6.6% (7.6%)
for men (women). The local exit hazard, on the other hand, is either unaﬀected in the
case of men or, somewhat surprisingly, marginally decreases in the case of women. This
contradicts the idea that jobseekers shift search eﬀort to the local area as a response to an
increasing relative wage level. The reduced eﬀect on the migration hazard is thus likely to
mainly reﬂect the direct negative eﬀect of lower wages in the distant labour market. On
the other hand, the ﬁndings may indicate that the wage measures included in the analysis
do not capture the behaviourally relevant interregional real wage diﬀerential. In addition,
regions with relatively high wages may attract additional job searchers from other regions.
In this case, an additional congestion eﬀect may yield insigniﬁcant or negative eﬀects on the
local exit hazard even if there was an increase in local search eﬀort.
Exit hazards may also be aﬀected by changing aggregate conditions between 1983 and
1997. As discussed in section 2.3, a higher local unemployment-vacancy ratio when control-
ling for the relative uv-ratio indicates deteriorating overall labour demand conditions. The
corresponding negative eﬀect on the exit hazards seems to dominate a counteracting de-
21Yankow (2002) uses the unemployment rate, while Kettunen (2002) uses the unemployment-vacancy
ratio as an indicator of local job-ﬁnding conditions.
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crease in reservation wages and thus results in lower employment hazards everywhere in the
economy which prolongs unemployment. Similarly, a higher aggregate wage level as reﬂected
by a higher local wage level when controlling for interregional wage diﬀerentials results in
signiﬁcantly higher migration hazards, but somewhat surprisingly leaves the local exit haz-
ard either unaﬀected in the case of women or even results in a lower local exit hazard for
men. This latter ﬁnding might indicate that in addition to an increasing reservation wage,
there is an encouragement eﬀect of boom periods that shifts search eﬀort from the local to
the non-local labour market.
Some of the other covariates that have been included to control for additional local labour
market characteristics also signiﬁcantly aﬀect the search strategy of the jobseeker and thus
deserve some discussion. Since diﬀerences between the UPLE and the SPLE estimates are
rather marginal, I discuss these ﬁndings based on the SPLE results. Higher employment
growth, for example, signiﬁcantly increases the local employment hazard, while there is a
negative but insigniﬁcant eﬀect on the migration hazard for both men and women. Thus, in
line with Yankow (2002), the evidence in favour of a signiﬁcant change in the allocation of
search eﬀort across regions as a response to local employment growth is inconclusive.
Secondly, the local accommodation of work creation schemes does not seem to have any
eﬀect on the migration hazard for men, but signiﬁcantly reduces the migration hazard for
women by almost 12%. Although the eﬀect of the local accommodation ratio on the local
exit hazard cannot be interpreted causally because the eﬀect may be endogenous (see section
2.3), the signiﬁcant eﬀect on the female migration hazard can only be explained by a shift
of search eﬀort away from non-local employment. Thus, complementing the evidence on a
regional locking-in eﬀect of participating in work creation schemes (Lindgren andWesterlund,
2003), this paper presents evidence that such programs also have a locking-in eﬀect on
female non-participants by reducing search eﬀort in non-local labour markets. The fact that
such locking-in eﬀects are only detectable for women may imply that participating in such
programs is a more attractive substitute for regular non-local employment for women than
for men as women tend to be more dependent on local labour market conditions.
As expected, a high share of male unemployment seems to reﬂect additional congestion
eﬀects on the labour market for men because the local employment hazard for men is sig-
niﬁcantly reduced while no eﬀect can be found for women. Interestingly, there is also a
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signiﬁcant and strong negative eﬀect on the male migration hazard such that the marginal
eﬀect on the cumulative migration probability even amounts to −18.2%. As an explanation,
massive de-industrialisation and the corresponding increase in male unemployment may af-
fect individual labour market behaviour by reducing the willingness to make eﬀorts to regain
employment if peers are also unemployed (Ritchie et al., 2005). Thus, both local and non-
local exit hazards may be particularly low in these regions, resulting in a growing share of
long-term unemployed.
The remaining covariates mostly have a minor impact only. A high share of employment
in certain sectors such as agriculture, construction and services positively aﬀects local exit
hazards for men, a result that likely reﬂects the seasonal character of jobs in these sectors.
No such eﬀects can be found for women though. Moreover, a higher population density
strongly accelerates local job exits among women, a result that, among others, may reﬂect
that such regions oﬀer more jobs that are easily accessible for women such as part-time
employment.
2.4.2 Mobility eﬀects by educational attainment
In order to examine whether skill groups diﬀer in their responsiveness to labour market
conditions, Table 2.4 compares estimates for low-skilled men with a high-school degree with
estimates for skilled men who have either a vocational training or even a tertiary education.22
I restrict the following discussion to men because low-skilled women have extremely low
migration rates and the estimates do not therefore appear very reliable.
To begin with, it is important to note that the average skilled worker is four times more
likely to leave the local labour market within two years of job search than the average low-
skilled worker as can be seen from Πd(730|x¯). Moreover, skilled individuals are not only
more mobile, but they are also more responsive to labour market conditions. In particular,
skilled individuals have a signiﬁcantly higher migration hazard in regions with a relatively
weak labour demand and relatively low wages. The simultaneous reduction in the local em-
ployment hazard in response to a higher relative uv-ratio suggests that the increase in the
migration hazard is partially due to a shift in search eﬀort from the local to the distant re-
gion. By contrast, a similar though only weakly signiﬁcant decrease of the local employment
22The share of unemployed people with tertiary education is around 5%.
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hazard for low-skilled individuals in response to a higher relative uv-ratio is not reﬂected
in a signiﬁcantly increasing migration hazard. As a consequence, a one standard deviation
increase of the relative uv-ratio results in a reduced probability of leaving unemployment
to any type of employment by 1.5pp for low-skilled jobseekers, but only by 0.8pp in the
case of skilled individuals. Low-skilled jobseekers thus constitute an immobile labour mar-
ket segment that is more dependent on local labour market conditions than their skilled
counterparts.
At ﬁrst sight, labour market institutions such as passive and active labour market mea-
sures do not seem to explain the immobility of low-skilled as compared to skilled jobseekers.
The length of UB entitlements shows similar result patterns for both skill groups with only
extremely long entitlements having a somewhat stronger mobility-reducing impact on low-
skilled individuals. Moreover, an extensive local supply of work creation programs increases
the migration probability among low-skilled jobseekers by 30% (0.3pp). Thus, instead of a
locking-in eﬀect, low-skilled individuals seem to be pushed out of the labour market, a result
that may indicate a crowding out of low-skilled jobseekers if work creation schemes tend to
substitute for low-skilled jobs, but are primarily taken by skilled individuals. Labour mar-
ket institutions thus do not seem to provide an explanation for lower mobility levels among
low-skilled individuals. However, there are a number of observations that indirectly point
towards the impact of the unemployment compensation and welfare system. One major
drawback of the IAB-REG is that we cannot identify individuals who receive social beneﬁts
in addition to unemployment compensation and thus reach actual income replacement rates
that are close to 100%23. This is because the IAB-REG does not include suﬃcient informa-
tion on the household context (e.g. spouse income, number of dependent children, private
savings) to identify individuals who are eligible for additional social beneﬁts. A likely disin-
centive eﬀect stemming from an unobserved receipt of supplementary welfare should thus be
partially reﬂected in those individual-level characteristics that are related to the receipt of
welfare such as low pre-unemployment wage income or having children. In particular, having
dependent children strongly increases the likelihood of receiving social beneﬁts, especially
among low-skilled with rather low pre-unemployment earnings. The relatively weak eﬀect
23Supplementary social beneﬁts may thus explain why the estimated eﬀect for the income replacement
rate that refers exclusively to the unemployment compensation in Table 2.4 shows only weak eﬀects for
low-skilled individuals who are more likely to be unemployed social beneﬁt recipients.
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of having children compared to the strong mobility-enhancing impact on skilled individuals
may thus partially reﬂect these disincentive eﬀects. Similarly, pre-unemployment earnings
in the lowest two wage quintiles have a strong mobility-reducing impact, especially among
low-skilled individuals who mainly (62.5%) earn a wage income that falls into these lower
wage quintiles. The ﬁndings thus provide some indirect evidence that the unemployment
compensation and welfare system may provide at least a partial explanation why low-skilled
jobseekers in Germany are less mobile than their skilled counterparts.
CHAPTER 2. MOBILITY OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS 81
T
ab
le
2.
4:
E
st
im
at
ed
ha
za
rd
ra
ti
os
an
d
m
ar
gi
na
l
eﬀ
ec
ts
fo
r
th
e
lo
ca
l
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
ha
za
rd
(h
l)
an
d
th
e
m
ig
ra
ti
on
ha
za
rd
(h
d
)
fo
r
a
st
ra
ti
ﬁe
d
pa
rt
ia
l
lik
el
ih
oo
d
es
ti
m
at
or
by
sk
ill
-l
ev
el
,
IA
B
S
19
83
-1
99
7,
M
en
L
ow
-s
ki
lle
d
Sk
ill
ed
ex
p
(βˆ
l)
ex
p
(βˆ
d
)
κˆ
l
(%
)
κˆ
d
(%
)
ex
p
(βˆ
l)
ex
p
(βˆ
d
)
κˆ
l†
(%
)
κˆ
d
†
(%
)
Π
k
(7
30
|x¯)
50
.7
1.
1
59
.3
4.
0
In
d
iv
id
u
al
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
M
ar
ri
ed
1.
20
9∗
∗
1.
24
9
11
.8
∗
16
.7
∗
1.
21
4∗
∗
1.
21
9∗
∗
9.
8∗
11
.5
∗
C
hi
ld
re
n
1.
02
9
1.
07
3
1.
6
6.
1∗
1.
14
2∗
∗
1.
40
7∗
∗
5.
3∗
30
.9
∗
A
ge
26
-2
9
1.
02
5
1.
00
4
1.
6
-0
.5
1.
11
3∗
∗
1.
10
1∗
5.
3∗
4.
8
A
ge
30
-3
4
1.
00
6
0.
79
4
1.
0
-2
0.
3∗
1.
05
3∗
∗
1.
10
1∗
2.
1∗
7.
2∗
A
ge
40
-4
4
0.
92
7
0.
95
9
-4
.3
-1
.5
0.
96
6
0.
92
1†
-1
.4
-6
.2
∗
A
ge
45
-4
9
0.
89
2∗
0.
75
5†
-6
.0
∗
-2
1.
0∗
0.
92
0∗
∗
0.
86
6∗
-3
.7
∗
-9
.9
∗
A
ge
50
-5
4
0.
81
7∗
∗
0.
45
3∗
∗
-1
0.
6
∗
-5
1.
0∗
0.
88
3∗
∗
0.
73
8∗
∗
-5
.4
∗
-2
1.
6∗
A
ge
>
55
0.
48
2∗
∗
0.
19
0∗
∗
-3
6.
1
∗
-7
5.
8∗
0.
38
1∗
∗
0.
21
1∗
∗
-4
1.
0∗
-6
9.
0∗
T
er
ti
ar
y
ed
uc
at
io
n
n/
a
0.
76
3∗
∗
1.
25
4∗
∗
-2
0.
3∗
30
.4
∗
U
ns
ki
lle
d
bl
ue
-c
ol
la
r
0.
92
6∗
0.
84
3
-4
.0
∗
-1
3.
1∗
0.
87
4∗
∗
0.
88
8∗
∗
-6
.3
∗
-5
.7
∗
W
hi
te
-c
ol
la
r
0.
76
2∗
∗
1.
46
2∗
-1
8.
4
∗
55
.1
∗
0.
60
9∗
∗
1.
23
5∗
∗
-2
7.
3∗
44
.5
∗
1s
t
&
2n
d
w
ag
e
qu
in
ti
le
0.
78
7∗
∗
0.
64
8∗
∗
-1
2.
4
∗
-2
8.
9∗
0.
82
6∗
∗
0.
85
5∗
∗
-8
.6
∗
-6
.4
∗
4t
h
&
5t
h
w
ag
e
qu
in
ti
le
1.
01
8
1.
03
3
0.
9
2.
5
0.
98
1
1.
40
3∗
∗
-2
.8
∗
39
.2
∗
P
re
v.
jo
b
te
nu
re
(i
n
qu
ar
te
rs
)
0.
97
8∗
∗
0.
97
2∗
∗
-1
.0
∗
-1
.7
∗
0.
98
5∗
∗
0.
96
4∗
∗
-0
.4
∗
-2
.7
∗
P
re
vi
ou
sl
y
un
em
pl
oy
ed
1.
27
0∗
∗
0.
90
1
16
.5
∗
-1
6.
4∗
1.
25
7∗
∗
0.
96
4
14
.5
∗
-1
1.
2∗
T
ot
al
pr
ev
.
un
em
p.
du
r.
(i
n
qu
.)
0.
98
0∗
∗
0.
94
9∗
∗
-1
.1
∗
-4
.3
∗
0.
98
5∗
∗
0.
96
7∗
∗
-0
.6
∗
-2
.5
∗
R
ec
al
l
fr
om
pr
ev
.
em
pl
oy
er
1.
54
8∗
∗
0.
59
8∗
∗
29
.1
∗
-4
8.
9∗
1.
40
8∗
∗
0.
54
5∗
∗
20
.8
∗
-5
2.
4∗
M
ax
.
U
B
0
m
on
th
s
0.
63
4∗
∗
0.
78
3
-2
5.
7
∗
-1
0.
2∗
0.
53
5∗
∗
0.
68
1∗
∗
-3
1.
0∗
-1
4.
9∗
M
ax
.
U
B
1-
12
m
on
th
s
0.
82
7∗
∗
0.
90
8
-1
1.
0
∗
-3
.3
0.
72
4∗
∗
1.
10
0∗
-1
7.
4∗
23
.5
∗
M
ax
.
U
B
13
-2
4
m
on
th
s
0.
98
1
0.
89
1
-1
.0
-1
0.
2
1.
00
5
0.
97
5
0.
3
-2
.7
M
ax
.
U
B
>
24
m
on
th
s
0.
87
0†
0.
43
0∗
-7
.0
∗
-5
4.
5∗
0.
88
2∗
∗
0.
67
5∗
∗
-4
.7
∗
-2
7.
7∗
C
on
ti
nu
ed
on
ne
xt
pa
ge
..
.
CHAPTER 2. MOBILITY OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS 82
..
.
ta
bl
e
2.
4
co
nt
in
ue
d
In
co
m
e
re
pl
ac
em
en
t
ra
te
0.
98
3†
0.
96
8
-0
.3
-2
.0
0.
97
1∗
∗
0.
93
9∗
∗
0.
3∗
-3
.2
∗
Fo
ur
th
qu
ar
te
r
0.
46
5∗
∗
0.
71
9∗
∗
-3
9.
1
∗
-9
.3
0.
52
4∗
∗
0.
74
6∗
∗
-3
0.
5∗
-4
.3
Y
ea
r
an
d
se
ct
or
du
m
m
ie
s‡
X
X
X
X
R
eg
io
n
al
co
va
ri
at
es
U
V
-r
at
io
0.
89
7∗
∗
0.
95
9
-6
.4
∗
-0
.5
0.
88
0∗
∗
0.
88
1∗
∗
-6
.0
∗
-6
.6
∗
R
el
at
iv
e
uv
-r
at
io
0.
95
0†
1.
06
7
-3
.2
∗
8.
4
0.
97
0∗
1.
12
0∗
∗
-2
.3
∗
12
.7
∗
W
ag
e
le
ve
l
0.
94
5
1.
06
9
-3
.6
∗
8.
7
0.
95
0∗
∗
1.
05
0†
-2
.9
∗
7.
0∗
R
el
at
iv
e
w
ag
e
le
ve
l
0.
97
5
0.
94
7
-1
.4
-4
.4
0.
99
4
0.
92
9∗
∗
0.
1
-6
.6
∗
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
gr
ow
th
1.
05
5∗
∗
0.
95
4
3.
3∗
-6
.4
1.
04
1∗
∗
0.
97
2
2.
2∗
-4
.3
A
cc
om
m
od
at
io
n
ra
ti
o
1.
01
7
1.
31
3∗
∗
0.
5
30
.0
∗
1.
05
5∗
∗
1.
00
9
2.
9∗
-1
.3
M
al
e
un
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
0.
92
1∗
∗
0.
91
9
-4
.9
∗
-5
.5
0.
91
3∗
∗
0.
77
6∗
∗
-4
.1
∗
-8
.9
∗
Sh
ar
e
of
H
S
em
p.
1.
01
3
0.
59
9∗
∗
2.
0
-3
9.
8∗
1.
02
9
0.
97
2
1.
7
-3
.8
E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
le
ve
l
1.
20
2
1.
52
6
9.
9
41
.2
1.
11
4
0.
97
8
5.
6
-6
.7
P
op
ul
at
io
n
de
ns
it
y
1.
25
0
1.
17
5
13
.2
7.
8
0.
90
1
0.
95
4
-5
.7
-0
.8
A
gr
ic
ul
tu
re
1.
04
1
0.
89
2
2.
7
-1
1.
8
1.
07
5∗
∗
1.
18
2∗
3.
1∗
13
.9
∗
In
ve
st
m
en
t
go
od
s
in
d.
1.
00
8
1.
62
5
-0
.4
60
.8
1.
10
7†
1.
12
0
5.
0
6.
9
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
go
od
s
in
d.
0.
95
8
1.
00
3
-2
.9
1.
5
0.
95
4
0.
84
1
-2
.0
-1
3.
9∗
C
on
st
ru
ct
io
n
1.
12
0∗
1.
27
5
6.
5∗
22
.1
1.
09
2∗
∗
1.
10
1
4.
3∗
5.
7
Se
rv
ic
es
0.
98
7
1.
14
0
-1
.1
14
.2
1.
18
5∗
∗
1.
05
9
8.
7∗
-1
.9
N
um
be
r
of
sp
el
ls
16
,5
62
16
,5
62
70
,6
98
70
,6
98
N
um
be
r
of
ex
it
s
10
,4
44
66
7
46
,5
08
6,
11
5
L
og
-l
ik
el
ih
oo
d
-4
0,
63
3.
6
-2
,3
21
.9
-2
48
,5
63
.0
-3
1,
68
4.
9
χ
2
(d
f
)
cl
us
te
ri
ng
te
st
47
4.
7
(5
6)
80
.3
(5
6)
1,
07
3.
1
(5
6)
18
6.
2
(5
6)
† R
ef
er
s
to
m
ar
gi
na
l
eﬀ
ec
ts
on
ex
it
-s
pe
ci
ﬁc
pr
ob
ab
ili
ti
es
(s
ee
pr
ev
io
us
se
ct
io
n)
.
C
or
re
sp
on
di
ng
st
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ha
ve
be
en
bo
ot
st
ra
pp
ed
w
it
h
50
0
re
pe
ti
ti
on
s.
‡ I
nc
lu
de
s
15
ye
ar
du
m
m
ie
s
an
d
6
du
m
m
ie
s
fo
r
th
e
pr
ev
io
us
se
ct
or
of
ac
ti
vi
ty
.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
fo
r
ha
za
rd
ra
ti
os
ar
e
ro
bu
st
w
it
h
re
sp
ec
t
to
cl
us
te
ri
ng
at
th
e
le
ve
l
of
la
bo
ur
m
ar
ke
t
re
gi
on
s.
Si
gn
iﬁ
ca
nc
e
le
ve
ls
:
†:
10
%
∗:
5%
∗∗
:
1%
CHAPTER 2. MOBILITY OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS 83
2.5 Conclusion
This paper has looked at a competing risks model of exiting unemployment to either a local or
a non-local job in order to test whether unemployed individuals in western Germany adjust
their search strategy to favour migration away from depressed regions. The equilibrating
role of interregional migration critically hinges on such search strategies. Previous studies
which have looked at the migratory behaviour of unemployed jobseekers in a competing
risks framework have not found any evidence that individuals adjust their search strategies
to local job-ﬁnding conditions (Kettunen, 2002; Yankow, 2002). The results of this paper
indicate that this may be due to biases that result from unobserved regional heterogeneity.
Using a stratiﬁed partial likelihood estimator that takes into account location-speciﬁc ﬁxed
eﬀects and thus mitigates biases from unobserved regional heterogeneity, the paper comes
to the following conclusions:
• Unemployed jobseekers are at least partially responsive to local labour market condi-
tions. In particular, unemployed men choose search strategies that favour migration
away from regions with a relatively weak labour demand compared to other regions.
This latter eﬀect is not detectable for a speciﬁcation that is subject to unobserved
regional heterogeneity. The implied downward bias is consistent with the idea that
unobserved regional amenities compensate for unfavourable labour market conditions.
• Women are less responsive to labour market conditions than their male counterparts.
Moreover, family-responsibilities strongly reduce migration among women, but not
among men. These gender diﬀerences probably reﬂect that women are often tied
movers and have a weaker labour force attachment than men. This may also explain
why there is signiﬁcant evidence that extensive local work creation schemes exercise a
regional locking-in eﬀect on women, but not on men. If women are more dependent
on the local labour market, participation in active labour market programs may be a
more attractive substitute for non-local employment for women than for men.
• Compared with skilled men, low-skilled men are relatively immobile and only weakly
respond to labour market conditions. Deteriorating labour demand conditions thus
translate into prolonged unemployment. These ﬁndings are unsettling if labour mobil-
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ity is envisaged as one way of reducing regional disparities and of increasing employ-
ment levels.
• Even though labour market conditions are relevant for the search strategy of some
groups of unemployed jobseekers, geographic mobility is clearly driven by individual
characteristics such as age, educational attainment and employment history (e.g. pre-
vious recalls).
• The mobility-reducing eﬀects of being entitled to a long receipt of unemployment bene-
ﬁts and generous income replacement rates suggest that the institutional framework is
also a major determinant of the migratory behaviour of unemployed jobseekers. Such
disincentives may also partially explain the weak responsiveness to regional labour
market conditions among low-skilled individuals because this labour segment is more
likely to receive social beneﬁts in addition to unemployment compensation and thus
reach extensive income replacement rates.
The responsiveness of skilled men to labour market conditions suggests that labour mo-
bility in western Germany may at least contribute to the reduction of regional disparities
although the low responsiveness among low-skilled individuals indicates that such counteract-
ing forces are partially weak. Moreover, the equilibrating role of labour mobility ultimately
depends not only on the responsiveness, but also on the level and speed of mobility. Even
among the most mobile segments of the German labour force, mobility is rather low in an
international comparison. The ﬁndings from this paper are thus in line with previous results
from a study by Mo¨ller (1995) that adjustment processes after region-speciﬁc shocks tend
to be slow in Germany. The results presented in this paper already point towards the un-
employment compensation system as one possible reason for low mobility levels and a weak
responsiveness to regional labour market conditions, but further research is necessary on this
topic.
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Appendix
A – Comparative statics for reservation wages
A.1 – Transfer payments
d wrl
d b
=
r
αlσ(el)(1− Fl(wrl )) + αdσ(ed)(1− Fd(wrd)) + r
> 0
and
d wrd
d b
=
d wrl
d b
because wrd = w
r
l + (al − ad) + pcd + r mcd (see equation (2.6)).
A.2 – Job oﬀer arrival rate
d wrl
d αk
=
σ(ek) P (w ≥ wrk) E(w|w ≥ wrk)
αlσ(el)(1− Fl(wrl )) + αdσ(ed)(1− Fd(wrd)) + r
> 0 ∀k = d, l
and again,
d wrd
d αk
=
d wrl
d αk
.
A.3 – Search cost
d wrl
d ck(ek)
= − r c
′
k(ek)
αlσ(el)(1− Fl(wrl )) + αdσ(ed)(1− Fd(wrd)) + r
< 0 ∀k = d, l
since c′k(ek) > 0. Again,
d wrd
d ck(ek)
=
d wrl
d ck(ek)
.
A.4 – Moving cost For ﬂow-type moving cost, the eﬀect on the local reservation wage is:
d wrl
d pcd
= − αdσ(ed)(1− Fd(w
r
d))
αlσ(el)(1− Fl(wrl )) + αdσ(ed)(1− Fd(wrd)) + r
< 0
and it follows that −1 < d wrl
d pcd
< 0. The eﬀect on wrd can be derived from equation 2.6:
d wrd
d pcd
=
d wrd
d wrl
d wrl
d pcd
+ 1 = 1− αd(ed)(1− Fd(w
r
d))
αl(el)(1− Fl(wrl )) + αd(ed)(1− Fd(wrd)) + r
> 0
and it follows that 0 <
d wrd
d pcd
< 1. For lump-sum moving cost, the corresponding eﬀects are
d wrl
d mcd
= r
d wrl
d pcd
< 0 and
d wrd
d mcd
= r
d wrl
d pcd
> 0.
A.5 – Amenities
d wrl
d al
= − αdσ(ed)(1− Fd(w
r
d))
αlσ(el)(1− Fl(wrl )) + αdσ(ed)(1− Fd(wrd)) + r
< 0
d wrl
d ad
=
αdσ(ed)(1− Fd(wrd))
αlσ(el)(1− Fl(wrl )) + αdσ(ed)(1− Fd(wrd)) + r
> 0
while
d wrd
d al
= 1 +
d wrl
d al
> 0 and
d wrd
d ad
=
d wrl
d ad
− 1 < 0 because −1 < d wrl
d al
< 0 and 0 <
d wrl
d ad
< 1.
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A.6 – Wage distribution Consider the following transformation of equation (2.6):
(r + αlσ(el) + αdσ(ed))w
r
l = r(bl − cl(el)− cd(ed)) (2.9)
+αlσ(el)[EFl(w) +
∫ wrl
0
Fl(w)dw]
+αdσ(ed)[EFd(w) +
∫ wrd
0
Fd(w)dw]
For an alternative wage oﬀer function Gl whose mean is µ units larger than the mean of Fl,
i.e. Gl ﬁrst order stochastically dominates Fl with Gl(w+µ) = Fl(w), equation (2.9) for the
wage oﬀer distribution Gl can be written as
(r + αlσ(el) + αdσ(ed))w
r
l (µ) = r(bl − cl(el)− cd(ed)) (2.10)
+αlσ(el)[EFl(w) + µ+
∫ wrl (µ)
0
Fl(w − µ)dw]
+αdσ(ed)[EFd(w) +
∫ wrd(µ)
0
Fd(w)dw]
limµ→0 (2.10)−(2.9) and rearranging yields:
d wrl
d µ
=
αlσ(el)(1− Fl(wrl ))
αlσ(el)(1− Fl(wrl )) + αdσ(ed)(1− Fd(wrd)) + r
> 0
and
d wrl
d µ
=
d wrd
d µ
. For a wage oﬀer distribution Gd(w + µ) = Fd(w), the analogous result is
d wrl
d µ
=
d wrd
d µ
> 0.
B – Comparative statics for the allocation of search eﬀort
The optimal allocation of search eﬀort across regions e∗k is derived by diﬀerentiating V
u
l with
respect to ek:
c′k(e
∗
k) =
αkσ
′(e∗k)
r
∫ wmax
wrk
(w − wrk)dFk(w) ∀k = d, l (2.11)
The eﬀect of changing conditions on the allocation of search eﬀort is given as
d e∗k
d x
= − Fx
Fe∗
k
with x being the changing condition of interest. It holds that
Fe∗k = αkσ
′′(e∗k)
∫ wmax
wrk
(w − wrk)dFk(w)− c′′k(e∗k) < 0 ∀k = d, l
because σ′′(e∗k) < 0 and c
′′
k(e
∗
k) > 0. Thus, sgn(
d e∗k
d x
) = sgn(Fx).
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B.1 – Transfer payments
sgn[
d e∗k
d bl
] = sgn[−αkσ
′(e∗k)
r
d wk
d bl
(1− Fl(wrk))] < 0 ∀k = d, l
because σ′(e∗k) > 0 and
d wk
d bl
> 0 follows from A.1.
B.2 – Job oﬀer arrival rate
sgn[
d e∗l
d αl
] = sgn[
σ′(e∗l )
r
∫ wmax
wrl
(w − wrl )dFl(w)
[1− αlσ(e
∗
l )(1− Fl(wrl ))
αlσ(e∗l )(1− Fl(wrl )) + αdσ(e∗d)(1− Fd(wrd)) + r
]] > 0
sgn[
d e∗l
d αd
] = sgn[−αlσ
′(e∗l )
r
d wrl
d αd
(1− Fl(wrl ))] < 0
because
d wrl
αd
> 0 follows from A.2. Analogously, it can be shown that
d e∗d
d αd
> 0 and
d e∗d
d αl
< 0.
B.3 – Search cost
sgn[
d e∗l
d cl
] = sgn[−αlσ
′(e∗l )
r
d wrl
d cl
(1− Fl(wrl ))− c′′l (e∗l )]
which is ambiguous because ck(e
∗
k) is convex with c
′′
k(e
∗
k) > 0 and
d wrl
d cl
< 0. Analogously,
d e∗d
d cd
is also ambiguous. By contrast, increasing search costs in a region increases search eﬀort in
alternative regions, i.e.
sgn[
d e∗l
d cd
] = sgn[−αlσ
′(e∗l )
r
d wrl
d cd
(1− Fl(wrl ))] > 0
because
d wrl
d cd
< 0 follows from A.3. For the same reason, it can be shown that
d e∗d
d cl
> 0.
B.4 – Moving cost
sgn[
d e∗l
d pcd
] = sgn[−αlσ
′(e∗l )
r
d wrl
d pcd
(1− Fl(wrl ))] > 0
sgn[
d e∗d
d pcd
] = sgn[−αdσ
′(e∗d)
r
d wrd
d pcd
(1− Fd(wrd))] < 0
because
d wrl
d pcd
< 0 and
d wrd
d pcd
> 0 follows from A.4. Lump-sum moving costs aﬀect the allocation
of search eﬀort analogously with
d e∗l
d mcd
> 0 and
d e∗d
d mcd
< 0.
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B.5 – Amenities
sgn[
d e∗l
d al
] = sgn[−αlσ
′(e∗l )
r
d wrl
d al
(1− Fl(wrl ))] > 0
sgn[
d e∗l
d ad
] = sgn[−αlσ
′(e∗l )
r
d wrl
d ad
(1− Fl(wrl ))] < 0
because
d wrl
d al
< 0 and
d wrl
d ad
> 0 follows from A.5. It also follows from A.5 that
d e∗d
d ad
> 0 and
d e∗d
d al
< 0.
B.6 – Wage distribution As in A.6, consider an improvement of the local relative to the
distant wage oﬀer distribution, i.e. Gl(w + µ) = Fl. After transforming equation (2.11) as
discussed in A.6 and taking the diﬀerence between the resulting equation and the equation
for the original wage distribution Fl, limµ→0 yields:
sgn[
d e∗l
d µ
] = sgn(
αlσ
′(e∗l )
r
[(1− Fl(wrl ))(1−
d wrl
d µ
)]) > 0
because 0 <
d wrl
d µ
< 1. By contrast, search eﬀort in the distant region decreases because
sgn[
d e∗d
d µ
] = sgn[−αdσ
′(e∗d)
r
[(1− Fd(wrl ))
d wrd
d µ
]] < 0
follows from
d wrd
d µ
> 0. The analogous opposite eﬀects can be shown in case of an improvement
in the distant relative to the local wage distribution.
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C – Data Description
C.1 - Description and data sources of regional covariates
Variables Descriptiona Data Sourceb 1yr
lag
Regional covariates with area variation
UV-ratio Ratio between registered unemployed and va-
cancies, i.e. Ul/Vl
BA X
Relative uv-ratio Local uv-ratio divided by uv-ratio in all distant
regions, i.e. Ul/VlUd/Vd
BA X
Accommodation ratio Number of participants in work creation
schemes (Arbeitsbeschaﬀungsmaßnahmen) di-
vided by number of unemployed people plus par-
ticipants in such schemes
BA X
Share of sector j Employment share in agriculture, investment
goods industry, consumption goods industry,
construction, services (reference: retail)
IABS-REG X
Share of HS employ-
ment
Share of employees with a tertiary education IABS-REG X
Male unemployment Share of unemployed people who are male BA X
Employment level Total average employment IABS-REG X
Population density Population divided by area New Chronos,
BA
X
Regional covariates with area and individual variation
Wage level Individual i’s predicted wage level in the local
labour market region (see C.3 for details)
IAB-R01
Relative wage level Individual i’s predicted wage level in the local
labour market divided by individual i’s average
aggregate wage level (see C.3 for details)
IAB-R01
Employment growth Average employment change compared with the
previous year in individual i’s skill group (low-
skilled without vocational training, skilled with
vocational training or tertiary education)
IABS-REG
a All regional indicators have been aggregated to the level of labour market regions.
b See C.2 for details on the data sources.
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C.2 - Details on regional data sources
• BA - Data is released by the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit) and is
coded at the level of labour oﬃce agencies (Arbeitsamtsbezirke). Since the IABS-REG only
contains information on the microcensus region of the workplace and microcensus regions
and labour oﬃce agencies are spatially misaligned, all BA data have been interpolated to
microcensus regions by using the simple area weighting that has been proposed in chapter
(1) of this dissertation.
• New Chronos - Regional database that is released by Eurostat.
• IABS-REG - Some regional covariates have been calculated based on the IABS-REG itself.
Employment in region k by sector and skill-group is computed for the 15th of each month.
Employment shares by sector and high-skilled individuals are then calculated as a yearly
average across all months. Employment growth by skill-group refers to the change of these
yearly averages.
• IAB-R01 - The IAB-R01 is released by the IAB (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt- und Berufs-
forschung) and has the same spell structure as the IABS-REG which is described in detail
in section 2.3. In contrast to the IABS-REG, the sample contains 2.2% instead of 1% of the
population working in a job that is subject to social insurance contributions and contains
fewer individual-level information.
C.3 - Wage estimates based on the IAB-R01 For the wage estimates, I create yearly
sub-samples with all full-time employees on 01/01. These sub-samples contain between 200-300,000
observations for each year with a minimum of 300 observations in each region. For each year, I
separately estimate Mincerian type wage equations with years of education, experience, squared
experience, nine sector dummies and ﬁve occupation type dummies. I take account of the fact that
wages in the IAB-R01 are top-coded and run a censored regression instead of simple OLS. Based on
the resulting estimates, I predict the average aggregate wage in year t for each individual i in the
IAB-REG sample (IAB-REG and IAB-R01 are comparable in the used covariates). I run the same
type of wage regression separately for each labour market region and year to predict individual i’s
wage in year t in the local region. Dividing this measure by the predicted average aggregate wage
for individual i in year t yields the relative wage measure.
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C.4 - Descriptive statistics - Men
Spells ending ...
All Spells in migration locally
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Individual level covariates
Family background1
Married 0.62 0.48 0.58 0.49 0.62 0.49
Children 0.56 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.56 0.50
Age at beginning of unemployment spell1 (Reference: 35-39 years)
26-29 0.20 0.40 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
30-34 0.19 0.39 0.25 0.43 0.20 0.40
40-44 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33
45-49 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.13 0.33
50-54 0.10 0.31 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31
> 55 0.14 0.34 0.03 0.17 0.07 0.26
Formal education1 (Reference: Vocational training)
High school degree 0.19 0.39 0.10 0.30 0.18 0.39
Higher education 0.04 0.21 0.13 0.34 0.03 0.16
Previous wage quintile1 (Reference: 3rd quintile)
1st & 2nd 0.49 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.49 0.50
4th & 5th 0.32 0.47 0.39 0.49 0.30 0.46
Previous job status1 (Reference: Skilled blue-collar worker)
Unskilled blue-collar 0.37 0.48 0.29 0.45 0.38 0.48
White-collar 0.16 0.37 0.34 0.48 0.11 0.31
Previous sector of activity1 (Reference: Retail)
Agriculture 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.15 0.06 0.24
Investment goods ind. 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.19 0.40
Consumption goods ind. 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.26
Construction 0.27 0.44 0.20 0.40 0.33 0.47
Services 0.21 0.41 0.30 0.46 0.19 0.39
Max. entitlement period for unemployment beneﬁts1 (Reference: 12 months)
0 months 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.23
1-12 months 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.39 0.15 0.35
13-24 months 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36
> 24 months 0.16 0.36 0.05 0.23 0.10 0.30
Continued on next page...
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... table 2.5 continued
Other individual characteristics
Income replacement rate (in %) 65.1 3.5 64.5 3.8 65.2 3.4
Job tenure prev. job (quarters) 10.2 16.5 6.2 9.7 6.8 10.9
Previously unemployed1 0.68 0.47 0.61 0.49 0.77 0.42
Total prev. unemp. dur. (quart.) 3.9 5.4 3.1 4.8 4.4 5.4
Recall from prev. employer1 0.27 0.45 0.11 0.31 0.35 0.48
Regional covariates with area variation2
UV-ratio 0.20 1.2 0.01 1.0 0.13 1.0
Relative uv-ratio 0.13 1.1 0.08 1.1 0.07 1.0
Accommodation ratio 0.00 1.0 -0.02 1.0 0.03 1.0
Male unemployment 0.28 1.0 0.20 0.9 0.37 1.0
Share of HS employment 0.36 1.2 0.67 1.2 0.28 1.2
Employment level 1.00 1.9 1.31 2.1 0.82 1.9
Population density 0.30 1.2 0.39 1.1 0.18 1.1
Employment shares by sector (Reference: Retail)
Agriculture 0.09 1.2 0.01 1.1 0.07 1.1
Investment goods ind. -0.14 0.8 -0.18 0.8 -0.17 0.8
Consumption goods ind. -0.23 1.1 -0.40 0.9 -0.12 1.1
Construction -0.25 0.9 -0.33 0.8 -0.21 0.9
Services 0.19 1.0 0.38 0.9 0.19 1.0
Regional covariates with area and individual variation2
Wage level 0.54 0.82 0.73 0.9 0.47 0.7
Relative wage level 0.10 0.82 0.11 0.8 0.09 0.8
Employment growth 0.24 0.75 0.26 0.7 0.29 0.8
Number of spells 87,260 6,782 56,952
1Dummy Variable(s)
2Time-varying covariates with quarterly (uv-ratio, relative uv-ratio, accommodation ratio, male unem-
ployment) or yearly (all other covariates) variation. All regional covariates are continuous and have been
standardised at the regional level. Thus, a value of one means one standard deviation above the average
labour market region between 1983 and 1997.
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C.5 - Descriptive statistics - Women
Spells ending ...
All Spells in migration locally
Variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Individual level covariates
Family background1
Married 0.65 0.48 0.46 0.50 0.59 0.49
Children 0.53 0.50 0.37 0.48 0.53 0.50
Age at beginning of unemployment spell1 (Reference: 35-39 years)
26-29 0.23 0.42 0.33 0.47 0.22 0.41
30-34 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.20 0.40
40-44 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.35
45-49 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.33
50-54 0.10 0.30 0.06 0.23 0.10 0.30
> 55 0.10 0.31 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.22
Formal education1 (Reference: Vocational training)
High school degree 0.26 0.44 0.12 0.32 0.23 0.42
Higher education 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.33 0.05 0.21
Previous wage quintile1 (Reference: 3rd quintile)
1st & 2nd 0.83 0.37 0.69 0.46 0.84 0.37
4th & 5th 0.09 0.29 0.20 0.40 0.08 0.28
Previous job status1 (Reference: Skilled blue-collar worker)
Unskilled blue-collar 0.28 0.45 0.18 0.39 0.29 0.45
White-collar 0.40 0.49 0.59 0.49 0.38 0.49
Previous sector of activity1 (Reference: Retail)
Agriculture 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.09 0.02 0.15
Investment goods ind. 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.11 0.31
Consumption goods ind. 0.15 0.36 0.08 0.28 0.15 0.35
Construction 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.15
Services 0.44 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.47 0.50
Max. entitlement period for unemployment beneﬁts1 (Reference: 12 months)
0 months 0.06 0.23 0.09 0.28 0.07 0.25
1-12 months 0.15 0.36 0.17 0.38 0.17 0.37
13-24 months 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.30 0.16 0.36
> 24 months 0.14 0.34 0.05 0.21 0.09 0.28
Continued on next page...
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... table 2.6 continued
Other individual characteristics
Income replacement rate (in %) 65.0 3.4 63.9 3.5 64.8 3.5
Job tenure prev. job (quarters) 12.4 16.8 8.8 11.7 8.3 12.7
Previously unemployed1 0.55 0.50 0.54 0.50 0.65 0.48
Total prev. unemp. dur. (quart.) 2.5 4.0 2.32 4.0 3.0 4.2
Recall from prev. employer1 0.21 0.40 0.10 0.30 0.27 0.44
Regional covariates with area variation2
UV-ratio 0.01 1.0 -0.14 0.9 -0.10 0.9
Relative uv-ratio 0.08 1.1 0.03 1.1 0.02 1.1
Accommodation ratio -0.01 1.0 -0.08 0.9 -0.00 1.0
Male unemployment 0.08 0.9 0.13 0.9 0.13 1.0
Share of HS employment 0.51 1.2 0.84 1.2 0.53 1.2
Employment level 1.1 2.0 1.47 2.2 1.06 2.0
Population density 0.36 1.1 0.46 1.2 0.28 1.1
Employment shares by sector (Reference: Retail)
Agriculture 0.01 1.1 -0.10 0.9 -0.04 1.0
Investment goods ind. -0.11 0.9 -0.18 0.8 -0.17 0.8
Consumption goods ind. -0.33 1.0 -0.47 0.9 -0.30 1.0
Construction -0.34 0.8 -0.45 0.7 -0.33 0.8
Services 0.28 1.0 0.50 1.0 0.35 1.0
Regional covariates with area and individual variation2
Wage level -0.55 0.7 -0.44 0.7 -0.50 0.7
Relative wage level -0.19 1.2 -0.19 1.2 -0.22 1.2
Employment growth 0.16 0.8 0.25 0.7 0.19 0.8
Number of spells 50,585 2,908 25,599
1Dummy Variable(s)
2Time-varying covariates with quarterly (uv-ratio, relative uv-ratio, accommodation ratio, male unem-
ployment) or yearly (all other covariates) variation. All regional covariates are continuous and have been
standardised at the regional level. Thus, a value of one means one standard deviation above the average
labour market region between 1983 and 1997.
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Appendix E - Maximum entitlement periods for unemployment
beneﬁts by age
up to age
Period 42 44 45 47 49 52 54 57
until 01/1995 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
01/1985 - 12/1985 12 12 12 12 18 18 18 18
1986 - 06/1987 12 16 16 16 20 20 24 24
07/1987 - 03/1997 18 20 22 22 26 26 32 32
Source: Plaßmann (2002)
Chapter 3
Unemployment Duration in Germany:
Individual and Regional Determinants
of Local Job Finding, Migration and
Subsidised Employment
joint with Ralf A. Wilke1
Abstract
Recent labour market reforms in Germany aim, among other things, at reducing unem-
ployment by restricting passive unemployment measures, emphasising local labour market
policies and re-structuring public employment services. This paper uses extensive individ-
ual administrative and regional aggregate data to explore the extent to which these factors
are likely to contribute to the shortening of unemployment duration. For this purpose, we
estimate a semi-parametric duration model with three competing exit states in order to
disentangle the relevance of these factors for exits to regular local, regular non-local and
subsidised employment. Our results suggest that changes in the unemployment compensa-
tion system rather than local employment policies and increasing job counselling eﬀorts may
accelerate exits to regular employment.
Keywords: competing-risk, labour market policy, individual and regional data
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3.1 Introduction
Throughout the last two decades Germany has experienced persistently high and even rising
levels of unemployment. At the same time, the share of unemployed who remain unemployed
even after one year of job search has also gone up to 37% in 2002 according to administrative
data from the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit , 2002). Survey-based
measures even report shares of long-term unemployment of close to 50% (Machin and Man-
ning, 1999). This is much higher than in the US, but reﬂects a labour market situation
that is not uncommon to many European countries. In this context, improved knowledge of
how individual characteristics as well as the regional and institutional context shape labour
market outcomes of unemployed jobseekers is of central concern to policy makers aiming to
design policies that will contribute to a shortening of the average unemployment duration.
However, most research on the determinants of unemployment duration has been conﬁned to
an analysis of individual level determinants (Steiner, 1990; Hunt, 1995; Hujer and Schneider,
1996; Steiner, 2001) and the role of the individual employment histories in determining the
duration of unemployment (Lu¨demann, Wilke and Zhang, 2006; Fitzenberger and Wilke,
2006b). Much less attention has been paid to the regional determinants of the unemploy-
ment duration. Most studies only test for additional region-speciﬁc eﬀects (Folmer and van
Dijke, 1988; Brown and Sessions, 1997; Fahrmeir et al., 2003) and conclude that the re-
gional context is a signiﬁcant determinant of the individual unemployment duration even
after controlling for major individual-speciﬁc factors. Other studies only assess the impact
of the local unemployment rate or the vacancy-to-unemployment ratio on individual unem-
ployment duration (Lindeboom et al., 1994; Petrongolo, 2001; Haurin and Sridhar, 2003)
and typically ﬁnd the expected prolonging eﬀect of deﬁcient local labour demand on the
duration of unemployment. Both of these approaches remain rather incomplete with respect
to improving our understanding of the regional factors that prolong or shorten unemploy-
ment. We do not know much either about how the institutional context aﬀects individual
labour market outcomes. Though there has been a strong interest in the prolonging eﬀect
of passive labour market policies such as unemployment beneﬁt entitlements on the dura-
tion of individual unemployment (e.g. Carling et al., 1996; Roed and Zhang, 2003; Cockx
and Dejemeppe, 2005; Lalive, van Ours and Zweimu¨ller, 2006; Kyyra¨ and Wilke, 2007), we
do not know much about the corresponding impact of other institutional aspects such as
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local active labour market policies and local job placement activities. This research gap is
particularly surprising in the German context because, among other things, recent labour
market reforms emphasise the role of regionally targeted policy mixes and the organisational
structure of public employment services. In particular, German policy makers as well as the
German public consider a high ratio of job counsellors to unemployed jobseekers as a key to
reduce the duration of unemployment.
The objective of this study is therefore to conduct a comprehensive analysis of unemploy-
ment duration in Germany. Since the period covered by our data, 2000-2004, falls mainly
into the pre-reform institutional setup, we cannot evaluate the success of recent reform ef-
forts. Instead, our regression type analysis aims at exploring the main determinants of the
length of unemployment not only among individual characteristics, but also considers the
regional and institutional context in which individuals seek employment. By doing so, we
provide evidence about the extent to which recent reforms concerning passive labour market
measures, regional employment policies and the organisation of public employment services
are likely to contribute to a reduction of unemployment duration. For this purpose, our
analysis uses a rich set of indicators that capture passive and active labour market policies
as well as local economic conditions and job counselling activities. Moreover, we use a new
generation of German administrative individual data that allows three main exit states to
be identiﬁed each of which may be aﬀected quite diﬀerently by the regional and institutional
context: exits to local regular employment, exits to non-local regular employment via mi-
gration and exits to subsidised employment. Previously available data sources did not allow
exits to subsidised employment to be distinguished from exits to regular employment. As
a consequence, estimated eﬀects of covariates on the duration of unemployment may have
been biased if there are heterogeneous eﬀects of covariates on these exit types. In the case of
subsidised and regular employment, biases are quite likely because labour market programs
typically aim at cushioning unfavourable local labour market conditions. Thus, unfavourable
labour market conditions may have an opposing eﬀect on exits to regular and subsidised em-
ployment. Similarly, as has been shown in chapter (2), a higher migration hazard may be a
response to a deﬁcient local labour demand that lowers the hazard of ﬁnding a local job. The
paper thus contributes to the literature by disentangling the relevance of individual, regional
and institutional factors for exiting unemployment durations to three important exit states.
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Moreover, distinguishing between these three exit states also allows for examining whether
the availability of active labour market programs (ALMP) aﬀects the probability of ﬁnding
employment in the regular labour market. Previous research concerning a locking-in eﬀect
of ALMP on exits to non-local employment via migration suﬀered from data limitations as
exits to subsidised employment were indistinguishable from exits to regular employment as
has been been discussed in chapter (2).
Our ﬁndings conﬁrm that for both individual and regional covariates, the impact diﬀers
signiﬁcantly depending on the type of exit. While deﬁcient local labour demand signiﬁcantly
decreases the likelihood of exiting to regular employment in the local area, the likelihood
of migration and the likelihood of entering subsidised employment signiﬁcantly increases.
The estimates indicate, however, that individual-level characteristics have a much stronger
impact on the duration of unemployment than regional factors. Thus, regional policies
may only be a supplementary means of reducing the duration of unemployment. Similarly,
local active labour market programs and a higher provision of counselling resources only
marginally aﬀect labour market outcomes of unemployed jobseekers and even yield negative
labour market outcomes which would be in line with recent results for the Netherlands (van
den Berg and van den Klaauw, 2006). Among the regional and institutional factors, our
ﬁndings indicate that passive labour market policies may have the strongest impact on the
duration of unemployment in Germany. This is suggested by extremely low exit hazards to
regular employment among individuals with long entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts as
well as by major diﬀerences in labour market outcomes of unemployed with diﬀerent income
replacement rates.
The structure of our paper is as follows. Section 3.2 gives a detailed description of
the unemployment compensation and welfare system and brieﬂy discusses recent labour
market reforms. Section 3.3 provides some theoretical underpinning on how job search
across multiple labour markets may be aﬀected by regional and institutional factors. Section
presents the individual and regional data used in the analysis and discusses the choice of
covariates. We then explain the methodological approach before presenting the results in
section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes and discusses the results in light of the recent reforms.
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3.2 Institutional context in Germany
Until 2004 the German unemployment compensation system consisted of two main com-
ponents: unemployment beneﬁts (UB) and unemployment assistance (UA). Unemployment
beneﬁts which were paid for a period of up to 32 months, depending on an individual’s
age and employment history, were equal to 60 % (67%) of the last net income for unem-
ployed individuals without (with) dependent children. The tax-funded and means-tested
unemployment assistance was paid indeﬁnitely to individuals who had exhausted their en-
titlement to unemployment beneﬁt and continued to provide income replacement rates of
53% (57%) for individuals without (with) dependent children. This combination of gener-
ous income replacement rates for long-term unemployed and indeﬁnite entitlement length
was rather exceptional among the OECD countries. As a consequence, income replacement
rates for long-term unemployed in Germany were and still are higher than in many other
OECD countries, especially for older unemployed with extended periods of entitlement to
UB and for unemployed with low former earnings who receive complementary tax funded
social beneﬁts. For this latter group, income replacement rates higher than 70% or even over
100% were thus common practice. From a search-theoretical perspective, high replacement
rates raise reservation wages and thus prolong unemployment as the potential net gain from
working compared to not working is small (Mortensen, 1990; Rogerson et al., 2005). The
institutional design in Germany thus resulted in work disincentives that are considered to
be partly responsible for the high share of long-term unemployment in Germany and the
considerably higher share of long term unemployment among older people (Fitzenberger and
Wilke, 2004) and the low wage unemployed (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2006b). Moreover, the
institutional design has also been associated with a lack of jobs for low-skilled workers in
Germany as the social beneﬁt level implies a relatively high minimum wage that is above
the productivity level of many low-skilled unemployed. The subsequent empirical analy-
sis of unemployment periods between 2000 and 2004 thus draws speciﬁc attention to the
unemployment experiences of individuals with low earning capacities.
The ”Hartz reforms” introduced between 2002 and 2005 ushered in marked changes in
active and passive labour market policies. While the Hartz IV reform that merged social
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beneﬁts and unemployment assistance to create the new social beneﬁt2 (Arbeitslosengeld II)
was not implemented before 2005 and is thus not relevant for our analysis, the Hartz I-III
reforms already started in 2003. See Jacobi and Kluve (2006) for an extensive overview.
These reforms mainly aim at activating the unemployed and increasing the eﬃciency of
employment services and measures. For this purpose, the reform shifts resources from labour
market programs aimed at the secondary labour market such as work creation schemes to
measures that aim at integrating individuals into the regular labour market (e.g. training,
subsidies for regular employment and self-employment). In order to improve the eﬃciency
of allocated resources, programs are targeted more strictly to speciﬁc groups of unemployed.
Speciﬁc reintegration measures are restricted to those who have been assessed to have a fair
chance of being reintegrated into the regular labour market, while work creation schemes
are targeted to jobseekers with less promising prospects. As a measure to activate job
search among unemployed, the reforms also introduced stricter sanction rules in the case of
insuﬃcient search eﬀorts, but also oﬀered a new set of programs such as subsidies for people
wishing to set up businesses (Ich-AG) and subsidies for employers hiring individuals with
low productivity levels.
Another key objective of the reforms was the restructuring and modernisation of the
Federal Employment Agency (FEA) in order to increase the eﬀectiveness of its placement
services. For this purpose, its regional employment agencies introduced a client-oriented
New Customer Service Centre (Kundenzentrum). An entry zone for customer requests and
questions in addition to scheduled appointments for job counselling now prevent long waiting
times and increases eﬃciency. Moreover, computer-based assessments now help in analysing
the needs of each customer and thus support tailor-made solutions. These modernisation
measures also aimed at reducing the workload of each counsellor in order to improve the
quality of job counselling. This new emphasis on job counselling has been facilitated by
an increase in the number of job placement counsellors since 2002 of almost 30% and a
consequent improvement in the counsellor/customer ratio, i.e. the number of unemployed
assisted per placement counsellor.
Another important aspect of the reform concerns the organisation of employment services.
2The ALG II provides almost the same level of beneﬁts as former social beneﬁts, while it is below the UA
for individuals with high pre-unemployment earnings. The unemployment insurance based UB was basically
left untouched.
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In contrast to the former hierarchical organisation, far greater responsibility has now been
assigned to local employment agencies. Each local employment agency now has to achieve
stipulated quantitative goals which are tailored to the speciﬁc situation of its regional labour
market. For such controlling purposes and the design of regionally tailored policy mixes, the
research institute of the Federal Employment Agency, the IAB (Institut fu¨r Arbeitsmarkt-
und Berufsforschung), identiﬁed employment agencies with comparable regional conditions.
The resulting twelve strategic types of employment agencies range from regional employment
agencies with unfavourable labour market conditions in eastern Germany to agencies with
favourable and dynamic labour market conditions (Blien et al., 2004). The restructuring of
the Federal Employment Agency has therefore resulted in an emphasis on job counselling
and eﬃcient placement services as well as an emphasis on regional labour market policies.
These internal changes of the FEA were mainly executed by leading international consulting
companies who received hundred of millions of euros for their input. An empirical analysis
of the institutional features is therefore of high policy interest.
Since the period covered by our data falls mainly into the pre-reform institutional setup
of the FEA, we cannot evaluate the success of the restructuring eﬀort. It is, however, possible
to obtain empirical evidence about whether one may expect these changes to bring about a
strong reduction in unemployment duration. In this respect, our analysis aims at examining
the extent to which institutional and regional factors aﬀect labour market outcomes of job-
seekers in Germany once individual factors have been taken into account. For this purpose,
we explore the impact of passive unemployment measures by looking at the eﬀect of long
entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts and by distinguishing between groups of diﬀerent
pre-unemployment wages and thus diﬀerent income replacement rates. The impact of active
labour market programs is captured by explicitly modelling exits to subsidised employment
and by examining the impact of the local availability of ALMP on the duration of individual
unemployment. In addition, we use a broad number of covariates that capture the regional
context and some institutional features such as the counsellor/customer ratio in order to
provide some empirical evidence about the extent to which regional employment policies
and local job counselling eﬀorts may aﬀect the duration of unemployment in Germany.
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3.3 Some theoretical underpinning
Before turning to the empirical approach of our analysis, this section brieﬂy discusses how
labour market conditions may aﬀect labour market outcomes after unemployment. For this
purpose, consider a framework in which a jobseeker looks for employment in a number of
distinct labour markets. In the case of simultaneous job-search across these labour markets3,
the probability of exiting to any of those labour markets can be broken down into the job
oﬀer probability and the probability of accepting a job oﬀer in this labour market both of
which depend on exogenous market conditions and the endogenous search strategy adopted
by the unemployed job searcher. In particular, jobseekers choose reservation wages for each
of the distinct markets such that the value of employment at the oﬀered wage is equivalent to
the value of continuing the unemployed job search. Moreover, search eﬀort is allocated across
the markets so that the marginal value of additional search in each market is equal to the
marginal costs of searching the market. While reservation wages aﬀect the job acceptance
probability, the allocation of search eﬀort across distinct markets inﬂuences the job oﬀer
probability. Intuitively, an individual’s search strategy should favour ﬁnding employment
in those labour markets that oﬀer the best working and living4 conditions. In the case of
job search across multiple industries, Fallick (1992) has shown that improving conditions
in one labour market - e.g. an increasing job oﬀer probability - raises reservation wages in
all markets while at the same time shifting search eﬀort towards the improving market and
reducing search eﬀort in all others. As a consequence, changing exogenous conditions aﬀect
the hazard of exiting to a speciﬁc market not only directly due to, for example, higher job
oﬀer probabilities, but also aﬀect these hazards indirectly via the endogenous search strategy
of the unemployed job searcher. A similar notion has also been applied to job-search across
sectors (Thomas, 1998) and regions (see Damm and Rosholm (2003) as well as chapter (2)).
In our framework, we allow for a local and a non-local labour market and introduce a
labour market for subsidised jobs. Exits to non-local employment are likely to constitute only
a relatively small but still noticeable share of all exits as migration rates in Germany are low
3Alternatively, one may assume some sort of sequential search strategy (Salop, 1973; McCall and McCall,
1987). Accordingly, an unemployed job seeker searches sequentially according to the expected returns from
searching a particular market segment.
4Since accepting a job in a distant labour market entails a residential mobility, individuals should not
only consider job-related characteristics but also the attractiveness of a region as a place of living as has
been discussed in chapter (2).
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compared with the US, Australia and Canada, but relatively high compared with many other
European countries (OECD, 2005). Exits to subsidised employment are likely to constitute
a larger part of all exits from unemployment. Compared with other European countries,
subsidised employment in Germany is an important part of labour market policy. While
spending on active labour market policies in Germany has been around average compared
with other European countries, the proportion spent on subsidised employment has been
above average in recent years (Martin and Grubb, 2001). Subsidised employment refers to
employment in the context of an active labour market program. Such programs mainly
encompass subsidised jobs in the secondary labour market, subsidies for regular employment
and subsidies for self-employment (see section 3.4 for details). The reforms of recent years
have brought about a shift from subsidised jobs in the secondary labour market to the latter
two program types (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit, 2004). In 2002, more than 200,000 jobseekers
entered subsidised jobs in the secondary labour market and more than 350,000 jobseekers
received a subsidy for regular employment or self-employment (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit,
2002).
Applying the above job search framework across multiple labour markets to our particular
setting, jobseekers are simultaneously looking for employment in the market for regular5
local, regular non-local and subsidised employment. Thus, jobseekers choose the search
strategy, i.e. reservation wages and the search eﬀort for each of these markets according to
the attractiveness of each of these markets in terms of job availability, oﬀered wages, work and
living conditions. Changing conditions in one market may aﬀect all exit-speciﬁc hazards via
the endogenous search strategy of the jobseeker. In many cases, for example, labour market
conditions that favour an exit to local regular employment may have an opposing eﬀect on
non-local exits as has been shown in chapter (2). Similarly, subsidised employment is often
a means of cushioning unfavourable local labour market conditions. Distinguishing between
the three exit states should therefore be quite helpful in understanding how the regional
and institutional context aﬀects labour market outcomes of jobseekers in Germany. For this
purpose, the empirical analysis considers a number of indicators that capture the exogenous
conditions of the local labour market that are discussed in detail in the next section. By
5Regular employment can be further diﬀerentiated by the number of hours worked or the type of job
contract (temporary versus unlimited). However, the data we use does not contain the relevant information
such that we pool all types of regular employment.
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aﬀecting the search strategy, such conditions not only aﬀect the duration of unemployment,
they also aﬀect the probability of making a transition to either local employment, non-
local employment or subsidised employment. Other behaviourally distinct and alternative
destination states after unemployment that, due to data limitations, are not considered here
include exits to self-employment or out of the labour force entirely. Our analysis should
therefore be considered as a starting point for improving our understanding of the impact of
labour market conditions on the labour market outcomes of unemployment.
3.4 Data
This section describes how we select the sample and covariates for our analysis. We use
individual data merged from several administrative registers which is then combined with
regional data from various sources.
Individual data The Sample of the Integrated Employment Biographies V.1 (IEBS) of
the Research Data Centre (Forschungsdatenzentrum) of the Federal Employment Agency
(FEA) is a new data set which was released in 2005. See Hummel et al. (2005) for a de-
tailed description of the data. It is a 2.2% sample containing about 1.4 million individuals
in the period 1992-2004. It comprises high quality information about employment periods
that have been subject to social insurance contributions and thus excludes civil servants and
self-employed individuals. The sample also contains information on the receipt of unem-
ployment compensation from the FEA. In addition, the data set provides information about
participation in active labour market programs for the period 2000-2004. One of the ma-
jor drawbacks of the data is that it only partially identiﬁes the true unemployment period.
This is because there are unobserved periods in the employment trajectories whenever an
individual is neither a socially insured employee nor receives unemployment compensation,
nor participates in any active labour market program. As a consequence, some parts of the
individual employment trajectory may not be observed so that it is necessary to use proxies
for the true unemployment period, see e.g. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) and Lee and Wilke
(2005) for this problem. In the analysis of this paper we use the following proxy for the true
unemployment duration:
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• Unemployment with permanent income transfers (UPIT) is a lower bound
of the true unemployment period that deﬁnes unemployment as a continued period of
transfer receipt. Gaps between transfer receipt and the beginning of a new employment
period need to be less than four weeks. Thus, UPIT excludes periods of unemployment
without receipt of UB or UA from the FEA.
Unfortunately, there is no exact way of telling whether this unemployment proxy more
closely resembles the true length of unemployment than competing proxies. Moreover, the
data does not contain all necessary information to identify unemployed social beneﬁt recipi-
ents, a group that we are speciﬁcally interested in as discussed in section 3.2. Entitlements to
complementary social beneﬁts depend on pre-unemployment earnings but also on the num-
ber of dependent children as well as ﬁnancial resources (e.g. spouse income, private savings).
Since we do not observe enough information in the IEBS about the household context nor
about its ﬁnancial resources, no exact identiﬁcation of unemployed social beneﬁt recipients is
possible. Individuals with relatively low pre-unemployment wages, however, are more likely
to receive additional social beneﬁts. We therefore compare unemployment periods of social
beneﬁt recipients which are contained in the Social Beneﬁt Statistics (Sozialhilfestatistik, SH-
Stat)6 with unemployment spells in the IEBS for individuals of diﬀerent pre-unemployment
earnings in order to choose an income threshold below which unemployed in the IEBS are
similar to unemployed social beneﬁt recipients. Moreover, we conduct this comparison not
only for the above UPIT proxy of unemployment in the IEBS, but also for a wider proxy
which also adds nonemployment periods to the unemployment duration. A comparison of
the corresponding distributions of unemployment duration suggests that the UPIT proxy for
individuals with pre-unemployment gross earnings of less than 60 euros per day better rep-
resents the group of unemployed social beneﬁt recipients than the competing unemployment
proxy or other income thresholds. A daily gross wage of 60 euros closely corresponds to the
lowest wage quintile for full-time employees in western Germany and to the lowest two wage
quintiles for full-time employees in eastern Germany. Applying the same income threshold
for both parts of Germany may appear somewhat crude. Robustness checks using, for exam-
6The use of the SHStat was conﬁned to the research project Evaluation of the experimentation clause §6c
SGB II which was funded by the German Ministry of Labour and Social Aﬀairs. No scientiﬁc use ﬁle exists
for this unique data set such that apart from the comparison of both data sets, no further analysis could be
conducted. For more details on the comparison of the data sets see Arntz et al. (2006b).
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ple, unemployed in the lowest wage quintile for both parts of Germany, did not signiﬁcantly
change the results. We therefore decided to apply the UPIT deﬁnition in the subsequent
empirical analysis and stick to the chosen threshold of 60 euros daily gross earnings to distin-
guish individuals of low-earning capacities from individuals with higher earning capacities.
Individuals above this threshold are less likely to receive additional social beneﬁts and should
thus have diﬀerent unemployment experiences than their low-earning counterparts.
For all UPIT unemployment spells, we observe the exit state if the spell is not right-
censored due to the end of the observation period and if the unemployed continuously re-
ceives income transfers from the FEA. As discussed in the theoretical section, we distinguish
between local regular employment, non-local regular employment (migration) and subsidised
employment. We deﬁne migration as movements between non-adjacent labour market re-
gions (Arbeitsmarktregionen). The 227 labour market regions (LMRs) in Germany comprise
typical daily commuting ranges such that for the majority of individuals the workplace is
located within the LMR. Finding employment in a non-adjacent LMR therefore usually
necessitates residential mobility. We refer to subsidised employment whenever an individ-
ual exits to socially insured employment or self-employment in the context of an active
labour market program. Such programs mainly encompass subsidised jobs in the secondary
labour market (ABM, SAM ), subsidies for regular employment (Eingliederungszuschu¨sse,
Bescha¨ftigungshilfen) and subsidies for self-employment (Ich-AG, U¨berbru¨ckungsgeld), but
also contain more extensive training programs (FbW ) if these programs count as socially
insured employment. Table 3.1 describes the composition of all exits to subsidised employ-
ment observed in the IEBS for UPIT spells starting between 2000 and 2002. For the analysis,
we decided to pool all forms of subsidised employment because robustness checks for distin-
guishing between certain types of programs did not yield noteworthy diﬀerences compared
to pooling all programs.
We restrict our analysis to unemployment periods starting in the period 2000-2002. This
is because information on periods of subsidised employment is not available before 2000.
Since we are able to observe information about unemployment up to 2004 while exits to
employment are only observable up to the end of 2003, we decided to exclude spells starting
in 2003. This reduces the amount of right censoring in the data and ensures a minimum
observation period of one year. Table 3.2 shows the sample sizes and exit states when
CHAPTER 3. LOCAL, NON-LOCAL, AND SUBSIDISED EMPLOYMENT 108
applying the UPIT deﬁnition and distinguishing individuals by their earning capacities.
We also distinguish by gender and marital status as these characteristics are important
determinants of individual labour market outcomes.
Table 3.1: Composition of exits to subsidised employment, IEBS, 2000-2002
Subsidy for ... Number % % of all exits
... employment in secondary market 10,391 31.0 7.7
... regular employment 9,643 28.7 7.1
... self-employment 9,001 26.8 6.7
... training measure 2,146 6.4 1.6
... other programsa 2,379 7.1 1.8
Total subsidised employment 33,560 100.0 24.9
a This category refers to a mix of programs that can be autonomously designed by each em-
ployment agency. As an example, these measures include subsidies for entering vocational
training or a premium for extending working hours of an existing job (Bundesagentur fu¨r
Arbeit, 2002).
Table 3.2 shows that individuals with low pre-unemployment wages are more likely
to exit to subsidised employment and less likely to migrate than jobseekers with higher
pre-unemployment earnings. Moreover, the median unemployment duration is signiﬁcantly
longer for individuals with low pre-unemployment wages, a ﬁnding that is in line with the
expectations that the institutional framework creates disincentives for individuals with low
earning capacities to take up a job. Table 3.2 also indicates diﬀerences by gender and marital
status. Singles are geographically more mobile than their married counterparts, a ﬁnding
that is consistent with the migration literature regarding higher migration costs for married
people with children (see Ghatak et al., 1996). Diﬀerences between female and male singles,
however, are very small. Since estimation results for single males and females proved to be
very similar, we decided to pool male and female singles in the subsequent analysis. By
contrast, results for married individuals strongly diﬀer by gender. Married women have by
far the longest median unemployment duration and the lowest exit rates. This probably
reﬂects the looser labour force attachment of married women. Moreover, the extremely low
migration rates among married women may reﬂect the fact that women are more likely to be
tied to the local area if the male breadwinner is employed locally. Due to these particularities
of labour market decision of married women, we decided to restrict the analysis to married
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males and singles only and diﬀerentiate these groups by their pre-unemployment earnings.
Table 3.2: Unemployment duration and exit types by gender, marital status and
earning capacity, IEBS, 2000-2002
Low Wagea Higher wagea
Men Women Men Women
Singles
% exit to
local employment 48.1 (70.3) 51.3 (74.0) 57.9 (74.5) 53.5 (70.5)
non-local employment 6.4 (9.4) 5.6 (8.1) 9.1 (11.7) 10.3 (13.6)
subsidised employment 13.9 (20.3) 12.4 (17.9) 10.7 (13.8) 12.1 (15.9)
all exits 68.4 (100.0) 69.3 (100.0) 77.7 (100.0) 75.9 (100.0)
Unemployment spells
Median duration (days) 138 146 107 123
Number of spells 43,528 31,206 20,849 7,319
Married
% exit to
local employment 47.5 (64.9) 44.6 (60.9) 58.7 (73.3) 45.9 (72.6)
non-local employment 5.8 (7.9) 2.8 (3.4) 8.0 (10.0) 4.6 (7.3)
subsidised employment 19.9 (27.2) 14.7 (20.1) 13.4 (16.7) 12.7 (20.1)
all exits 73.2 (100.0) 62.1 (100.0) 80.1 (100.0) 63.2 (100.0)
Unemployment spells
Median duration (days) 176 238 116 194
Number of spells 28,018 31,088 23,620 5,483
a Low wages refers to individuals with pre-unemployment daily gross wages of less than 60 euros,
while higher wages denotes individuals with pre-unemployment earnings above this threshold.
Individual-level covariates for the econometric analysis that are contained in the IEBS
are age, education and a number of indicators of an individual’s employment history such
as previous unemployment experiences, previous participation in active labour market pro-
grams and previous commuting status. These covariates are chosen to capture diﬀerences
in job-ﬁnding chances and migration costs that are relevant for the labour market outcomes
of jobseekers. In addition, the analysis also includes the maximum length of unemployment
beneﬁt receipt at the beginning of unemployment. Long entitlement periods may prolong
unemployment and should thus be included in the analysis. As previously discussed, entitle-
ments to unemployment beneﬁts increase with age and job tenure within some claim period.
Since actual entitlements are not observed for many individuals in the IEBS, the missing
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information has been imputed based on known information concerning age and tenure in the
previous job.7 Summary statistics of the samples can be found in Appendix A.
Regional aggregate data We use a broad number of regional indicators which are mainly
provided by the two largest German data producers: the Federal Employment Agency and
the Federal Statistical Bureau (FSB). The FEA data is coded at the level of employment
agency districts and contains monthly information about labour market tightness (e.g. va-
cancies, jobseekers, degree of long term unemployment), the extent and structure of local
labour market programs and the organisation of the local employment agency (e.g. num-
ber of staﬀ). The FSB data contains yearly county level information about the population
structure (e.g. age, education), the type of region (urban vs. rural), its infrastructure and
industrial structure. There are 180 employment agency regions and 440 counties in Ger-
many. Since the IEBS identiﬁes both the county and the employment agency region of the
workplace, we decided to merge the data at the regional level for which they are originally
provided. This avoids problems associated with interpolating attributes from one of these
regional classiﬁcations to the other as has been discussed in chapter (1).
The FSB and the FEA data together contain more than 100 regional indicators, a full
list of which is included in Arntz et al. (2006b). These are far too many regional covariates
for an econometric analysis and there is a high degree of correlation among several of these
regional indicators. Thus, as a ﬁrst step we used a combination of cluster and factor analy-
sis to identify indicators that contain very similar information. In a next step, we decided
to compress the regional information further by grouping the remaining regional indicators
according to economically reasonable groups that cover major regional factors that are likely
to aﬀect unemployment durations and the labour market state after unemployment as dis-
cussed in the theoretical framework. In particular, we create ﬁve groups and select up to
ﬁve indicators as their representatives such that the correlation among the representatives
is minimised. As a consequence, the chosen representatives proxy for their group of interest
in the econometric analysis so that estimated coeﬃcients reﬂect eﬀects of the group they
represent. Table 3.3 shows a description and summary statistics of all regional indicators.
7Gaps between two employment spells of less than one month have been considered as one continuous job.
The resulting measure is likely to be a lower bound of the true entitlements because remaining entitlements
from a previous claim of unemployment beneﬁts are not taken into account.
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There seems to be enough regional variation in most of the indicators that describe the re-
gional labour market situation to identify the eﬀect of regional covariates on labour market
outcomes. For the subsequent econometric analysis, we standardised all continuous regional
variables to ease comparability of estimation results.
The ﬁrst group of indicators characterises local labour demand and supply conditions,
i.e. local job availability. The local unemployment rate may be considered as an indicator of
deﬁcient local labour demand. In addition, the change in the unemployment rate compared to
the previous year conveys information about the development of the local imbalance of labour
supply and demand. In regions with an excess supply of labour, the probability of receiving a
job-oﬀer should be reduced. As a reaction, reservation wages in all labour markets decrease
since jobseekers become less choosy and search eﬀort shifts from the local to alternative
markets. This implies a decrease in the number of local jobs found and an increasing hazard
of ﬁnding a non-local or a subsidised job. Increasing exits to subsidised employment in the
case of an excess supply of labour may also reﬂect an increasing availability of subsidised
employment because labour market programs are often used to cushion unfavourable labour
market conditions.
Another important determinant of unemployment duration might be local economic
performance since well-performing and dynamic regions should oﬀer a higher expected
lifetime income and should thus attract search eﬀort to the local market while non-local and
subsidised employment should become less attractive. Well-performing and economically
growing regions should be characterised by a high and growing GDP per head as well as by
a high level of newly established businesses which we all include as covariates.
Apart from economic conditions of the locality, its social structure may also shape
individual labour market behaviour. In particular, individuals may have ”lower incentives to
work where peers are also unemployed ... and a view of joblessness as unproblematic within
a context of lowered aspirations, ...” (Ritchie et al., 2005:3). In Germany, discouraging
social contexts might be found in old industrial regions which have experienced massive
deindustrialisation in recent decades and a subsequent rise in long-term unemployment. We
thus decided to include indicators such as the level of long-term unemployment and the
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average schooling level in the region to control for diﬀerent social contexts.8
In addition, we use information about the institutional organisation of the local em-
ployment agency. As discussed in section 3.2, there has been an increase in the number of
job placement counsellors of around 30% during the period of observations. This politically
motivated increase in the counsellor/customer ratio, i.e. the ratio between placement oﬃcers
per jobseeker, provides some exogenous variation to identify the eﬀect of an increasing level
of job counselling. We hypothesise that a higher counsellor/customer ratio shortens the
duration of unemployment, especially by accelerating exits to regular employment. We also
include indicators of the local availability of labour market programs. As discussed in section
3.2, there has been a shift from measures aiming at the secondary labour market to programs
that aim at integrating individuals into the regular labour market. Moreover, individuals
with diﬀerent employment prospects may be aﬀected diﬀerently depending on the type of
program due to the increased proﬁling eﬀorts of employment agencies. We therefore distin-
guish between programs with a focus on the regular labour market such as training measures
(FbW ), programs targeted to young unemployed (JUMP) and subsidies for regular employ-
ment or self-employment (U¨bergangsgeld, Eingliederungszuschuss, Bescha¨ftigungshilfe) and
programs with a focus on the secondary market such as work creation schemes (ABM, SAM )
and include the share of unemployed participating in these program types, respectively.9
While exits to subsidised employment should be positively aﬀected by the level of oﬀered
programs, the hazard of leaving the region may be negatively aﬀected if such programs oﬀer
a substitute for leaving the region. In this case, jobseekers may reduce search eﬀort in non-
local labour markets. An extensive local availability of ALMP may thus result in a regional
locking-in eﬀect as has been discussed in the Scandinavian literature (e.g. Westerlund, 1998;
Fredriksson, 1999).
8Both of these indicators are highly correlated to the share of social beneﬁt recipients in the region which
we therefore decided to leave out. The two remaining indicators should capture this regional characteristic.
9Further diﬀerentiating the program types is problematic as we often found a high degree of correlation
between similar program types.
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Finally, we include several structural indicators to characterise the type of region.
In particular, we include a population density related classiﬁcation to distinguish between
rural and urban regions. Moreover, we use driving distance to the next higher level city
as a proxy for the degree of remoteness of a region. Both of these characteristics aﬀect
the availability and the accessibility of employment and may thus change an individual’s
search behaviour. Moreover, an individual’s search behaviour may also be aﬀected because
these characteristics to some extent reﬂect the attractiveness of a region as a place of living
(e.g. availability of consumer amenities, disamenities such as pollution). We also control
for three speciﬁc other regional characteristics. Regions with a high level of seasonal work,
proxied for by the ﬂow in and out of unemployment, may be characterised by a large share
of short unemployment spells. Secondly, the local existence of third level institutions may
aﬀect the composition of the available workforce and thus the competition for certain jobs.
Finally, we include the local availability of child care support in order to test whether the
public infrastructure aﬀects unemployment experiences of jobseekers with children. The
availability of kindergarten or nursery school might reduce the opportunity costs of local
employment and thus accelerate exits to local employment.
3.5 Methodological issues
Let F (t) be the unemployment duration distribution, where t is the duration of unemploy-
ment. The hazard rate, h(t) = {∂F (t)/∂t}/(1 − F (t)), is an intuitive way of formalising
transitions from unemployment to employment. In our econometric analysis we use a hazard
rate model to investigate the eﬀect of various covariates x = {x1, x2} on the distribution of
unemployment, where x1 denotes the set of individual characteristics such as demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics, work history variables and ﬁrm-level variables, while x2
contains all remaining regional indicators. In particular, we assume the diﬀerent exit states
to be independent conditional on all covariates10 and estimate a competing-risk Cox propor-
tional hazard model
hj(t|x) = λj(t)exp(αjx1 + βjx2),
10If this assumption is violated, estimates for the independent competing-risk model may be biased. Since
this assumption only needs to hold conditional on all covariates and the analysis includes a rich set of
covariates, the assumption may be justiﬁed.
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where hj denotes the exit-speciﬁc hazard rate for the three destination states local regular
employment, subsidised employment and non-local employment, i.e. migration. λj is the
destination-speciﬁc baseline hazard.
There are three major sources of biases that have to be addressed when using this ap-
proach. First of all, there may be biases from unobserved individual heterogeneity. As sug-
gested by Meyer (1990), however, unobserved individual heterogeneity may not have much
of an eﬀect if there is a ﬂexible baseline hazard that partly absorbs this heterogeneity. Sec-
ondly, there may be a simultaneity issue of the regional covariates if an explanatory variable
xt depends on observed exits from unemployment in period τ ≥ t. Due to the discrete nature
of the data, this may be the case for certain contemporaneous labour market characteristics
such as the unemployment rate, the accommodation of local active labour market programs
or the counsellor/customer ratio. For this reason, all labour market related information pro-
vided by the FEA for which such an issue may arise have been calculated as the average value
for the 12 months preceding the start of unemployment. Estimation results may, however,
still be biased due to unobserved regional heterogeneity. In the literature, this problem has
been addressed by stratiﬁcation (see Ridder and Tunali, 1999). When stratifying according
to regional labour markets, separate baseline hazards are estimated for each regional labour
market. This approach resembles the well-known ﬁxed eﬀects approach and thus controls for
unobserved heterogeneity at the level of regional labour markets. Unfortunately, our data
is limited to a relatively short time span. Thus, a stratiﬁed estimation approach turned out
to be infeasible since, in this case, identiﬁcation rests on time variation. We are nonetheless
fairly conﬁdent that biases from omitted regional characteristics may be negligible due to
the rich account of regional covariates used in the analysis.
As has been discussed by Thomas (1996), in a competing-risk duration analysis, the
estimated parameter vector for a particular destination state may not be interpreted as the
eﬀect on the duration until exiting to this state. Instead, this eﬀect as well as the eﬀect on
the probability of leaving to a particular state depends on parameter vectors for all states.
In particular, deﬁne the conditional cumulative probability of exiting to state j until t as
Πj(t|x) =
∫ t
0
hj(t|x)(1−G(t|x))dt
with hj(s) as the exit hazard to state j and (1 − G(s)) as the overall survival probability
that takes account of all exit options. In our empirical analysis we evaluate the estimates at
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xl ∈ {x¯l, 0}, where we choose the average values of all individual level variables (x1 = x¯1)
and we choose zero for the regional variables (x2 = 0).
11 We estimate the probability of
exiting to state j as the duration elapses one year, i.e. Πj(365|x). We compute the marginal
eﬀects ∂Πj(365|x)/∂xk as the marginal change of the cumulative probability of exiting to
state j during the ﬁrst year if one regressor xk changes. This outcome is of particular
political interest because in oﬃcial statistics long-term unemployment starts after one year
of unemployment. Thus, our marginal eﬀects correspond to the change in probability of
becoming long-term unemployed that is due to a marginal increase of covariate k.12 Based
on 500 samples, we estimate the standard error of the conditional marginal eﬀect bootstrap
distribution. Assuming that standard errors are distributed normally, we then determine
the signiﬁcance level of the estimated marginal eﬀects.
3.6 Results
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the estimated conditional marginal eﬀects for singles and married
men with low and higher pre-unemployment wages. We generally ﬁnd that the individual
work-history seems to be the driving force behind the duration of unemployment, a result
that is similar to Lu¨demann et al. (2006) and Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006b) who use
data without information on subsidised employment and on migration. Compared to the
impact of individual characteristics, regional disparities only marginally aﬀect the length
of unemployment periods in Germany as has also been suggested by the analysis in the
preceding chapter that uses data without information on subsidised employment. Thus,
although some regional factors signiﬁcantly aﬀect both the unemployment duration and the
likelihood of ending up in a speciﬁc destination state, our results suggest that the recent
emphasis on regionally tailored policy mixes and job placement activities is unlikely to bring
about a substantial reduction in the length of unemployment in Germany. In what follows
11Due to the standardisation of all continuous regional variables, this corresponds to the sample mean
value for these covariates and to the reference category of the regional dummy variables.
12Since Πj(t|x) has the properties of a distribution function, one may deﬁne the conditional marginal
quantile eﬀect at quantile q as ∂tˆj(q|x)/∂xk = ∂Π−1j (q|x)/∂xk as an alternative marginal eﬀect. Since the
underlying unemployment duration distribution is defective, Π−1j (q|x) does not exist for the upper quantiles
so that 0 ≤ Πj(t|x) ≤ q¯|x ≤ 1. Moreover, the maximum quantile for which this marginal eﬀect can be
identiﬁed varies by covariate and destination state, i.e. q¯jk. For this reason, we decided to report the
marginal eﬀect on the cumulative probability Πj(365|x) only. Marginal quantile eﬀects are available from
the authors upon request.
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we present a detailed discussion of the estimation results for the individual-speciﬁc covariates
before turning to the regional covariates. In line with the ﬁnding that regional covariates
have only a limited impact on individual labour market outcomes, we also ﬁnd only few
general and robust result patterns across the four sub-groups. A detailed discussion of each
single eﬀect thus seems an infeasible approach. Instead, we only focus on the most important
results for each group of regional covariates and point to the most interesting and robust
diﬀerences across the sub-samples.
Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics Several socioeconomic variables sig-
niﬁcantly aﬀect the duration of unemployment13, but only few of them have a strong eﬀect.
Among the most important for all exit states of singles and married men alike is age. Gen-
erally, the probability of ﬁnding regular employment in either the local or the non-local
area decreases with age. For low-earning individuals aged 46-56, the reduced probability of
ﬁnding regular employment is partially compensated by a higher probability of entering sub-
sidised employment. Those aged 56 and above experience lower exit probabilities to all exit
types and thus stay unemployed signiﬁcantly longer than their younger counterparts. Once
having controlled for diﬀerent levels of pre-unemployment wages, the eﬀect of educational
attainment on the duration of unemployment is rather limited. Instead, the educational de-
gree rather has some impact on the observed exit state after unemployment. In particular,
a university degree markedly reduces the probability of ﬁnding local regular employment,
but increases the likelihood of entering subsidised employment or migration if they are sin-
gle. The resulting probability of leaving unemployment to any of these exit states within
one year thus tends to be slightly lower only than for their unskilled counterparts. Lower
pre-unemployment earnings associated with higher income replacement rates rather than
the observed educational degree thus seem to be able to explain the high share of long term
unemployment among the unskilled in Germany. This ﬁnding also conﬁrms our approach of
stratifying the sample with respect to the pre-unemployment wage level.
Work history Characteristics associated with the work history have the strongest inﬂu-
ence on the unemployment duration distribution and eﬀects are typically similar for all sam-
13When the eﬀect is similar for all destinations we simply use the notion unemployment or unemployment
duration.
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ples. In particular, long entitlement periods for unemployment beneﬁts (UB) are associated
with a much lower likelihood of ﬁnding regular employment either in the local or the non-local
region, especially among individuals with higher pre-unemployment wages. One reason for
why UB entitlements have a weaker eﬀect on individuals with low pre-unemployment wages
may be that these individuals often receive complementary social beneﬁts. In this case,
prolonging unemployment beneﬁts does not result in additional transfer payments as the
income replacement rate is the same irrespective of whether receiving UB or unemployment
assistance (UA). For those with higher pre-unemployment earnings, longer UB entitlements
may instead be quite beneﬁcial as income replacement rates for this group should be higher
for UB than for UA. In line with our ﬁndings, the disincentive eﬀect from longer UB entitle-
ments should be stronger for individuals with higher pre-unemployment earnings. Another
interesting ﬁnding concerns extremely long UB entitlements of more than 2 years which
apply only to older unemployed who already have much lower exit probabilities than their
younger counterparts. These individuals basically never leave unemployment again but use
their long entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts as a means of early retirement.
We also obtain strong results if an unemployed person was already subsidised by the local
employment agency before the start of the current unemployment period. If these individuals
slip back into unemployment they have a very low transition probability to either local or
non-local regular employment. Instead, a high percentage of these individuals ends up in
another subsidised employment period. With the new generation of individual administrative
data we are therefore able to identify what is typically called a ”career of labour market
measures”.14 Our results therefore suggest that both passive and active labour market
measures are strongly associated with negative individual labour market outcomes. We do
not, however, read this as a pure causal relationship because these results may partially be
driven by unobserved factors such as a selection of immobile unemployed into subsidised
employment or long entitlements to UB. Since entitlements to UB depend on a positive
employment history, a negative selection may be less likely, however, to explain the negative
labour market outcomes of individuals with long entitlements to unemployment beneﬁts.
14We also made estimations in which we distinguished between several types of employment subsidies
oﬀered by the employment agencies. Surprisingly, the results patterns are similar even for subsidised artiﬁcial
jobs and temporary subsidies of regular employment which have a very purpose. For this we decided to report
the pooled results only.
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Furthermore, we identify several factors that increase exit probabilities among the un-
employed. Individuals who have previously been recalled by their former employer, have
much shorter unemployment periods due to faster local exits. Moreover, this group is less
likely to be subsidised or to migrate, and this suggests that recalls are related to seasonal
unemployment and temporary lay-oﬀs. Being in minor employment15 at the beginning of the
unemployment period considerably increases local job ﬁnding and reduces the likelihood of
migration in many cases. Working in a minor employment signals some labour force attach-
ment, but may also increase the attachment to the local area. Individuals who commuted
to their last job have lower local but higher non-local employment probabilities. This may
capture both a higher propensity to migrate as well as a higher propensity to commute very
long distances.
Supply and demand conditions As expected, a deﬁcient local labour demand as re-
ﬂected in high and increasing unemployment levels tends to reduce the probability of ﬁnding
employment locally within one year among all groups. Among single persons with higher
pre-unemployment wages, this detrimental eﬀect on the duration of unemployment is par-
tially oﬀset by higher migration levels while their married counterparts increasingly enter
subsidised employment in regions with an excess supply of labour. For individuals with low
pre-unemployment wages, such counteracting eﬀects are even smaller or absent so that this
group appears to be more reliant on local labour market conditions. Similar to the ﬁnd-
ings in chapter (2), the results thus indicate some heterogeneity among diﬀerent groups of
unemployed individuals with respect to the responsiveness to regional labour market con-
ditions. Moreover, the fact that signiﬁcantly higher migration levels can only be found for
well-earning singles in response to deteriorating unemployment rates during the previous ﬁve
years suggests that such counteracting forces tend to be slow, a result that is in line with
slow adjustment processes after region-speciﬁc shocks (Decressin and Fata`s, 1995; Mo¨ller,
1995). Thus, deteriorating local labour demand conditions seem to result in a growing share
of long-term unemployed at least in the medium-term.
15An employment on a salary of less than 400 euros per month and with exemption from social security
contributions.
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Table 3.4: Marginal eﬀects in pp on the conditional cumulative probability of exiting
to local, subsidised or non-local employment, Singles, IEBS, 2000-2002
Low wage High wage
Variable local subsidised non-local local subsidised non-local
Individual characteristics
Female 7.6∗∗ -0.8† 0.6† 2.9∗ -0.5 2.1∗∗
Age < 26 16.7∗∗ -0.9∗∗ 1.2∗∗ 11.7∗∗ -2.2∗∗ 0.0
Age 26-35 3.7∗∗ 0.4† 1.1∗∗ 4.2∗∗ 0.7† 1.0∗∗
Age 46-56 -9.6∗∗ 1.5∗∗ -0.9∗∗ -4.5∗∗ 0.2 -0.2
Age > 56 -22.2∗∗ -0.8 -1.7∗∗ -12.2∗∗ -5.4∗∗ -0.1
Unskilled -3.0∗∗ 0.5∗∗ 0.2 -2.8∗∗ 0.0 1.4∗∗
University degree -2.6 3.0∗∗ 3.6∗∗ -9.8∗∗ 3.2∗∗ 1.6∗∗
Foreign born -1.4 -1.0∗ 0.6 -3.8∗∗ -1.3 -1.3∗∗
Female foreign born -2.1 -1.9∗ -1.4∗∗ -1.1 1.5 -1.4
Children -2.1∗∗ 0.7∗∗ -0.1 -1.8† 0.4 0.4
Children & female -4.7∗∗ -0.2 -2.2∗∗ -1.7 1.1 -2.6∗∗
Minor job 9.2∗∗ 0.0 -0.4† 3.9 1.5 -3.4∗∗
Spell starts in winter 4.7∗∗ 0.8∗∗ 0.2 7.1∗∗ -1.0∗∗ 0.2
Previous employment history
Part time -5.3∗∗ -0.9∗∗ 0.0 5.0∗∗ -1.2† 2.4∗∗
Lower/upper wage‡ -2.7∗∗ 1.1∗∗ -0.5∗∗ -5.2∗∗ 1.6∗∗ 4.5∗∗
Lower/upper wage† & female 0.8 -0.2 0.6∗ 2.2 0.7 -0.8∗
Construction 8.5∗∗ -1.2∗∗ -0.8∗∗ 10.3∗∗ -1.9† -2.2∗∗
Trade and Food Ind. 7.7∗∗ -0.6∗ -0.1 3.8∗∗ 0.8 -2.0∗∗
Services/Public sector 3.8∗∗ -0.5∗∗ 0.6∗∗ -3.4∗∗ 1.7∗∗ -0.5∗
Previously recalled 15.7∗∗ -1.7∗∗ -0.4∗ 14.8∗∗ -4.6∗∗ 0.4
Previously unemployed 1.3∗∗ 1.0∗∗ -0.4∗∗ 1.9∗∗ -0.4 0.0
Large ﬁrm -2.7∗∗ -1.2∗∗ 0.2 -5.9∗∗ -1.6∗∗ 0.7∗
BE > 6− 12 mths 3.7∗∗ 0.3 0.1 -2.7∗∗ 2.2∗∗ -1.2∗∗
BE > 12− 18 mths -1.0 0.5 0.2 -9.7∗∗ 2.5∗ -1.5∗∗
BE > 18− 24 mths -3.7 0.9 -1.1† -15.1∗∗ 4.0∗∗ -2.9∗∗
BE > 24 mths -21.0∗∗ -1.7∗ -1.9∗∗ -28.2∗∗ 1.6 -4.7∗∗
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.4 continued
ALMP measure -31.1∗∗ 7.2∗∗ -2.0∗∗ -25.2∗∗ 12.7∗∗ -1.8∗∗
Commuter -4.6∗∗ 0.3† 5.6 ∗∗ -11.8∗∗ 0.7† 8.0∗∗
Regional characteristics
Unemployment rate (UR) -2.3∗ 0.6 0.0 -0.5 -1.8∗ 1.0
Change in UR 1995-2000 -1.5∗∗ 0.5∗∗ 0.2 -3.3∗∗ 0.7∗ 0.7∗∗
GDP per head -0.5 -0.2 0.2 -0.7 0.3 0.4∗
Change of GDP 1995-2000 0.7∗∗ 0.1 -0.2∗∗ 0.3 -0.5∗∗ -0.2∗
Rate of business set ups 1.1∗∗ -0.2† 0.0 -0.2 0.2 0.3†
Share of long-term U -1.9∗∗ -0.4∗ 0.2 -3.2∗∗ 0.7∗ 0.9∗∗
Avg. yrs of schooling 1.8∗∗ -0.2 -0.5∗∗ 0.6 -0.3 -0.4∗
Placement counsellor per U 0.2 -0.4∗ 0.4∗∗ -1.2∗ -0.2 1.6∗∗
Share of U in ALMPR 0.1 0.5
∗∗ -0.1 -0.1 0.6† -0.1
Share of U in ALMPS -1.4
∗∗ 0.9∗∗ 0.1 -1.5∗ 1.1∗∗ 0.0
Driving time to higher level city 0.8∗∗ -0.2 -0.2† -0.2 0.1 0.2
Child care places & child 0.3 -0.3† -0.4∗∗ 0.4 0.4 -0.1
University present -2.6∗∗ 0.1 0.4 ∗∗ -1.8∗∗ -0.3 1.0∗∗
Saisonal unemployment -0.2 0.2 0.1 -2.5† 1.8† 0.0
Rural region -1.8∗∗ 0.0 0.2 1.6† -1.4∗∗ 0.2
Urban region -0.1 1.0∗∗ -0.9∗∗ 1.6∗ -0.6 -0.4
West & 2000 8.6∗∗ 0.5 1.4∗∗ 9.9∗∗ -1.1† 1.0∗
West & 2000 & female 0.4 0.0 0.0 1.3 -0.3 -1.0∗
West & 2001 2.5∗∗ 1.2∗ 0.3 0.1 0.5 0.8
West & 2001 & female 2.0† 0.2 0.5 1.7 -0.8 0.0
East & 2000 -3.8∗∗ 2.0∗ 3.7∗∗ -7.8∗∗ 2.3 11.3∗∗
East & 2000 & female -6.5∗∗ 0.0 -0.7∗ 1.6 -2.1† -2.7∗∗
East & 2001 -2.0 0.5 3.6∗∗ -5.4∗∗ 1.7 6.8∗∗
East & 2001 & female -6.0∗∗ 0.3 -1.0∗∗ -1.8 -1.3 -1.5∗
East & 2002 0.1 0.0 2.6∗∗ -2.3 1.5 3.1∗∗
East & 2002 & female -6.6∗∗ 0.0 -1.1∗∗ -0.2 0.5 -1.5∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Note: Low wage sample refers to individuals with pre-unemployment daily gross wages ≤ 60 euros. BE=Beneﬁt entitlements;
ALMP=Active labour market program with focus on regular (R) or secondary (S) employment; U=Unemployment.
‡: Daily pre-unemployment wages are in the lowest (highest) wage quartile for the low (higher) wage sample.
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Economic performance Indicators that proxy for the local economic performance do not
show any robust pattern across the diﬀerent groups of unemployed. The only exception is
the strong and positive eﬀect of the setting up of new local businesses on the likelihood of
ﬁnding local employment within one year for low-earning individuals. One reason for this
positive eﬀect may be that new ﬁrms tend to oﬀer precarious jobs which are a more relevant
type of employment for individuals at the fringe of the labour market. Apart from this
noteworthy eﬀect, the eﬀects of other local indicators of economic performance are negligible.
We therefore conclude that local economic performance does not seem to be an important
determinant of labour market outcomes for jobseekers in Germany, one explanation of which
may be that due to central wage bargaining regional productivity levels as reﬂected in local
GDP do not translate into behaviourally relevant interregional wage diﬀerences. In fact, gaps
between regional productivity and wage levels may be one reason for persistent interregional
employment disparities in Germany.
Social structure While the eﬀect of the average schooling level shows no clear result
pattern across the diﬀerent sub-samples, the share of long-term unemployment (LTU) seems
to mainly conﬁrm the negative eﬀects of a discouraging social context. As expected, a high
share of LTU signiﬁcantly prolongs the duration of unemployment as the strong decrease in
local exits is only partially oﬀset by increasing exits to non-local and subsidised employment.
We are however careful in reading this as a pure discouraging eﬀect as this eﬀect to some
extent may also reﬂect that regions with a high share of LTU are characterised by bad
job-ﬁnding conditions that prolong unemployment.16 On the other hand, controlling for the
unemployment rate during the last year and the change in unemployment during the last
ﬁve years suggests that the remaining variation in LTU mainly stems from an unfavourable
composition of individuals who tend to experience prolonged unemployment periods. In this
case, the eﬀect may indeed rather reﬂect a discouraging eﬀect on the search activities of
jobseekers, although there is no evidence that overall search eﬀort is reduced as, at least for
some individuals, the probability of migration and subsidised employment increases.
16We do not think that there is a severe problem with reverse causality because we use the lagged share
of LTU and control for a rich set of regional characteristics that may be related to the share of LTU.
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Table 3.5: Marginal eﬀects in pp on the conditional cumulative probability of exiting
to local, subsidised or non-local employment, Married Men, IEBS, 2000-2002
Low wage High wage
Variable local subsidised non-local local subsidised non-local
Individual characteristics
Age < 26 10.2∗∗ 0.0 0.8† 1.9 0.1 -0.2
Age 26-35 2.1 ∗∗ 0.5 0.5∗ 2.3∗∗ -0.3 -0.1
Age 46-56 -8.3∗∗ 2.8∗∗ -0.8∗∗ -5.7∗∗ 0.0 0.0
Age > 56 -22.1∗∗ 0.5 -2.2∗∗ -20.6∗∗ -5.6∗∗ -1.2∗∗
Unskilled -3.4∗∗ 1.1∗∗ 0.0 -1.5∗ -1.5∗∗ 0.1
University degree -7.0∗∗ 3.6∗∗ 0.1 -10.0∗∗ 2.5∗∗ 0.4
Foreign born -2.0∗∗ -1.5∗∗ 0.3 -5.7∗∗ -2.8∗∗ 0.8∗
Children -0.5 0.2 -0.1 -0.6 0.0 -0.2
Minor job 13.9∗∗ -0.4 -0.6 9.0∗∗ 1.0 -2.9∗∗
Spell starts in winter 10.0∗∗ 0.4 0.2 11.3∗∗ -2.7∗∗ 0.1
Previous employment history
Part time -4.6∗∗ -0.9∗ -0.4 n/a
Lower/upper wage‡ -8.2∗∗ 0.8∗ -0.5∗∗ -5.7∗∗ 2.8∗∗ 2.7∗∗
Construction 16.6∗∗ -1.8∗∗ -0.3 16.0∗∗ -3.4∗∗ -2.8∗∗
Trade and Food Ind. 12.0∗∗ -1.0∗ 0.2 6.5∗∗ -0.2 -1.0∗∗
Services/Public sector 6.9∗∗ -0.6† 0.8∗∗ -0.4 1.9∗∗ -0.1
Recall 12.3∗∗ -2.1∗∗ -0.3 16.1∗∗ -5.5∗∗ -0.5†
Unemployment 1.8∗ 1.2∗∗ 0.1 1.6† -0.4 0.3
Large ﬁrm -7.1∗∗ 0.5 -0.4 -4.5∗∗ -1.9∗∗ -0.2
BE > 6− 12 mths 1.2† 0.7∗ -0.3† -1.3† 1.7∗∗ -0.6∗∗
BE > 12− 18 mths 1.2 -0.5 -0.2 -6.9∗∗ 3.1∗∗ -1.3∗∗
BE > 18− 24 mths -1.2 1.1 -0.3 -9.0∗∗ 2.3∗∗ -1.4∗∗
BE > 24 mths -8.9∗∗ -3.1∗∗ -1.4∗∗ -27.3∗∗ 0.2 -3.1∗∗
Continued on next page...
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... table 3.5 continued
ALMP measure -28.4∗∗ 7.2∗∗ -1.8∗∗ -29.2∗∗ 15.2∗∗ -1.8∗∗
Commuter -3.9∗∗ -0.4 5.2∗∗ -13.4∗∗ 0.4 8.9∗∗
Regional characteristics
Unemployment rate (UR) 0.1 -1.3∗ 0.2 -4.5∗ 1.0 -0.1
Change in UR 1995-2000 -1.3∗∗ 0.1 -0.1 -4.3∗∗ 0.8∗ 0.1
GDP per head 0.5 0.0 -0.2 -0.6 -0.3 0.2
Change of GDP 1995-2000 0.5 -0.1 0.1 0.4 0.4 -0.2
Rate of business set ups 1.3 ∗∗ -0.2 0.0 -0.3 0.2 -0.1
Share of long-term U -3.7∗∗ 0.5† -0.2 -3.0∗∗ 0.3 0.7∗∗
Avg. yrs of schooling -1.1∗ -0.6∗ -0.4∗∗ 0.9 -0.1 -0.2
Placement counsellor per U -1.8∗∗ 0.2 0.3† -2.6∗∗ 0.6† 1.4 ∗∗
Share of U in ALMPR 0.5 0.1 -0.3
∗∗ 0.3 0.3 -0.5∗∗
Share of U in ALMPS 0.0 0.4
† -0.1 0.6 0.8∗ -0.6∗∗
Driving time to higher level city 1.1∗∗ 0.0 -0.2† 0.6 -0.2 -0.2∗
Child care places per child & child 0.8† -0.9∗∗ 0.2† 0.9 -0.4 0.0
University present -2.3∗∗ 0.2 0.4† -2.2∗∗ -0.5 0.0
Seasonal unemployment -3.2∗∗ 3.1∗∗ 0.0 -2.5 0.4 1.5 ∗
Rural region -0.4 0.2 0.4 2.9∗∗ -1.3∗ -0.4†
Urban region 1.4 0.1 -0.4∗ -0.2 -0.4 -0.6∗∗
West & 2000 13.5∗∗ -1.1† 1.1∗∗ 6.9∗∗ -1.6∗∗ 0.9∗
West & 2001 4.4∗∗ -1.3∗ 0.3 -1.9† -0.3 0.4
East & 2000 -3.3 6.3∗∗ 1.5† -5.9∗ -0.8 8.6∗∗
East & 2001 -0.8 3.4∗ 1.4† -4.9∗ -0.1 7.3∗∗
East & 2002 2.8 3.2∗∗ 1.5∗ -2.9 1.0 4.1∗∗
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
Note: Low wage sample refers to individuals with pre-unemployment daily gross wages ≤ 60 euros. BE=Beneﬁt entitlements;
ALMP=Active labour market program with focus on regular (R) or secondary (S) employment; U=Unemployment.
‡: Daily pre-unemployment wages are in the lowest (highest) wage quartile for the low (higher) wage sample.
CHAPTER 3. LOCAL, NON-LOCAL, AND SUBSIDISED EMPLOYMENT 125
Institutional organisation According to our ﬁndings, the recent emphasis on job coun-
selling that is, among other things, reﬂected in the increasing number of job counsellors per
unemployed jobseeker, is unlikely to substantially contribute to a shortening of unemploy-
ment duration. This is because a higher counsellor/customer ratio does not signiﬁcantly
accelerate exits from unemployment but rather aﬀects the labour market state after unem-
ployment. In particular, individuals with higher pre-unemployment earnings are more likely
to migrate and to exit to subsidised employment while there are less local exits in regions with
a higher ratio of job counsellors to unemployed jobseekers. This may suggest that additional
human resources in job counselling speed up exits to migration and subsidised employment
at the cost of local placement without resulting in a positive net eﬀect on the duration of
unemployment.17 We also ﬁnd that an extensive local availability of active labour market
programs accelerates exits to subsidised employment at the expense of exits to regular em-
ployment. Among single persons, we mainly observe less local exits, while among married
men with a higher local attachment, subsidised employment rather substitutes for non-local
employment. There therefore seems to be a small regional locking-in eﬀect of active labour
market policies for married men that complements the ﬁndings from the previous chapter
concerning a regional locking-in eﬀect for women in western Germany.
Structural indicators The type of region as well as the driving time to the next large city
to some extent capture diﬀerences in the availability of certain employment opportunities
within a commuting range. A lack of unskilled service jobs in rural areas, for example,
may help explain reduced probabilities of ﬁnding local employment for individuals with
low earnings capacities. Subsidised employment partially cushions these diﬀerences with
increasing exit probabilities in rural regions among low earning married men and decreasing
exit probabilities for individuals with higher pre-unemployment earnings. Moreover, apart
from singles with higher pre-unemployment earnings, all other groups show higher local exit
probabilities in remotely located regions. This may suggest that relatively immobile groups
17One might retort that the counsellor/customer ratio is endogenous because the number of customers
should be higher in regions with a long average unemployment duration. However, we use lagged value,
i.e. the average counsellor/customer ratio during the 12 month preceding the start of the unemployment
spell, which should preclude a direct simultaneity issue. Moreover, we use a number of indicators that
capture regional labour market conditions such the the remaining variation in the customer/counsellor ratio
is likely to mainly reﬂect the exogenous variation due to the politically motivated improvement of the
customer/counsellor ratio during the study period.
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of unemployed lower their reservation wage in regions with a lack of accessible jobs and thus
experience faster exits to local employment.
The presence of a university reduces local job-ﬁnding among all groups and increases
migration probabilities among all but married men with low earning capacities. These results
are in line with the idea that students may exert additional congestion eﬀects on the local
labour market as students seek a minor job during their studies and often start their job
search after graduation in the local area. Finally, somewhat unexpectedly, a higher level of
day care places per child weakly accelerates local exits among married men with children,
but not among single parents although single parents are somewhat less likely to leave a
region with an extensive child care infrastructure. The relatively weak eﬀects may partially
reﬂect that child care facilities should only be of major importance for individuals with young
children, a group that cannot be identiﬁed in the IEBS.
Western/eastern Germany Despite strong economic diﬀerences between western and
eastern Germany, conditional unemployment durations are surprisingly similar. On the one
hand, this suggests that our regional labour market characteristics already capture major
economic diﬀerences between both parts of Germany. Since the eﬀect of these regional
characteristics are relatively limited, however, the much higher level of unemployment in
eastern Germany and the long average duration of unemployment have to be explained by
the huge inﬂow into unemployment just after reuniﬁcation and the fact that many of these
displaced workers never found regular employment rather than by unemployment experiences
of those currently entering unemployment. For those entering unemployment between 2000
and 2002, diﬀerences between the conditional unemployment duration in eastern and western
Germany are small and in many cases even disappear as we reach the end of the observation
period. With regard to subsidised employment this is probably due to a reduction in the
formerly extensive public spending on subsidised employment in eastern Germany. The
likelihood of exiting to local regular employment, however, remains somewhat lower for most
unemployed people in eastern Germany than for unemployed people in western Germany.
This is partially compensated for by higher migration rates among the unemployed from
eastern Germany which can be explained by the strong pull factors from western Germany.
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3.7 Conclusion
In the light of recent labour market reforms, this paper explores the extent to which passive
and active labour market measures, local job placement activities and regional factors aﬀect
unemployment experiences of jobseekers in Germany. For this purpose, we perform a com-
prehensive analysis of unemployment duration using the latest generation of administrative
individual data and a broad set of regional aggregate and institutional data in the period
2000-2004. By distinguishing three exit states, local regular employment, non-local regular
employment and subsidised employment we are able to disentangle the eﬀects of individual,
regional, and institutional characteristics on these destination states. This is highly relevant
because there may be diverging eﬀects on the three destination states. As a consequence,
previous estimates may have been biased if non-local or subsidised employment have not
been separated from exits to local employment.
Based on competing risk Cox proportional hazard estimates, we generally obtain that
individual characteristics and in particular an individual’s work history strongly aﬀect the
duration of unemployment and the chosen destination state while the eﬀect of regional fac-
tors such as the unemployment rate is often rather small. This is consistent with German
and international evidence concerning the impact of regional labour market conditions on
the duration of unemployment until exiting to a local or non-local job (see Kettunen (2002),
Yankow (2002) and chapter (2) of this dissertation). Regional disparities thus appear to be
much less important than usually considered by the German public and by German policy
makers. Therefore, our results suggest that regional policies may only be a supplementary
means of improving labour market outcomes of unemployed individuals. Moreover, consis-
tent with previous ﬁndings in chapter (2), we only ﬁnd weak increases in migration as a
response to unfavourable local labour demand conditions. Deteriorating local labour market
conditions thus prolong unemployment and build up an increasing level of regional long-term
unemployment.
With regard to public counselling, there is no evidence that increasing counselling eﬀorts
have much of a shortening eﬀect on the duration of unemployment. These results may
indicate that recent restructuring eﬀorts of public employment services are unlikely to bring
about a substantial reduction in unemployment. Nonetheless, restructuring eﬀorts may
contribute to the increasing eﬃciency of public spending, an aspect that we do not analyse
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in our work. For this reason and given our econometric approach it is diﬃcult to compare our
results directly with international evaluation studies which are available for several countries,
e.g. the UK (Blundell et al., 2004) and the Netherlands (van den Berg and van den Klaauw,
2006).
Entering subsidised employment in the context of an active labour market program
(ALMP) often tends to cushion negative local labour market conditions and thus somewhat
counteracts a prolonged unemployment duration. Moreover, previous ALMP participants
are likely to end up in ALMP again, a result which likely reﬂects a selection of immobile
individuals into what we might call ALMP-careers. Our analysis thus does not identify the
causal eﬀect of participating in ALMP on labour market outcomes which may be positive
depending on the type of program as has been suggested by Lindgren and Westerlund (2003).
Our analysis suggests, however, that an extensive local supply of ALMP reduces migration
rates for married men. We thus ﬁnd evidence for a minor regional locking-in-eﬀect that
complements the ﬁnding from chapter (2) concerning a similar eﬀect for women.
We obtain a number of indications that the unemployment compensation and welfare
system strongly aﬀects individual labour market outcomes:
• Individuals with low pre-unemployment earnings who are likely to have high income
replacement rates have the lowest exit hazards to both local an non-local regular em-
ployment.
• Exits to regular employment decrease with increasing entitlement length to unem-
ployment beneﬁts, especially among previously well-earning unemployed for whom
exhausting unemployment beneﬁts entails some major reductions in transfer receipt.
• Older individuals with extremely long UB entitlements basically never leave for regular
employment as they use UB as a means of early retirement.
Similar to the ﬁndings from chapter (2), the evidence again suggests that the reduction of
UB entitlements and income replacement rates are likely to drastically shorten unemploy-
ment and to increase migration for certain groups. A strong eﬀect of the unemployment
compensation system on the duration of unemployment has already been observed in the
past. Christensen (2005) shows that social beneﬁt recipients with high reservation wages are
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unlikely to leave unemployment. Similarly, Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006b) ﬁnd that unem-
ployed people with lower former wages are much less likely to leave unemployment. Mu¨ller
et al. (2007) evaluate a reform of the unemployment beneﬁt system in 1997 which reduced
entitlement length for unemployment beneﬁts for older unemployed. They show that this
reform was successful in drastically reducing inﬂow to unemployment and the duration of
unemployment in the relevant group of unemployed.
Although our approach is fairly comprehensive and includes new data, it still has several
limitations. Alternative destination states such as leaving the labour force or retirement, for
example, should be an important extension to our competing risk approach. Unfortunately,
our data does not provide information on these exit states such that we leave this extension
to future research. Moreover, the fact that we do not observe the true length of the unem-
ployment duration may aﬀect our results. In addition, our econometric approach faces the
methodological diﬃculty that a certain share of our unemployed population has zero proba-
bility for an exit to regular employment. This is known as the mover - stayer problem in the
literature (Abbring, 2002; Addison and Portugal 2003) and results in the defectiveness of the
unemployment duration distribution. Our estimation results may therefore be biased, but as
the degree of defectiveness is limited in our data, this problem may be of minor importance.
Our model does not include random eﬀects in order to account for individual unobserved
heterogeneity. For this reason we left the baseline hazard nonparametric and do not draw
attention to it because it is likely to be biased. Also the assumption of proportional hazard
rates can be incorrect as Fitzenberger and Wilke (2006a and 2006b) have shown with similar
data that this assumption is implausible for several regressors. A more ﬂexible approach
which allows the eﬀect of the regressors on the conditional distribution of unemployment
duration to vary over the quantiles and thus even crossing of the conditional hazard rates,
may provide more detailed insights. The empirical analysis in this paper still provides many
new insights and it raises several interesting research questions.
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Appendix
A - Summary Statistics by sub-samples
Singles Married Men
Individual characteristics Low Wage Higher Wage Low Wage Higher Wage
Female 41.7 26.0 n/a
Age < 26 41.4 21.2 4.4 2.5
Age 26-35 27.4 39.1 23.5 24.6
Age 46-56 10.5 12.0 30.6 28.5
Age > 56 1.8 2.0 8.0 7.0
Unskilled 52.2 30.5 45.9 32.4
University degree 1.6 7.2 1.5 5.6
Foreign born 6.2 5.3 16.9 12.4
Female foreign born 2.2 1.1 n/a
Children 21.2 18.0 63.1 66.7
Children & female 11.6 4.8 n/a
Minor job 8.6 1.0 8.8 1.3
Spell starts in winter 32.0 39.1 37.6 45.2
Previous employment history
Part time 20.3 4.6 n/a
Lower/upper wage‡ 39.5 22.9 26.6 27.8
Lower/upper wage‡ & female 18.6 6.7 n/a
Construction 4.3 2.8 6.5 4.3
Trade and Food Ind. 14.7 26.2 25.8 35.7
Services/Public sector 44.2 33.8 38.2 29.0
Recall 12.2 20.2 19.9 28.3
Unemployment 61.9 64.9 74.9 66.8
Large ﬁrm 7.0 10.3 5.1 7.0
BE > 6− 12 mths 43.4 49.2 31.5 39.7
BE > 12− 18 mths 1.1 2.0 3.4 4.5
BE > 18− 24 mths 0.9 2.2 3.3 5.7
BE > 24 mths 0.9 2.2 3.7 7.0
ALMP measure 9.4 1.5 12.5 1.3
Commuter 20.8 27.7 20.8 29.2
Number of unemployment spells 74,724 28,168 28,018 23,620
Note: All covariates are dummy variables. BE=Beneﬁt entitlements; ALMP= Active labour market programs;
Minor Job = Job < 15 hrs/week while unemployed at the beginning of unemployment
‡: Refers to individuals with daily pre-unemployment wages in the lowest (highest) wage quartile for
the low (higher) wage sample.
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The data problems imply that risk-speciﬁc failure distributions can only be bounded. We
develop a non-parametric bounds analysis of risk-speciﬁc cumulative incidence curves (CIC)
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durations. Our simulations demonstrate the applicability of this approach also in case of
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4.1 Introduction
In this paper, we present an approach how to empirically analyse competing risks models
in the case of partially missing information concerning the failure times. As an example,
administrative unemployment duration data from Germany provide only incomplete informa-
tion concerning the duration until leaving unemployment to diﬀerent failure types because
there are unobserved periods in an individual’s employment trajectory (Fitzenberger and
Wilke, 2004). As a result of such incomplete information, parameters of interest can only
be bounded (Manski, 2003). As proposed by Abadie (2005), Lee and Wilke (2005) bound a
diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences treatment eﬀect over diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the latent durations. In
the context of incomplete information concerning exits from unemployment to destinations
other than employment such as out of labour force or self-employment, Lee and Wilke (2005)
assume independence between competing risks and thus independent censoring within a sin-
gle risk framework. If this assumption holds, estimated bounds for the marginal survivor
function are unbiased while they are biased in case of dependent competing risks.
The contribution of this paper is to extend the bounds framework for partially identiﬁed
data to a competing risks setting and derive bounds for the empirical cumulative incidence
function instead of using independent censoring as proposed by Lee and Wilke (2005). Cu-
mulative incidence curves (CIC) refer to the empirical probability of failing from one of the
causes until time t in the presence of all competing failure types (Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice,
1980; Pepe, 1991; Pepe and Mori, 1993). By using the CIC, our analysis yields bounds
for estimates of the eﬀects on observed failure time distributions even in case of dependent
risks. It is thus a generally applicable tool to describe and analyse observed failure time
distributions.
Changes of the CIC, however, convey only limited information concerning the causal
eﬀect on the underlying marginal distribution of the latent failure times. This is because
the CIC does not tackle the general identiﬁcation problem of competing risks models and
does not recover the underlying risk-speciﬁc marginal distribution (Cox, 1962; Tsiatis, 1975).
Instead, the CIC gathers information about the observed distribution of failures and thus
circumvents the inherent non-identiﬁability of competing risks data. In light of this funda-
mental identiﬁcation problem, nonparametric bounds of the marginal distribution as have
been proposed by Peterson (1976) typically are too wide to infer some causal eﬀect. As an
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alternative, parametric assumptions can be imposed to identify the marginal distribution of
a particular failure type. Under rather restrictive assumptions, Heckman and Honore´ (1989)
and Abbring and van den Berg (2003) show identiﬁcation of the semiparametric mixed pro-
portional hazard model. Honore´ and Lleras-Muney (2006) impose quite mild assumptions
to obtain tight bounds for parameters within the accelerated failure time model. Our ap-
proach avoids such parametric assumptions which are unlikely to be met. The accelerated
failure time model, for example, assumes a constant eﬀect of a regressor on the conditional
risk-speciﬁc failure distributions. Since we develop our model with the purpose to apply it
to a reform of the unemployment compensation system that is unlikely to have a constant
eﬀect, we require a more ﬂexible speciﬁcation. See Fitzenberger and Wilke (2007) for more
details on this topic. Although our approach cannot solve the fundamental identiﬁcation
problem of competing risks failure models, it still provides a ﬂexible descriptive tool for the
observed distribution of competing failures under a variety of settings such as dependent
risks. In particular, our approach is fully nonparametric in the sense that we do not impose
assumptions that may be violated in the real world. It tackles an important identiﬁcation
problem that stems from missing failure time information which is present in administra-
tive individual data if interval duration can only be partly observed. Since administrative
processes often record only certain labour market states, this should be relevant for many
countries. The growing literature using these data is another indicator for the relevance of
our work.
After presenting the theoretical framework for a bounds analysis of risk-speciﬁc cumu-
lative incidence curves in the case of partially missing data, a simulation demonstrates the
applicability of this approach in case of dependent competing risks in contrast to a bounds
analysis based on the Kaplan-Meier estimator of the marginal survivor curve. We then ap-
ply our approach to an economic research question that has already raised some research
interest, namely the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on the probability of migration. Sev-
eral studies have already looked at the link between unemployment compensation and the
duration of unemployment. These studies generally conﬁrm a disincentive eﬀect of unem-
ployment compensation on the transitions from unemployment to employment (Katz and
Meyer, 1990; Card and Levine, 2000; Lalive and Zweimu¨ller, 2004; van Ours and Vodopivec,
2006). These ﬁndings are in line with the predictions from search theory that considers
CHAPTER 4. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND MIGRATION 135
unemployment beneﬁts to raise reservation wages (Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991). The
eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on migration, however, is much less clear. The negative
eﬀect of rising reservation wages and smaller geographical search horizons as a reaction to
higher beneﬁt levels (Hassler et al., 2005) contrasts a positive resource eﬀect as higher un-
employment beneﬁt levels enable individuals to bear migration costs (Tatsiramos, 2003) and
to increase expenditures that enhance the productiveness of job search (Barron and Mellow,
1979; Tannery, 1983). Most studies, however, seem to suggest a mobility-reducing eﬀect of
unemployment beneﬁts on migration. Goss and Paul (1990) ﬁnd that unemployment beneﬁts
reduce migration probabilities among involuntary unemployed in the US. Antolin and Bover
(1997) present evidence from Spain that registered unemployed with beneﬁt receipt are less
mobile than their non-registered counterparts. Consistent with these ﬁndings, chapter (2)
and (3) of this dissertation provide some evidence that unemployed in Germany who are
entitled to receive unemployment beneﬁts (UNB) for an extended period of more than 18
months are much less likely to leave unemployment and migrate than individuals with a
shorter period of UNB receipt. To some extent, however, the ﬁndings of these studies may
be driven by unobserved individual heterogeneity. In a study with individual ﬁxed eﬀects
that should mitigate a possible selection problem, Tatsiramos (2003) ﬁnds a positive eﬀect
of unemployment beneﬁts on migration, a result that he assigns to the mobility-enhancing
resource eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts. As a drawback, however, this study does not take
account of competing transitions to local employment. Our bounds analysis thus reexam-
ines the eﬀect of shorter unemployment beneﬁt receipt on the transitions to either local
or non-local employment via migration. For this purpose, we exploit a natural experiment
that generates some exogenous variation of entitlement length, namely the reform of un-
employment beneﬁt entitlements in Germany in 1997. This reform reduced the length of
entitlements for certain age groups by up to ten months. As a consequence, it is possible
to construct a treatment group with shortened entitlement length and a control group for
whom entitlements have been unaﬀected by the reform. Based on two diﬀerent deﬁnitions
of the latent durations until exiting to either local or non-local employment, it is possible
to apply our bounds framework to the inference of the eﬀect on the CIC for migration and
for other exit states. The ﬁndings indicate that the degree of uncertainty in the German
administrative data that is due to unobserved periods in an individual’s employment tra-
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jectory at ﬁrst precludes any clear inference as the bounds tend to be very wide. When
introducing an additional assumption concerning the missing information, bounds are gen-
erally much tighter. For high-skilled individuals, for whom the threat of entitlement loss due
to the 1997 reform is likely to be largest, the corresponding bounds are indicative for the
mobility-reducing eﬀect of extensive UB receipt.
The paper is structured as follows. The following section presents the theory of a com-
peting risks bounds analysis of cumulative incidence curves in the case of partially missing
information. We then simulate the applicability of this approach in case of non-random cen-
soring and dependent competing risks. Section 4.4 applies the proposed method to analyse
the eﬀect of unemployment beneﬁts on the cumulative incidence of migration. Section 4.5
concludes.
4.2 Model
Let the pair (T,R) be the latent failure times and exit states, respectively, where the failure
times are observed on a discrete scale t1 < t2 < . . . < tk and exit states R = 1, . . . , r, . . . , z.
Latent censoring time is denoted by C. There are i = 1, . . . , N independent and identically
distributed observations. Failure time for risk r of observation i, (Ti, r) = tj is observed only
if (Ti, r) = minR{(Ti, R), Ci}. We assume independent censoring throughout the paper, i.e.
λrj = P [(T, r) = tj|(T, 1) ≥ tj ∩ . . . ∩ (T, r) ∩ . . . ∩ (T, z) ≥ tj ∩ C ≥ tj]
= P [(T, r) = tj|(T, 1) ≥ tj ∩ . . . ∩ (T, r) ∩ . . . ∩ (T, z) ≥ tj], (4.1)
which means that the censoring in the data does not change the risk-speciﬁc distribution
of failure times and thus the hazard rate λrj. We suppose further that failure type r and
censoring occurs with multiplicity drj and cj at time tj, respectively. If all competing risks
are independent, the hazard rate from (4.1) becomes
λrj = P [(T, r) = tj|(T, r) ≥ tj], (4.2)
and the likelihood function can be written as
L =
k∏
j=1
{
z∏
r=1
P [(T, r) = tj]
drjP [C = tj]
cj
}
. (4.3)
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The likelihood L can be maximised by replacing P [C = tj] by P [T > tj] = P [(T, 1) >
tj ∩ . . .∩ (T, z) > tj] as the only contribution to the likelihood by the censored observations.
After rearranging,
L =
k∏
j=1
{
z∏
r=1
λ
drj
rj (1− λj)nj−dj
}
, (4.4)
where λj =
∑
λrj, dj =
∑
drj and nj = (dj + cj) + . . . + (dk + ck) represents the number
of observations at risk. Using the ﬁrst-order-condition, the Kaplan-Meier estimate of λrj
which maximises (4.4) and thus the (overall) survivor function, Sˆ(tj), and the risk-speciﬁc
cumulative incidence curve (CIC), Iˆr(tj), are given by
λˆrj =
drj
nj
, and (4.5)
Sˆ(tj) = Pˆ [T > tj] =
j∏
l=1
(1− λˆl) =
j∏
l=1
nl − dl
nl
, (4.6)
Iˆr(tj) = Pˆ [(T, r) ≤ tj] =
j∑
l=1
λˆrlSˆ(tl). (4.7)
It can be shown that, in the independent competing risks setting, (4.5) has the same value
if we treat the competing risks other than r as censored, i.e. replacing P [(T,R 	= r) = tj] by
P [T > tj] in (4.3). In other words, censoring is equivalent to independent competing risks
with unknown exit states. For the survivor function, however, the deﬁnition of competing
risks and censoring are not interchangeable. Since λj is a sum of all risk-speciﬁc hazard rates,
treating some of the competing risks as censored changes the estimated (overall) survivor
curve as in (4.6) to reﬂect only the probability of survival from the remaining competing
risks. In the case of independent competing risks, treating all competing risks besides r
as censored still produces consistent results. The Kaplan-Meier survivor curve from (4.6)
becomes a consistent estimator for the marginal survivor curve speciﬁc to risk r only, i.e. (4.4)
and (4.6) becomes
Lc =
k∏
j=1
{
λ
drj
rj (1− λrj)nj−drj
}
, and (4.8)
Sˆcr(tj) =
j∏
l=1
(1− λˆrl) = P [(T, r) > tj]. (4.9)
In the case of dependent competing risks, the above Kaplan-Meier type estimator is biased.
See Moeschberger and Klein (1995) for a review. As hazard rates are now interdependent,
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competing risks cannot arbitrarily be considered as censored observations. Nevertheless,
as is shown by Cox (1962) and Tsiatis (1975), from any observed distribution (T˜ , r) with
dependent joint probability P [(T˜ , R) > tj] = P [(T, 1) > tj ∩ . . .∩ (T, z) > tj] an independent
joint probability function (T´ , R) can always be ﬁtted which produces the same observed
distribution, i.e.
P [(T˜ , R) > tj] = P [(T, 1) > tj ∩ . . . ∩ (T, z) > tj]
= P [(T´ , 1) > tj] . . . P [(T´ , z) > tj]. (4.10)
P [(T´ , r) = tj] is the marginal density function of the hypothetical distribution of value zero
if r is not observed at tj, and thus P [(T˜ , r) = tj] = P [(T´ , r) = tj] holds for all r and tj.
Thus, the Kaplan-Meier estimator from (4.6) still produces unbiased estimates of the overall
survivor curve when replacing the true failure time T with the assumed independent T´ in
(4.2) to (4.6) and treating all dependent risks as competing risks. It is, however, no longer
a consistent estimator for the marginal survivor curve speciﬁc to risk r. This is the result of
the non-identiﬁcation problem, and thus the underlying marginal probability for each failure
cannot be identiﬁed without any additional parametric assumptions.
The cumulative incidence curve (CIC) has been suggested as an alternative nonparametric
tool which has a meaningful interpretation also in presence of dependent competing risks
(Kalbﬂeisch and Prentice, 1980; Pepe, 1991; Pepe and Mori, 1993). The CIC refers to the
observed probability of experiencing a speciﬁc failure type prior to time tj in the presence of
all competing failure types. It therefore does not recover the underlying risk-speciﬁc marginal
distribution. Instead, it refers to observed failure probabilities which are also well deﬁned in
the case of dependent competing risks. In other words, the CIC oﬀers a descriptive tool.
In what follows, we present bounds for the CIC in a context of partially identiﬁed data.
In such a setting, (Ti, z) is not exactly identiﬁed and we assume a lower- and upper-bounded
latent distribution for z, i.e. (TLB, z) < (T, z) < (TUB, z). The latent distribution for the
remaining risks, (T,R 	= z), are fully identiﬁed and have no bounds, i.e.
(TLB, R) = {(T, 1), . . . , (T, z − 1), (TLB, z)}, and
(TUB, R) = {(T, 1), . . . , (T, z − 1), (TUB, z)}.
Thus, we also observe a lower bound and upper bound for each risk-speciﬁc duration time,
(T˜LBi , R) and (T˜
UB
i , R). This is because the observed distribution for risks R 	= z depends
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on the bound for risk z and the bounded failure data on risk z will change the observations
on risks other than z. If there was no missing information problem, the observable duration
time for risk z is (T˜i, z). Instead, given the partial identiﬁcation problem, if we observe a
failure to risk z, then we have for sure observed the lower bound (T˜LBi , z). The upper bound
for this duration is deﬁned by min{(Ti, r), (TUBi , z), Ci} for r = 1, . . . , z − 1. This means
that the upper bound may diﬀer not only in terms of duration but also in terms of the exit
state:
(i) (T˜LBi , z) ≤ (T˜i, z) ≤ (T˜UBi , z), or
(ii) (T˜LBi , z) ≤ (T˜i, z) ≤ (T˜UBi , R 	= z), or
(iii) (T˜LBi , z) ≤ (T˜i, z) ≤ CUBi
As an illustration, Figure 4.1 shows the case where the true (T˜i, z) falls in region (ii). Under
the deﬁnition of the lower bound, risk z is observed at T˜LB, whereas risk R 	= z is observed
at T˜UB under the deﬁnition of the upper bound.
Figure 4.1: Upper and lower bound of the observed risk speciﬁc duration
✲[ ]
t0 (T
LB, z) (T,R 	= z) (TUB, z)
✲
✲
(T˜LB, z)
(T˜UB, R 	= z)
Regarding the empirical section, the particular data problem is that only a lower bound
for exit state z is observed, and thus only regions (ii) and (iii) are valid. Formally speaking,
the model studies the latent distributions of (T, 1), . . . , (T, z − 1) and min{TR =z, Tz}, as
(T, z) does not necessarily fall into the bounds indicated by the second and third region if it
is not the minimum of (T,R) and thus could never be observed.
The hazard rate, survivor curve and the CIC are estimated nonparametrically using the
above equations by replacing T˜ with T˜LB and T˜UB respectively. In analogy to Lee and Wilke
(2005), we use the monotone relations of the survival function and the CIC to formulate
the bounds analysis and to study the treatment eﬀect of some policy reforms. Using the
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relations T˜LB ≤ T˜ ≤ T˜UB, it is straightforward to see the following relations, which hold for
r = 1, . . . , z − 1:
dLBrj ≤ dUBrj ,
j∑
l=1
dLBzl ≥
j∑
l=1
dUBzl ,
nLBj ≤ nUBj , and thus
SˆLB(tj) ≤ Sˆ(tj) ≤ SˆUB(tj) (4.11)
IˆLBr (tj) ≤ Iˆr(tj) ≤ IˆUBr (tj) (4.12)
Bounds for other functions such as the cause-speciﬁc hazard rate or the cause-speciﬁc cumu-
lative hazard rate cannot be derived. Thus, the identiﬁcation problem concerning the latent
duration (T, z) implies that we observe only bounds for all risk-speciﬁc survivor curves and
CICs. The implications of dependent competing risks for these bounds call for some remarks.
Remark 1 If the exit state z is independent to the remaining competing risks and we treat
it as censored, the distributions of the fully observed failure times are then estimated in a
way without making use of the additional information provided by this risk, and thus the
bounds analysis is obsolete3, i.e.
Sˆc, LBr (tj) = Sˆ
c, UB
r (tj) = P [(T, 1) > tj ∩ . . . ∩ (T, z − 1) > tj], and (4.13)
Iˆc, LBr (tj) = Iˆ
c, UB
r (tj) =
j∑
l=1
P [(T, r) = tl]. (4.14)
(4.13) is the unbiased estimator for the survivor curve of the remaining competing risks and
- since risk z is independent - of the overall survivor curve. (4.14) is the latent marginal
density of exit r.
Remark 2 If risk z is dependent, the previously discussed properties of the survivor curve
and the CIC under competing risks carry over to their respective bounds. Moreover, the
estimated bounds depend on the chosen upper and lower bound for the unobserved latent
3This follows from the deﬁnition of independent censoring. Kaplan-Meier type estimators are consistent
estimators for the survivor curve and the CIC of the latent marginal distribution. Since this property has
an asymptotic nature, there may be some deviations in an application. We may observe a slight discrepancy
of the lower and upper bound for which a monotone relation does not necessarily hold.
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durations. If we treat risk z as censored, the bounds of the survivor curve bound the sur-
vivor curve for the hypothetical independent distribution and not the actual overall survival
function. The bounds for the CIC exist even if risk z is dependent and we treat it as a com-
peting risk because I´LBr (tj) =
∑j
l=1 P [(T˜
LB, r) = tl] and I´
UB
r (tj) =
∑j
l=1 P [(T˜
UB, r) = tl]
and the monotone relation P [(T˜LB, r) < tj] > P [(T˜ , r) > tj] < P [(T˜
UB, r) > tj] implies
I´LBr (tj) < Ir(tj) > I´
UB
r (tj). If the dependent risk z is treated as censored, bounds of the
hypothetical risk-speciﬁc CIC will not have a meaningful interpretation because the infor-
mation provided by the dependent risk z is dropped artiﬁcially.
To conclude the above argument, bounds analyses for the CIC and the survivor curve
can generally be used by treating missing data as a competing risk instead of as censored.
By doing so, we estimate the unbiased overall survivor curve and the risk-speciﬁc CIC.
Now consider a setting where the duration of interest is the unemployment duration.
Moreover, an individual faces several risks: it may enter local employment, non-local em-
ployment, or it may leave the labour force, become self-employed or enter subsidised em-
ployment. Unfortunately, the data oﬀers only limited information on certain exit states
R = 1, . . . , z, i.e. (T˜i, R)R=1,...,z can be observed while all other competing risks cannot be
distinguished. Thus, for the indistinguishable other exit states denoted with R = o, we
observe (T˜i, o) = min{(Ti, o1), (Ti, o2), . . . , (Ti, ov)}, with (T, ov) representing the latent fail-
ure times for the non-distinguishable exit states ov.
4 Lower and upper bounds are denoted
with (T˜LBi , o) and (T˜
UB
i , o). Duration is independently censored with time Ci. The dura-
tion to exit state o is dependent on that of exit state R = 1, . . . , z. Treating the exit state
o as a competing risk, bounds for a treatment eﬀect on the overall survivor curve and on
cause-speciﬁc cumulative incidence curves can be used without imposing the independence
assumption.
Now, suppose there is a policy intervention in a natural experiment setting. We have two
groups, the control group (G = 0) and the treatment group (G = 1), and two time intervals,
the pre-reform period (P = pt0) and the post-reform period (P = pt1). The reform of interest
is supposed to have an eﬀect on the unemployment duration of the treatment group in the
post-reform years and the eﬀect of the reform can be estimated by a Diﬀerence-in-Diﬀerences
4In an application, the pooling of all unidentiﬁed exit states aggravates its interpretability as changes in
the failure time for certain exit states subsumed under the exit state o may actually oppose each other.
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estimator (DID) as
∆Ir(tj|pt0, pt1, x) = [Ir(tj|1, pt1, x)− Ir(tj|0, pt1, x)]− [Ir(tj|1, pt0, x)− Ir(tj|0, pt0, x)] (4.15)
for r = 1, . . . , z, where Ir(tj|g, p, x) = P (T ≤ tj, R = r,G = g, P = p,X = x) with X as
further observable variables such as gender, age etc. and
∆S(tj|pt0, pt1) = [S(tj|1, pt1, x)− S(tj|0, pt1, x)]− [S(tj|1, pt0, x)− S(tj|0, pt0, x)], (4.16)
where S(tj|g, p, x) = P (T > tj, G = g, P = p,X = x). Given that we observe bounds
for the estimated survivor function as in (4.11) and bounds for the estimated cause-speciﬁc
cumulative incidence curve as in (4.12) it is straightforward to derive bounds for ∆ˆIr and
∆ˆS since they are bounded by intervals with endpoints [lIr(tj|pt0, pt1, x), uIr(tj|pt0, pt1, x)]:
lIr(tj|pt0, pt1, x) = max[−1, {ILBr (tj|1, pt1, x)− IUBr (tj|0, pt1, x)}
− {IUBr (tj|1, pt0, x)− ILBr (tj|0, pt0, x)}] (4.17)
and
uIr(tj|pt0, pt1, x) = min[1, {IUBr (tj|1, pt1, x)− ILBr (tj|0, pt1, x)}
− {ILBr (tj|1, pt0, x)− IUBr (tj|0, pt0, x)}] (4.18)
for r = 1, . . . , z and [lS(tj|pt0, pt1, x), uS(tj|pt0, pt1, x)]:
lS(tj|pt0, pt1, x) = max[−1, {SLB(tj|1, pt1, x)− SUB(tj|0, pt1, x)}
− {SUB(tj|1, pt0, x)− SLB(tj|0, pt0, x)}] (4.19)
and
uS(tj|pt0, pt1, x) = min[1, {SUB(tj|1, pt1, x)− SLB(tj|0, pt1, x)}
− {SLB(tj|1, pt0, x)− SUB(tj|0, pt0, x)}]. (4.20)
Note that the lower and upper bounds are restricted to be between -1 and 1. This is due to
the fact that maximum variation of probabilities cannot be larger than 1 in absolute values.
In the next section, we use simulations to demonstrate our major ﬁndings in this section.
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4.3 Simulations
The following simulation framework is closely related to the empirical application which is
concerned with transitions from unemployment. For the simulation, we thus assume that
there are two observed exit states, employment (r = e) and other destinations (r = o) such as
leaving the labour force and self-employment and no censoring.5 T˜o is not directly observed.
Let T˜LB be the observed lower bound of T˜o. To simplify the issue, we use T˜e as a natural
upper bound of T˜o.
6 We assume that the latent failure times, Te and T
LB, have the following
multivariate lognormal distribution
log(Tr) ∼ N(µr +G× c1r +DP × c2r +G×DP × c3r,Ω),
Ω =

 σ
2
e ρeLBσeσLB
ρeLBσeσLB σ
2
LB

 ,
with r = e, LB. G is a group dummy equal to zero for the control group and equal to
one for the treatment group. DP is a period dummy equal to zero in the pre-reform period
and equal to one in the post-reform period. µ thus refers to the mean failure time for the
control group in the pre-reform period. Values of the parameters {µr, cir, σr} for r=e, LB
and i=1, 2, 3 are chosen to approximate the conditions in the empirical application and are
summarised in Table 4.1:
Table 4.1: Chosen parameters for the simulation framework
r µ c1 c2 c3 σ
e 1.0 0.4 0.6 -0.4 2.5
LB 0.8 0.0 0.0 -0.5 1.5
5In the application, we will further distinguish between employment in the local area and employment
via migration.
6If T˜o was larger than T˜e, it could not be observed and therefore did not exist.
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We further assume that the true failure time for exit o, To, follows a uniform distribution in
the interval [TLB, TLB + 5]. Moreover, the treatment group is assumed to have longer latent
failure times to all exit states in both the pre- and post-reform period than the control group
(c1 > 0). Due to factors unrelated to the reform, both the treatment and control group have
longer failure times to all exit states in the post-reform period than in the pre-reform period
(c2 > 0). The interaction term G × DP reﬂects the assumption that the reform decreases
the failure time to exit state e on the treatment group only (c3 < 0). We ﬁrst adopt a
framework with zero correlation between the failure time to exit state e and its lower limit,
i.e. ρeLB=0, in order to study the case of independent competing risks before we relax this
assumption later.
Using formulas (4.15)-(4.16), we make use of the fully identiﬁed competing risks, To, to
compute the estimated change in the observed distribution for exit state e. We then compute
the bounds for these changes for the situation that we observe only TLB. We apply the
formulas (4.17)-(4.20) and treat TLB either as censored or as a competing risk. We run 500
simulations, each with 10, 000 failure times for each exit state to derive consistent estimates
for the changes of the observed distribution functions and the corresponding bounds. The
mean value and the bounds for the eﬀects are reported in Figure 4.2. In addition, the 5%
(95%)-quintile of the estimated lower bounds (upper bounds) are also included.
As the parameters c3e and c3o are negative, failure times to all exit states are shortened
after the reform. The expected positive treatment eﬀect on the CIC for exit e and the
expected negative eﬀect on the overall survivor curves with fully identiﬁed data are shown
as the black thick line in Figure 4.2(i)(a), (ii)(a) and Figures 4.2(i)(b), (ii)(b), respectively.7
In Figure 4.2(i)(a) & (b), results using the competing risks framework show that the
bounds contain the estimated treatment eﬀect on the CIC for exit e and the overall survivor
curve. Using the censoring framework, as discussed in remark 1 in the last section, the upper
and lower bounds coincide with each other in Figure 4.2(ii)(a) & (b) and are an unbiased
estimate for the treatment eﬀect on the latent marginal survivor curve of exit e. As TLB
and To are independent of Te, the overall survivor curve and the CIC in the presence of To
correspond to the estimated marginal survivor curve.
7In both the competing risk and the censoring setting, the estimated ”true” reform eﬀects are computed
in the same way.
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Figure 4.2: Simulated treatment eﬀects and their bounds in case of uncorrelated failures
types
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(ii) Treating TLB as censored
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Next we allow a correlation of Te and T
LB with ρeLB=0.05 and thus introduce a setting
in which the failure times for the exit state e and the observed lower bound are dependent.
In a competing risk framework, Figure 4.3(i) is very similar to Figure 4.2(i). The bounds
contain the estimated treatment eﬀect on both the overall survivor and the cause-speciﬁc
cumulative incidence curve. In the presence of dependent competing risks, the bounds for
the marginal survivor curve of exit e revert in direction when treating TLB as censored as
shown in Figure 4.3(ii)(b) and are thus not applicable. In fact, as discussed in remark 2 of
the last section, the bounds are now bounding neither the treatment eﬀect on the overall
survivor curve nor the marginal survivor curve for the employment. When treating TLB as
censored, Figure 4.3(ii)(a) shows that a slight increase in the correlation ρeLB from zero to
0.05 suﬃces to dramatically widen the bounds from a single line to a wide bound. This
bound diﬀers from that without censoring in 4.3(i)(a) and, as discussed in remark 2 of the
last section, does not have a meaningful interpretation.
We conclude that estimating the bounds on the CIC and treating TLB as a competing
risk is a preferable approach. In the case of independent competing risks, both bounds on the
CIC and the survivor curve produce a consistent estimate of the latent marginal treatment
eﬀect. In the case of dependent competing risks, however, the bounds for the survivor curve
are now bounding neither the treatment eﬀect on the overall survivor curve nor the marginal
survivor curve for the exit state employment. By contrast, the bounds for the CIC are still
interpretable as an estimate of the eﬀect on the observed distribution of failures, but - due
to the non-identiﬁability of competing risks - do not any longer capture the latent marginal
treatment eﬀect. Since the degree of dependence between competing risks is unknown, a
bounds analysis of CICs is a preferable approach as it yields an interpretable result under
all conceivable circumstances.
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Figure 4.3: Simulated treatment eﬀects and their bounds in case of ρel= 0.05
(i) Treating TLB as a competing risk
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(ii) Treating TLB as censored
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4.4 Empirical Application
As brieﬂy discussed in the introduction, we apply our bounds analysis to bound the eﬀect
of reducing the maximum duration of receiving unemployment beneﬁts on the observed
transitions from unemployment to local and non-local employment via migration. We begin
this section with a brief description of the German unemployment compensation system
and discuss the 1997 reform of unemployment beneﬁt entitlements. This discussion is based
on the Employment Promotion Act (Arbeitsfo¨rderungsgesetz ), the Social Welfare Act III
(Sozialgesetzbuch III ) and several secondary sources such as Plaßmann (2002), Oschmiansky
et al. (2001) and Wolﬀ (2003). We then introduce the data and discuss the selection of
treatment and control group, before we present the result of bounding the eﬀect as described
in the previous methodological section.
Basic features of the unemployment compensation system During the study pe-
riod, the system of unemployment compensation in Germany consists of two main compo-
nents: unemployment beneﬁts (UNB) and unemployment assistance (UNA). As an insur-
ance, unemployment beneﬁts are limited in time depending on the length of socially insured
employment during a period of seven years before the beneﬁt claim. Moreover, the length
of beneﬁt receipt positively depends on age with a maximum UNB receipt of 12 months
for younger age groups and up to 32 months for older age groups in the years prior to the
1997 reform. After exhausting UNB, unemployed individuals receive the tax-funded unem-
ployment assistance if they pass a means-test. Both UNB and UNA are a percentage of
former wage income with UNB replacing 63% (68%) of former wage income and UNA still
reaching income replacement rates of 53% (57%) for individuals without (with) dependent
children. For individuals with low pre-unemployment wages, income replacement rates may
even be higher. If the unemployment compensation as a percentage of former wage income
does not suﬃce to ensure the legally deﬁned minimum standard of living, individuals receive
complementary social beneﬁts. As a result, income replacement rates for individuals with
low pre-unemployment wages may be close to 100% and disincentives to take up a new job
should be particularly severe for this group of unemployed. Consistent with such disincen-
tive eﬀects, there is empirical evidence that these groups experience longer unemployment
durations and are less likely to leave for non-local jobs than unemployed individuals with
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higher pre-unemployment wages (see chapter (3) of this dissertation). The design of the
unemployment compensation and welfare system in Germany thus implies that any changes
concerning the maximum duration of UNB receipt are ineﬀective for unemployed individuals
with complementary social beneﬁts. Receiving unemployment assistance instead of unem-
ployment beneﬁts does not change the income replacement rate for these individuals and
should thus not aﬀect their job search strategy. By contrast, unemployed individuals with-
out additional social beneﬁts but with eligibility for the means-tested UNA loose around 10%
of their former wage income when switching from UNB to UNA. For this group, a shortening
of UNB is likely to have a small eﬀect only. Individuals who do not pass the means test for
receiving UNA due to other income sources or private savings even loose all unemployment
compensation after exhausting UNB. The threat of entitlement loss should thus be strongest
for this rather small group of unemployed.
1997 Reform In April 1997, a major reform of the Employment Promotion Act came into
force to shorten the receipt of UNB for some of the older age groups and to introduce stricter
sanction rules for the non-compliance with certain eligibility requirements. The enforcement
of stricter sanction rules in Germany after 1997 may have accelerated the transition from
unemployment to employment because temporary reductions in UNB due to non-compliance
with eligibility rules have been found an eﬀective means of reducing unemployment (Boone
et al., 2002, 2004). Since these new regulations applied to all unemployed at the same time,
however, our DID framework should eliminate this eﬀect and still allow for the identiﬁcation
of the causal eﬀect of shortening the UNB receipt for some older age groups in 1997. In
Germany, the potential UNB duration (PUNBD), i.e. the maximum duration of UNB receipt
at the beginning of the unemployment period, positively depends on the period of socially
insured employment within the seven years prior to the beneﬁt claim. This so called extended
claim period is restricted by previous beneﬁt claims and is thus shorter than seven years for
individuals with a beneﬁt claim within the previous seven years. In addition, the PUNBD
positively depends on age. During the 1980s, the PUNBD had successively been expanded
for older age groups. Thus, before the reform in 1997, entitlements to UNB lasted up to
32 months for individuals above the age of 42, while the PUNBD for individuals below this
age range was only 12 months. A detailed description of these earlier reforms can be found
in Hunt (1995). One well-documented result of these earlier reforms that demonstrates the
CHAPTER 4. UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS AND MIGRATION 150
disincentive eﬀect of this system was the rapid increase of early retirees whose extremely
long UNB receipt allowed for bridging the gap between employment and retirement age.
See Fitzenberger and Wilke (2004) for a nonparametric analysis using similar administrative
data. In 1997, the PUNBD was reduced for some of the older age groups by lowering the age
limits for certain maximum UNB receipts (see Table 4.2). As a consequence, the PUNBD for
individuals between 42 and 43 years of age was cut from 18 months before 1997 to 12 months
after the 1997 reform. For individuals aged 44, UNB was even cut from a maximum receipt
of 22 to a maximum receipt of 12 months. Individuals aged below 42 years were unaﬀected
by the reform as they always received a maximum of 12 months of UNB. The 1997 reform
thus provides a natural experiment with a credible source of variation in PUNBD that can
be used to identify its causal eﬀect.
Table 4.2: Potential unemployment beneﬁt duration (PUNBD) for
UNB claimants up to age 47 by work history and age, IAB-R01
Soc. insured employment PUNBD (in months)
during claim period until 03/97 since 04/97
12 months 6 6
16 months 8 8
20 months 10 10
24 months 12 12
28 months 14 (age ≥42) 14 (age ≥45)
32 months 16 (age ≥42) 16 (age ≥45)
36 months 18 (age ≥42) 18 (age ≥45)
40 months 20 (age ≥44) 20 (age ≥47)
44 months 22 (age ≥44) 22 (age ≥47)
Source: Plaßmann (2002)
One problem of the 1997 reform that has to be taken into account, however, is that
the implementation of the reform was partially cushioned. Until March 1999, new beneﬁt
claimants were treated according to the pre-reform regulations if there was a work history of
more than one year during the three years prior to the beneﬁt claim. Thus, the new regula-
tions applied to all new beneﬁt claims after March 1999 only. Two German studies already
looked at the eﬀect of the 1997 reform on transitions from unemployment to employment.
Based on the German Socio-Economic Panel, Wolﬀ (2003) only ﬁnds very weak positive
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eﬀects of shortening the PUNBD on the transitions to employment in eastern Germany.
As previously discussed, this ﬁnding may reﬂect that the entitlement loss due to the 1997
reform was rather limited for most groups. Moreover, due to the limited sample size of the
GSOEP data, the study pools unemployment spells starting between 1990 and 1999 and thus
includes only a limited number of spells that were actually aﬀected by the reform. In the
subsequent analysis, we use an administrative data set that provides a much larger sample
size and thus also allows for distinguishing between exits to local versus exits to non-local
employment after migration. Based on the same data set, Mu¨ller et al. (2007) look at the
eﬀect of the 1997 reform on transitions to employment among older unemployed above the
age of 52 for whom the 1997 reform also shortened the PUNBD. They ﬁnd evidence that
the reform reduced the inﬂow into unemployment and drastically reduced the duration of
unemployment among this group, a result that suggests that shorter UNB durations lower
the attractiveness of early retirement via the receipt of UNB. Using the same administra-
tive data set, we reexamine the eﬀect of the PUNBD on transitions to local and non-local
employment. Moreover, we restrict the analysis to prime age individuals for whom early
retirement should not be an issue. Moreover, prime age individuals are much more likely to
migrate as a response to the 1997 reform than their older counterparts.
Data: IAB-R01 The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample 1975-2001 -
regional ﬁle (IAB-R018). This register data set contains spell information on a 2 % sample
of the population working in jobs that are subject to social insurance payments and thus
excludes self-employed individuals and tenured civil servants. The data contains spell infor-
mation on periods for which the individual received unemployment compensation (UC) from
the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit) such as unemployment beneﬁts
UNB (Arbeitslosengeld), unemployment assistance UNA (Arbeitslosenhilfe) and maintenance
payments during training measures MP (Unterhaltsgeld). Thus, employment histories in-
cluding periods of transfer receipt can be reconstructed on a daily basis. One major drawback
of the data set is that the true unemployment duration is not known because the data only
contains information on the receipt of UC. As a consequence, there is a gap in the IABS-R01
record whenever an individual continues to be unemployed after exhausting unemployment
8See Hamann et al. (2004) for a detailed description of the IAB-R01.
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beneﬁts without receiving unemployment assistance. Since such a gap in the IABS-R01
record is indistinguishable from other unobserved labour market states, such as being out of
the labour force or self-employed, there is uncertainty about the true duration until leaving
unemployment to one of these other destination states (o). As a consequence of this par-
tially missing information problem, it is necessary to deﬁne unemployment spells according
to a suitable bound (Fitzenberger and Wilke, 2004, Lee and Wilke, 2005). For the following
analysis, we use two proxies, an upper and a lower bound that can be used for the bounds
analysis as discussed in the methodological section. In our case T˜LB and T˜UB are deﬁned as
follows:
• Unemployment with permanent income transfers: The lower bound (T˜LB)
closely follows the receipt of UC. It requires an individual to receive UC within 1
month after the end of employment and continue to receive UC with intermediate gaps
of less than 4 weeks. If such an intermediate gap or the gap between the end of UC
receipt and employment is longer than 1 month, we consider this as an exit to an
unknown destination (o) since these exits encompass exits to out of labour force as
well as exits to self-employment.
• Nonemployment: The upper bound (T˜UB) closely follows a non-employment deﬁni-
tion. It requires at least one receipt of UC after an employment spell, but does not
impose further restrictions. The resulting spells of unemployment are considered as
exits to an unknown destination (o) only if an individual does not exit to employment
until the end of the observation period.
By construction of the two unemployment deﬁnitions, we observe more UB spells9 than
LB spells because only the lower bound T˜LB conditions on the receipt of UC within four
weeks after the end of employment. In order to avoid a potential sample selection issue
if the excluded spells are not random with respect to the treatment eﬀect, we extend the
LB sample to match the size of the UB sample as in Lee and Wilke (2005). We do so by
adding the missing UB spells to the LB spells. These spells have an observed unemployment
duration of zero days and are considered as an exit to an unknown destination state o. This
way of treating the added spells is in line with the lower bound deﬁnition.
9We refer to UB (LB) spells or sample for the sample of unemployment spells that result when applying
T˜UB (T˜LB).
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For both unemployment proxies, right-censoring occurs in the case of continued UC re-
ceipt at the end of the observation period. For all unemployment spells that exit to employ-
ment, the IAB-R01 allows for identifying the location of the new workplace disaggregated to
the level of microcensus regions. Thus, by comparing the previous and the new workplace lo-
cation, it is possible to distinguish local from non-local exits to employment. In the following
analysis, a movement between non-adjacent labour market regions (Arbeitsmarktregionen)
is considered as migration. The 227 labour market regions (LMRs) in Germany comprise
typical daily commuting ranges such that for the majority of individuals both residence and
workplace are located within the LMR. Since individuals living at the fringe of an LMR may
nevertheless easily commute to the adjacent LMR, what is considered a local job change has
been extended to include all adjacent LMRs. Finding employment in a non-adjacent LMR
should thus necessitate residential mobility in most cases. For each spell of unemployment,
the analysis thus distinguishes exits to a local and a non-local job after migration from exits
to other destination states. We present estimates for ﬁnding local employment and migra-
tion only because changes for all other pooled exit states are not easily interpretable and the
focus of this application is on transitions to employment.
For our analysis, we include inﬂow samples for a pre- and a post-reform era. Due to the
implementation of stricter sanction rules in 1994, extending the pre-reform era beyond 1995,
might mix diﬀerent reforms. We therefore consider an unemployment spell starting between
1995 and 1996 as a a pre-reform spell. The post-reform era is predetermined by the fact
that the implementation of new UNB regulations did not start before 1999. The post-reform
inﬂow sample thus consists of all unemployment spells starting in 1999 or 2000. Since the
observation period of the IAB-R01 ends on 12/31/2001, the duration of a post-reform spell
is between one and three years only.
Choosing the treatment and control group The aim of the analysis is to identify the
eﬀect of being eligible for an extended UNB duration on the transitions from unemployment
to either a local job or a non-local job by using the natural experiment that is provided by the
reform of the Employment Promotion Act in 1997. In particular, eligibility to an extended
UNB duration of more than 12 months was cut for individuals aged 42-44 years, while the
PUNBD of individuals below this age was unaﬀected by the reform. Thus individuals aged
36-41 years serve as the group to control for changing labour market conditions as well
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as changing sanction rules when comparing transitions to local and non-local employment
before and after the reform. Since only individuals with long UNB entitlements are aﬀected
by the reform, the exact choice of treatment and control group has to be conditioned not
only on age, but also on the entitlement length at the beginning of the unemployment period.
Moreover, the chosen selection rule should be the same for both treatment and control group
to ensure that the groups are comparable with regard to their working history. Choosing,
for example, all individuals with a maximum duration of UNB receipt in their respective age
group results in a non-comparability of individuals in the control and treatment group as the
criterium to reach this maximum entitlement is less strict for the younger cohort (see Table
4.2). For this reason, we compute counterfactual UNB entitlements in addition to the actual
UNB entitlements at the beginning of each unemployment spell. Both information have to
be computed based on the known employment history, age and the known regulations and
changes across time (see Appendix A for details). Since the working history for individuals
from eastern Germany is not known before 1991 which aggravates the comparability of
computed entitlement length, we restrict the analysis to individuals from western Germany.
For the counterfactual UNB entitlements, we calculate the entitlement length in the absence
of the 1997 reform had the individual been aged 42-44 at the time of beneﬁt claim. As can
be seen in Table 4.3, the resulting counterfactual UNB entitlements are quite comparable
for both age groups (Pearson chi2(9) = 14.9).
For the subsequent analysis, we choose all unemployment spells that begin with a re-
ceipt of unemployment beneﬁts and whose counterfactual UNB duration exceeds 12 months.
Moreover, we condition on previous full-time employment to keep the sample more homoge-
neous in terms of labour force attachment. We also exclude unemployment spells of women
because missing information on marital status and dependent children in the IAB-R01 ag-
gravates the interpretation of corresponding results. For the chosen control group and the
post-reform treatment group the estimated actual entitlement length as shown in Table 4.4
that is subject to the 1997 reform and the true age of the individual is up to 12 months10
only. In the pre-reform era, the treatment group is entitled to 18.5 months of UNB receipt
on average while in the post-reform era, this average UNB duration falls to 11.8 months.
10For some individuals who do not fulﬁll the criterium for the maximum entitlement length, but still pass
the selection criterium, the true UNB duration may be lower than 12 months.
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This latter UNB receipt is almost exactly the UNB duration for the control group in the
pre- and post-reform era. The average treatment thus is a reduction of UNB entitlements of
6.7 months with the treatment ranging from a reduction of one to a reduction of ten months
for individuals aged 44 with maximum UNB entitlements.
Table 4.3: Estimated counterfactual UNB entitlement length for unemployment
spells in the pre- and post-reform era by age groupa, IAB-R01
Age 36-41 Age 42-44
UNB duration # spells % # spells %
≤ 2 months 1,226 6.8 551 7.6
3-4 months 1,212 6.7 473 6.6
5-6 months 1,061 5.9 423 5.9
7-8 months 1,092 6.1 440 6.1
9-10 months 1,194 6.6 463 6.4
11-12 months 1,017 5.6 444 6.2
13-14 months 1,182 6.6 486 6.7
15-16 months 1,026 5.7 435 6.0
17-18 months 9,008 50.0 3,505 48.6
Total 18,018 100.0 7,220 100.0
a Includes all previously full-time employed individuals born in West Germany whose unemployment spell
starts with the receipt of unemployment beneﬁts.
The chosen selection rule for the treatment and control group should ensure some com-
parability with respect to the working history that builds up claims to UNB. As the working
history strongly shapes labour market outcomes, this is quite important in order to minimise
selection biases. For a DID approach to be valid, both groups should be comparable in both
observed and unobserved characteristics which are likely to aﬀect labour market outcomes.
For the available information and some major indicators that can be calculated based on the
employment history, Appendix B shows that treatment and control group are quite com-
parable in most characteristics. Unfortunately, characteristics such as the marital status
and dependent children which are likely to aﬀect the likelihood of migration are missing.
The subsequent analysis thus rests on the assumption that the composition of treatment
and control group in the pre- and post-reform era are as comparable with respect to these
unobserved characteristics as they are with respect to the observed characteristics. Another
assumption of the DID approach is that both treatment and control group experience similar
changes in labour market conditions in the post- compared with the pre-reform era. This
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assumption could fail if older workers face more problems to exit unemployment in times
of economic downturn than their younger counterparts because of stricter employment pro-
tection for older workers. This might be relevant as the post-reform era is characterised
by slightly improving labour market conditions, while the pre-reform era rather falls into a
period of economic downturn (Bundesanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, 2001). On the other hand, stricter
employment protection for individuals above 40 only applies occasionally and generally re-
quires a job tenure of more than ten years. For jobseekers between 36 and 44, employment
protection should thus be quite comparable and the better labour market conditions in the
post-reform era should boost the transition to employment for both groups to a comparable
extent.
Table 4.4: Estimated actual UNB entitlement length for unemployment spells
with counterfactual UNB entitlements of >12 months in the pre- and post-
reform era by treatment and control group, IAB-R01
Control group Treatment group
UNB duration pre-1997 post-1997 pre-1997 post-1997
6-8 months 2.1% 1.3% 0.00% 1.5%
9-11 months 6.9% 4.5% 0.00% 5.6%
12 months 91.0% 94.2% 0.00% 93.0%
13-14 months 0.0% 0.0% 8.1% 0.0%
15-16 months 0.0% 0.0% 7.2% 0.0%
17-18 months 0.0% 0.0% 56.4% 0.0%
19-20 months 0.0% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0%
21-22 months 0.0% 0.0% 25.2% 0.0%
Average months 11.8 11.9 18.5 11.8
Total spells 4,294 3,577 1,557 1,436
Table 4.5 shows exit types and median unemployment duration for both unemployment
deﬁnitions. Due to the end of the observation period, the degree of censoring is more
pronounced in the post-reform year. Moreover, exits to other destination states are much
more likely for the LB spells. The simple descriptive statistics for both unemployment
deﬁnitions suggest that the treatment group has a somewhat longer unemployment duration,
but that the gap between treatment and control group almost disappears after the reform.
Among the non-censored spells, both unemployment deﬁnitions suggest that the treatment
group in the post-reform period almost catches up with the higher exit probability of the
control group, especially for exits to local employment.
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Table 4.5: Descriptive summary of full sample, IAB-R01
Control group Treatment group
pre-1997 post-1997 pre-1997 post-1997
LB spells
median duration (days) 79 73 88 73
exit to local job 54.5% (54.9%) 53.8% (57.0%) 53.4% (53.9%) 52.9% (56.2%)
exit to non-local job 7.7% (7.8%) 8.4% (8.9%) 6.7% (6.8%) 8.2% (8.7%)
exit to other destination 37.1% (37.3%) 32.1% (34.1%) 39.0% (39.3%) 32.9% (35.0%)
total exits 99.3% (100.0%) 94.3% (100.0%) 99.1% (100.0%) 94.0% (100.0%)
UB spells
median duration (days) 161 124 185 130.5
exit to local job 75.1% (77.4%) 65.9% (74.6%) 72.1% (75.1%) 64.8% (74.1%)
exit to non-local job 12.8% (13.1%) 11.0% (12.5%) 12.5% (13.0%) 11.2% (12.8%)
exit to other destination 9.2% (9.5%) 11.4% (12.9%) 11.4% (11.9%) 11.5% (13.1%)
total exits 97.1% (100.0%) 88.3% (100.0%) 96.0% (100.0%) 87.5% (100.0%)
Total spells 4,294 3,577 1,557 1,436
Cumulative incidence in the pre- and post-reform era Figure 4.4 shows the cumu-
lative incidence curves for exits to local and non-local employment by treatment and control
group in the pre- and post-reform years. First of all, note that exit probabilities increase for
all groups and exit types in the post-reform years. As has been discussed previously, this
may reﬂect a combination of better labour market conditions compared to the pre-reform
years as well as the stricter sanction rules that applied to both the control and the treat-
ment group. More importantly, the ﬁgures suggest that the increase in both the local and
the non-local exit probability via migration is more pronounced among the treatment group,
especially as we reach the end of the shortened UNB duration of 12 months. For exits to
local employment, we even observe a small kink for the treatment group after approximately
one year of unemployment in the post-reform years. In the pre-reform years where UNB du-
rations have been above 12 months for the treatment group, no such kink can be detected.
This timing of events is indicative for a causal relationship of these observed changes to the
shortening of UNB receipt in the post-reform years. For exits to non-local employment no
clear kinks can be detected, but the increase in the probability of non-local exits seems to
be strongest as we reach one year of unemployment.
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In particular, the cumulative incidence curves for non-local exits in the pre-reform era
appear ﬂatter after one year of unemployment for the treatment than for the control group.
In the post-reform era, the cumulative incidence curve of migration is as steep or even steeper
for the treatment compared to the control group. Thus, this may also indicate some positive
eﬀect of the shortening of UNB receipt for the treatment group on the observed probability
of migration.
Bounds Analysis I As discussed previously, neither of the two unemployment deﬁnitions
reﬂects the true unemployment duration. As a consequence, the eﬀects implied by Figure
4.4 do not capture the true eﬀect of the reform on the cumulative incidence of local and
non-local employment. We therefore apply formulas (4.17)-(4.18) to bound the true eﬀect of
the reform by the cumulative incidence curves for these two unemployment deﬁnitions. As
a ﬁrst interesting observation, we ﬁnd that the resulting bounds do not coincide with the
point estimates for the lower and upper bound of the latent variable. As shown in Appendix
E, point estimates for the diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the unemployment duration data do not
span the full width of our estimated bounds. This suggests that a sensitivity analysis based
on diﬀerent failure time deﬁnitions alone may be misleading.
Figure 4.5: Lower and upper bound of treatment eﬀect on the cumulative incidence of local
and non-local exits to employment, IAB-R01
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As regards the reform eﬀects on local employment and migration, Figure 4.5 suggests
that the data insecurity involved due to the unobserved duration until exiting unemployment
to one of the unknown exit states precludes any clear inferences. At the very beginning of
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unemployment, the upper bound for both exit types is above zero which suggests the same
direction of eﬀects as in Figure 4.4. However, after 50-100 days of unemployment bounds
are too wide to deduct any treatment eﬀect on exits to local or non-local employment. One
reason for the bounds to be so wide is that the natural lower and the natural upper bound
for the deﬁnition of unemployment that we apply result in many lower bound spells of length
zero. These spells are generally uninformative and result in large diﬀerences between the
distribution of T˜LB and T˜UB.
Bounds Analysis II As an approach to tighten the bounds, we impose an additional
assumption. Instead of expanding the LB spells to match the size of the UB sample, we
restrict the analysis to the spells that are included in both deﬁnitions. Given the deﬁnitions
for T˜LB and T˜UB this means that we restrict the analysis to unemployed individuals who
receive unemployment compensation within one months after the end of employment. This
approach is only valid if the exclusion of spells with a later start of unemployment beneﬁts
is a random sample in the sense that the joint distribution of the true unemployment dura-
tion remains unchanged. Intuitively, this implies independence of the treatment eﬀect with
respect to the exclusion of these uninformative spells.
Table 4.6: Descriptive summary of restricted sample, IAB-R01
Control group Treatment group
pre-1997 post-1997 pre-1997 post-1997
LB spells
median duration (days) 107 93 118 95
exit to local job 68.4% (68.9%) 65.2% (70.0%) 66.9% (67.6%) 64.7% (69.8%)
exit to non-local job 9.7% (9.8%) 10.2% (11.0%) 8.5% (8.5%) 10.1% (10.9%)
exit to other destination 21.1% (21.3%) 17.8% (19.1%) 23.6% (23.8%) 18.0% (19.4%)
total exits 99.2% (100%) 93.2% (100.0%) 98.9% (100.0%) 92.7% (100.0%)
UB spells
median duration (days) 117 99 126 104
exit to local job 78.0% (79.7%) 69.4% (76.4%) 75.5% (78.0%) 69.3% (76.2%)
exit to non-local job 12.1% (12.4%) 11.1% (12.2%) 11.4% (11.8%) 11.1% (12.2%)
exit to other destination 7.7% (7.9%) 10.3% (11.3%) 9.9% (10.2%) 10.6% (11.6%)
total exits 97.9% (100.0%) 90.8% (100.0%) 96.9% (100.0%) 91.0% (100.0%)
Total spells 3,426 2,952 1,243 1,174
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As can be seen in Table 4.6, using the restricted sample of spells yields similar descriptive
patterns than before. Moreover, the cumulative incidence curves in the pre- and post reform
era for the restricted sample in Appendix C indicate comparable shifts than for the full
sample. This suggests that restricting the sample to spells with UC receipt within one
months does not considerably alter the treatment pattern. A selection issue thus does not
seem to be of major concern and the introduction of the sample restriction may be a valid
way of tightening the bounds. Bounds for the restricted sample tend to be tighter because
the distribution of TLB and TUB are more similar after eliminating one major source of data
insecurity by assumption.
Figure 4.6: Lower and upper bound of treatment eﬀect on the cumulative incidence of local
and non-local exits to employment, restricted sample, IAB-R01
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The resulting bounds in Figure 4.6 are tighter and indicate a positive reform eﬀect for
observed transitions to non-local employment. After one year of unemployment, the cumu-
lative incidence of migration for individuals entitled to 12 months of UNB is 1− 3pp higher
than for individuals entitled to 16.8 months of UNB on average. In light of the institutional
design in Germany, this ﬁnding is quite plausible as the counteracting resource eﬀect sug-
gested by Tatsiramos (2003) is likely to be small. This is because unemployed individuals
irrespective of whether receiving UNB or UNA get ﬁnancial support for search costs and
moving costs. The negative eﬀect of higher reservation wages in case of higher UNB receipt
should thus likely exceed any resource eﬀect. Given the unresolved identiﬁcation issue of
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the competing risks model, however, Figure 4.6 may only be considered as some tentative
evidence that unemployment beneﬁts reduce migration. Moreover, despite tighter bounds,
the eﬀect of shortening the receipt of UNB on the observed transitions to local employment
still cannot be identiﬁed from the data and the eﬀect on observed non-local exits remains
rather small. One reason for this weak ﬁnding may be that due to the institutional design
the threat of entitlement loss from a reduction of the PUNBD is likely to be large for a
rather small group only. In the ﬁnal section, we therefore take a look at the heterogeneity
of the treatment eﬀect.
Heterogeneous treatment eﬀects As discussed before, the treatment eﬀect of the re-
form is unlikely to be homogeneous. Individuals with complementary social beneﬁts are not
really aﬀected by the length of UNB receipt. Moreover, individuals who pass the means
test for the receipt of UNA only loose around 10% of there former wage income so that
the impact of the reform should be limited. Individuals with other ﬁnancial resources loose
the entire unemployment compensation after exhausting unemployment beneﬁts. Unfortu-
nately, the IAB-R01 does not include enough information to actually distinguish between
these three groups as the receipt of complementary social beneﬁts is unknown. The wage
information included in the IAB-R01 is only a rough indicator of complementary receipt of
social beneﬁts as the receipt of social beneﬁts strongly depends on the household context
which is unobserved in the IAB-R01. We therefore decided to compare two diﬀerent skill
groups instead because education is highly correlated with wage income and should thus
capture some of the aforementioned diﬀerences. Less-skilled11 workers are more likely to
receive complementary social beneﬁts or pass the means test for the receipt of UNA than
their high-skilled12 counterparts. The reform eﬀect is thus likely to be weaker for less-skilled
individuals. Moreover, distinguishing between skill groups gave a clearer picture compared
to looking at diﬀerent wage quintiles as the latter results were not monotone across wage
quintiles. Figure 4.7 therefore presents the ﬁndings by skill group. Moreover, we also add
the asymptotically valid 90% joint conﬁdence intervals for upper and lower bounds, which
are computed following the bootstrap procedure of Horowitz and Manski (2000) and Lee
11Includes individuals who are either unskilled or have a vocational training and work as blue-collar
workers.
12Includes individuals with a tertiary education or white-collar workers with at least a vocational training.
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and Wilke (2005). Sample sizes for the two skill groups can be found in Appendix D.
Figure 4.7: Lower and upper bound of treatment eﬀect on the cumulative incidence of
local and non-local exits to employment among high-skilled (left) and less-skilled (right)
unemployed, restricted sample, IAB-R01
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Despite the fact that none of the estimated lower bounds in Figure 4.7 is signiﬁcantly
above zero, the bounds are suggestive for a stronger reform eﬀect on observed exit proba-
bilities for the high-skilled segment for whom the threat of entitlement loss after exhausting
UNB is likely to be largest.13 The point estimates for the bounds indicate that the observed
13Due to the identiﬁcation issue comparisons between groups are not unproblematic as both groups may
experience diﬀerent correlations between exit types which then also aﬀect the resulting cumulative incidence
curves.
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post-reform probability of migration after one year of unemployment is 3 − 7pp higher for
high-skilled individuals while the corresponding bounds for less-skilled individuals suggest
a change of 0 − 1pp only. Moreover, point estimates also indicate an increasing observed
transition probability to local employment after one year of unemployment of 2−8pp for high-
skilled individuals only. For high-skilled individuals, the corresponding percentage change
on the observed probability of migration is approximately 15− 35% while the corresponding
change for exits to local employment is around 5 − 20% only. Under the assumption of
independent exit risks, these ﬁndings would have a causal interpretation in the sense that
extensive unemployment beneﬁts mainly allow for avoiding or postponing migration such
that the reduction of UNB entitlements primarily fosters the willingness to migrate. Due to
the missing statistical signiﬁcance which is probably due to the small sample size, however,
all these ﬁndings are only weakly suggestive for some reform eﬀects on leaving unemployment
locally or non-locally and thus call for additional future research with a larger sample size14.
4.5 Conclusion
This paper has presented an approach that allows for analysing competing failure types in
the case of partially missing information concerning the failure times. Partially missing data
may occur whenever the state of an individual is partially unobserved such as in the case
of unobserved periods in an individual’s employment trajectory in administrative individual
data. The nonparametric bounds analysis presented in this paper is thus a highly relevant
approach for applied researchers who face similar data limitations. It extends the nonpara-
metric bounds analysis for the single risk framework by Abadie (2005) and Lee and Wilke
(2005) to a competing risk setting by deriving bounds for the risk speciﬁc cumulative in-
cidence curve (CIC). One major advantage of the CIC compared to the marginal survivor
curve is that it is still well deﬁned in the case of dependent competing risks. In a simu-
lation, we have demonstrated that this important property of the CIC also carries over to
our bounds framework. Although our approach does not resolve the non-identiﬁability of
competing risks and thus precludes a direct causal inference, it provides a ﬂexible descriptive
tool for the observed distribution of competing failures. In particular, our approach is fully
14The original sample size of the IAB-R01 is in fact quite large with a 2% sample of all individuals working
in a job subject to social insurance contributions. The necessary sample selection of treatment and control
group, however, reduces the large sample to around 6,000 unemployment spells.
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nonparametric in the sense that we do not impose assumptions that may be violated in the
real world. In an empirical application of our bounds framework, we have explored the eﬀect
of reducing the maximum receipt of unemployment beneﬁts on the observed transitions to
either local or non-local employment via migration. For this purpose, we use the variation of
unemployment beneﬁt entitlements that is provided by the 1997 labour market reform. De-
spite avoiding basically any identifying assumption in our bounds framework, we still obtain
a number of interesting observations:
• Without showing statistical signiﬁcance, the bounds are weakly suggestive for a positive
eﬀect of reducing the maximum receipt of unemployment beneﬁts on the observed
migration probabilities of high-skilled unemployed for whom the threat of entitlement
loss after exhausting UNB is likely to be largest. This ﬁnding is in line with the previous
results from chapters (2) and (3) that entitlements to a long receipt of unemployment
beneﬁts tends to prolong unemployment and reduce migration.
• Under the assumption of independent competing risks, the treatment eﬀect on migra-
tion clearly seems to exceed the positive treatment eﬀect on exits to local employment
in relative terms. This may suggest that extensive unemployment beneﬁts mainly
substitute for migration.
• In light of our ﬁndings, the current labour market reform in Germany (Hartz IV ) is
likely to foster migration and to accelerate exits to local employment among those for
whom the threat of entitlement loss increases. First, the introduction of the means-
tested social beneﬁts II (SBII) decouples unemployment compensation after exhausting
unemployment beneﬁts from former wage income. This increases the threat of entitle-
ment loss only for those unemployed for whom the former unemployment assistance was
more generous than the new SBII. In addition, the reduction of the maximum receipt
of unemployment beneﬁts for individuals above the age of 45 since 2003 is also likely
to increase transition probabilities to both local and non-local employment. However,
the transferability of our results to older age groups may be limited. For older age
groups, more restrictive unemployment beneﬁts may rather reduce early retirement,
i.e. reduce the inﬂow into unemployment.
• We generally observe a smooth variation of the bounds with unemployment duration.
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This does not suggest any discontinuities in the hazard rates or survivor functions
and thus supports the results of the non-stationary job-search theory of van den Berg
(1990).
• As another interesting observation, we obtain that point estimates for the lower and
upper bound of the latent variable do not span the full width of our estimated bounds.
Therefore, a sensitivity analysis based on diﬀerent deﬁnitions of the unemployment
duration data alone may be misleading.
The limitations of our approach point towards some interesting future research needs:
• With regard to data limitations, data with more information on individual and house-
hold characteristics would be desirable to reexamine our empirical results. Such addi-
tional information would also allow to distinguish groups for whom a shorter receipt
of unemployment beneﬁts implies diﬀerent entitlement losses. Moreover, repeating the
analysis with a longer post-reform period or a larger sample size should be worthwhile
to improve the statistical signiﬁcance of the data.
• Due to the unresolved identiﬁcation problem of the competing risk data, the causal
inference from our empirical results is limited. Strictly speaking, our results can be
interpreted causally only under the assumption of independent risk.
A promising route for future research thus is to combine our bounds framework for
partially missing data with attempts to break the non-identiﬁability of dependent competing
risks such as Honore´ and Lleras-Muney (2006). However, as a disadvantage to our current
bounds framework for cumulative incidence curves, such attempts necessitate additional
assumptions.
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Appendix
A - Computation of actual and counterfactual UNB entitlements
The entitlement length at the beginning of the unemployment spell is not included in the
data and has to be computed based on the known employment history, age and the known
regulations and changes across time. For this purpose, we compute the claim period which
encompasses a maximum of three years prior to making the UNB claim, but ends with a
previous UNB claim within this three years period. In the same token, we calculate the
employment duration within the relevant extended claim period of up to seven years prior
to making the claim. As previously mentioned, UNB entitlements depend on the duration
of socially insured employment within the relevant claim and the relevant extended claim
period. Unemployment beneﬁts exceeding six months necessitate at least 12 months of
socially ensured employment within the claim period. Thus, an individual with at least 12
months of socially ensured employment within the claim period and 24 months within the
extended claim period gets 12 months of UNB. If there is a shortened claim period due
to a previous UNB claim, the new UNB claim based on the employment periods after this
last unemployment period may be extended up to the age-speciﬁc PUNBD by remaining
entitlements at the end of the previous unemployment period if the beginning of the last
UNB claim lies within the last seven years.
For the estimation of actual UNB entitlements all changing regulations throughout the
1980s and 1990s have been applied. For the counterfactual UNB entitlements, we apply the
pre-reform conditions to the post-reform period and compute the UNB entitlements as if
all individuals had been 42 by the time of the beneﬁt claim. More precisely, we adjust the
whole age history of an individual as if, for example, an individual aged 38 at the beginning
of the unemployment period had always been four years older. This adjustment alone does
not ensure the comparability of the resulting counterfactual entitlements for the pre- and
post-reform period because entitlements depend on the entire work history which is subject
to all previous changes in regulations. We therefore compute the counterfactual entitle-
ments for the post-reform period had all changes in regulations been shifted by ﬁve years,
the diﬀerence between the pre- and post-reform period. This procedure ensures a twofold:
(i) the comparability of counterfactual UNB entitlements for all age groups irrespective of
whether the unemployment period starts prior or after the reform and (ii) the equivalence of
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counterfactual and actual UNB entitlements for the treatment group in the pre-reform era.
As a consequence, the treatment group in the pre-reform period with counterfactual UNB
entitlements of more than 12 months actually has entitlements of more than 12 months while
all others who fulﬁl this criterium actually receive UNB for a maximum of 12 months only,
but are comparable to the former group in terms of their employment history.
B - Descriptive summary of sample characteristics
Control group Treatment group
Age (years) 38.3 38.3 43.0 43.0
High school degree 8.6 8.0 8.9 7.7
Vocational training 82.8 83.1 83.1 82.7
Tertiary education 8.6 8.9 8.0 9.5
1st wage quintile 22.0 22.1 23.9 23.9
2nd wage quintile 26.8 30.3 24.0 29.1
3rd wage quintile 20.3 22.9 20.7 20.2
4th wage quintile 17.0 14.8 16.8 14.0
5th wage quintile 14.0 9.9 14.6 12.8
Tenure prev. job (days) 1172.9 1128.6 1385.0 1244.7
Tenure in claim period (days) 1471.4 1434.3 1563.1 1439.2
Prev. recall 17.0 19.6 17.1 19.8
Skilled blue-collar 43.5 43.3 42.8 43.1
Unskilled blue-collar 32.8 31.8 33.7 31.0
White-collar 23.7 25.0 23.4 25.9
Prev. unemployment 73.8 78.9 70.4 77.3
Total spells 4,294 3,577 1,557 1,436
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D - Descriptive summary of restricted sample by skill group
Control group Treatment group
pre-1997 post-1997 pre-1997 post-1997
High-skilled individuals
LB spells
median duration (days) 154 122 206 122
exit to local job 48.5% (48.9%) 46.5% (49.9%) 43.0% (43.3%) 46.3% (49.2%)
exit to non-local job 19.8% (20.0%) 19.8% (21.2%) 17.2% (17.3%) 18.8% (20.0%)
exit to other destination 30.9% (31.2%) 26.9% (28.9%) 39.2% (39.4%) 29.0% (30.8%)
total exits 99.2% (100.0%) 93.2% (100.0%) 99.4% (100.0%) 94.1% (100.0%)
UB spells
median duration (days) 200 127 305 154
exit to local job 58.5% (59.8%) 51.8% (56.9%) 53.5% (55.3%) 51.9% (56.0%)
exit to non-local job 25.6% (26.2%) 21.8% (24.0%) 22.3% (23.0%) 21.8% (23.5%)
exit to other destination 13.7% (14.0%) 17.4% (19.1%) 21.0% (21.7%) 19.1% (20.6%)
total exits 97.8% (100.0%) 91.2% (100.0%) 96.8% (100.0%) 92.8% (100.0%)
Total spells 864 815 314 335
Less-skilled individuals
LB spells
median duration (days) 99 91 102 92
exit to local job 75.1% (75.7%) 72.3% (77.6%) 74.9% (75.9%) 72.0% (78.1%)
exit to non-local job 6.3% (6.3%) 6.6% (7.0%) 5.5% (5.6%) 6.6% (7.1%)
exit to other destination 17.8% (18.0%) 14.3% (15.3%) 18.3% (18.5%) 13.6% (14.8%)
total exits 99.2% (100.0%) 93.2% (100.0%) 99.7% (100.0%) 92.2% (100.0%)
UB spells
median duration (days) 105 94 110 95
exit to local job 84.6% (86.4%) 76.2% (83.9%) 83.0% (85.7%) 76.3% (84.5%)
exit to non-local job 7.6% (7.8%) 7.0% (7.7%) 7.8% (8.0%) 6.8% (7.5%)
exit to other destination 5.7% (5.8%) 7.6% (8.4%) 6.1% (6.3%) 7.2% (7.9%)
total exits 97.9% (100.0%) 90.8% (100.0%) 96.9% (100.0%) 90.3% (100.0%)
Total spells 2,562 2,137 929 839
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E - Point estimates for lower and upper bound of treatment ef-
fect on the cumulative incidence of non-local exits to employment
among high-skilled unemployed, restricted sample
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The point estimations for the treatment eﬀect using the lower bound and upper bound
of the employment duration data are done by using the following formulas:
lIr(tj|pt0, pt1, x) = {ILBr (tj|1, pt1, x)− ILBr (tj|0, pt1, x)}
− {ILBr (tj|1, pt0, x)− ILBr (tj|0, pt0, x)}
and
uIr(tj|pt0, pt1, x) = {IUBr (tj|1, pt1, x)− IUBr (tj|0, pt1, x)}
− {IUBr (tj|1, pt0, x)− IUBr (tj|0, pt0, x)}
for r = 1, . . . ,m and other notation is the same as in section 4.2.
Chapter 5
What Attracts Human Capital?
Understanding the Skill Composition
of Interregional Job Matches in
Germany
Abstract
By examining the destination choice patterns of heterogeneous labour, this paper tries to
explain the skill composition of internal job matching ﬂows in Germany. Estimates from a
nested logit model of destination choice suggest that spatial job matching patterns by high-
skilled individuals are mainly driven by interregional income diﬀerentials, while interregional
job matches by less-skilled individuals are mainly aﬀected by interregional diﬀerentials in
job opportunities. Interregional diﬀerentials in non-pecuniary assets slightly contribute to
spatial sorting processes in Germany. Such diﬀerences in destination choices by skill level
are partly modiﬁed by diﬀerent spatial patterns of job-to-job matches and job matches after
unemployment. Simulating job matching patterns in a scenario of economic convergence
between eastern and western Germany demonstrates that a wage convergence is the most
eﬀective means of attracting human capital to eastern Germany.
Keywords: interregional job matches, destination choice, human capital
JEL classiﬁcation: R23, J61, C35
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5.1 Introduction
This paper examines the skill composition of migration ﬂows in Germany by looking at the
destination choices of diﬀerent skill groups. Understanding what attracts skilled migrants
to a particular region is of high policy interest because the local availability of a large pool
of qualiﬁed workers has been considered to facilitate innovative activities and to improve
the endogenous growth potential of the region (Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990). Rauch (1993)
and Simon (1998) empirically conﬁrm the positive linkage between the initial human capital
endowment of a region and its future economic growth. Similarly, Berry and Glaeser (2005)
ﬁnd that the spatial concentration of human capital in the US increased during the last
decades and attribute this to an agglomeration eﬀect that occurs if skilled entrepreneurs
tend to create jobs primarily for skilled workers. By contrast, Su¨dekum (2006) stresses skill
complementarities as a counteracting force to human capital externalities. For Germany, he
conﬁrms a positive link between an initial share of skilled individuals and future regional
growth, but attributes this eﬀect to employment growth for low-skilled rather than for skilled
workers. Thus, skill complementarities in the production process may result in a more even
distribution of human capital across space. However, if the human capital externalities dom-
inate any counteracting skill complementarities, the inward migration of skilled individuals
may foster a self-reinforcing spatial concentration of human capital that intensiﬁes regional
economic disparities (Nijkamp and Poot, 1997). In the German context, several recent
studies suggests that net migration from eastern to western Germany is disproportionately
high-skilled (Schwarze, 1996; Hunt, 2000; Burda and Hunt, 2001). This raises strong con-
cerns that a brain drain from eastern to western Germany may reinforce regional east-west
disparities1. The aim of this paper is therefore to identify major determinants of the skill
composition of internal migration ﬂows in Germany. By doing so, the paper provides insights
on how policy can promote integration and convergence, a topic that is of high relevance in
Germany as well as in a broader European context.
Similar to a recent US study by Hunt and Mueller (2004), the paper considers a number
of pecuniary and non-pecuniary forces behind the skill composition of internal migration in
1According to Burda and Hunt (2001), the eastern wage level continues to be three-quarters of the western
level despite a remarkable wage convergence in the early 1990s. More importantly, the eastern unemployment
level is around twice the western.
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Germany. This approach ﬁlls an important research gap in the European context because
existing European studies on the skill composition of internal migration ﬂows in Finland
only indicate that high-skilled individuals tend to relocate to high-density urban areas (Rit-
sila¨ and Ovaskainen, 2001; Ritsila¨ and Haapanen, 2003). Wether this is due to a mixture
of higher urban wage premia, job opportunities or consumer amenities, however, remains
an unresolved question that this paper wants to shed some light on. For this purpose, I
use a broad set of regional covariates to capture both pecuniary and non-pecuniary regional
disparities. Moreover, based on a sample of job movements between 1995 and 2001, I use a
partially degenerate two-level nested logit model to distinguish between job changes within
the local area and interregional job changes to one of the destination regions. The paper thus
considers migration within a job-changing context by analysing the destination choices of
job movers.2 This enables the spatial pattern of job-to-job matches to be compared with job
matches after unemployment which may diﬀer due to diﬀerent motives for changing a job.
Job-to job matches are likely to be mainly voluntary and career-oriented and aim at better
job matches. Destinations with good income prospects and attractive amenities may be par-
ticularly popular among job-to-job changers. By contrast, job matches after unemployment
are more likely to be concerned with job opportunities. To the extent that job-to-job matches
and job matches after unemployment are not equally distributed across skill groups, such
diﬀerences may also aﬀect the skill composition of internal job matching ﬂows. This study
therefore extends previous studies by examining diﬀerences in destination choices not only by
skill level, but also by the type of job match. As another contribution to the literature, the
econometric approach of this paper takes account of unobserved interregional heterogeneity.
To the extent that amenity valuations diﬀer by skill level, unobserved interregional amenity
diﬀerentials, for example, may bias the impact of interregional income diﬀerentials because
observable wage diﬀerentials tend to compensate for amenity diﬀerentials (Elhorst, 2003).
Preceding papers have tended to address this problem by including some amenity indicators
such as regional climate diﬀerentials (Hunt and Mueller, 2004) which should reduce but not
eliminate such biases. Using a pooled sample of job moves between a seven year period
2As a drawback, the analysis does not allow for modelling induced job movements. Extending the analysis
to endogenously model the probability of changing jobs is not feasible with the data used and is thus left to
future research. As a consequence, the study only explains the probability of moving to region k conditional
on changing the job (see Bartel, 1979 for a discussion).
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allows for including destination and origin ﬁxed eﬀects. This should avoid biases arising
from the omission of time-constant region-speciﬁc factors (Train, 2002).
Estimation results show some major diﬀerences in the spatial pattern of job matches
by skill level. Moreover, including destination ﬁxed eﬀects turns out to signiﬁcantly aﬀect
estimation results. In a model with destination ﬁxed eﬀects, the spatial pattern of job
matches by high-skilled individuals is mainly driven by interregional income diﬀerentials,
while job matches by less-skilled individuals are mainly aﬀected by regional diﬀerentials in
job opportunities. Interregional diﬀerences in wage dispersion as well as amenity diﬀerentials
only weakly contribute to spatial sorting processes in Germany. Moreover, diﬀerences in
destination choices by skill level are partly modiﬁed by diﬀerent spatial patterns of job-to-
job matches and job matches after unemployment. Simulating the spatial pattern of job
matches in a scenario of economic convergence between eastern and western Germany thus
demonstrates that converging wage levels is the most eﬀective means of attracting human
capital to eastern Germany.
The research outline of the paper is as follows. After a short theoretical discussion in
section 5.2, section 5.3 and 5.4 introduce the data set and some descriptive evidence regarding
the skill composition of internal job matching ﬂows in Germany. Section 5.5 introduces the
econometric speciﬁcation. Section 5.6 discusses estimation results and presents the ﬁndings
from a simulated economic convergence between western and eastern Germany. Section 5.7
concludes.
5.2 A theoretical underpinning of skill sorting across
space
Hunt and Mueller (2004) have recently modelled destination choices as a utility-maximising
instead of an income-maximising decision. This approach stresses the role of non-pecuniary
returns from moving to a particular region. Similarly, this paper assumes a theoretical
framework in which movements between K regions are based on utility maximisation, thus
including both pecuniary and non-pecuniary determinants of destination choice. The inter-
esting question now is why such a utility-maximising behaviour induces a sorting of skill
groups across space. Despite the rather manageable amount of research on the role of ed-
ucation for destination choices, the literature suggests a number of explanations for such
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skill sorting processes. In particular, the net present value of the expected lifetime indirect
utility of living and working in k, Vik, should depend on individual i ’s preferences for certain
region-speciﬁc attributes as well as his employment and wage prospects in region k. Thus,
Vik can be written as
Vik =
1
r
[αik
∫ wmax
0
w dFik(w) + (1− αik)bk + aik]− Ciok (5.1)
with r as the discount rate, and o denoting the origin region of individual i.
First of all, αik summarises individual i ’s chances of ﬁnding and keeping a job in region
k which may depend on individual i ’s occupation and skill level and the demand for these
characteristics in region k. 1 − αik thus denotes the individual-speciﬁc probability of fu-
ture periods without any wage income but a real transfer income bk instead that may diﬀer
across space due to regional cost-of-living diﬀerences. In case of employment, the expected
real wage for individual i is given by
∫ wmax
0
w dFik(w) which depends on the moments of the
wage distribution Fik(w) in region k for individual i ’s characteristics. While a variance-
preserving increase in the mean wage level should attract individuals irrespective of skill
level, a change in the wage dispersion may induce skill sorting. According to the extended
Roy selection model that applies the Roy model (Roy, 1951) to the international and subse-
quently to internal migration decisions (Borjas, 1987; Borjas et al., 1992), migrants maximise
their income by choosing a destination region that provides the most favourable income dis-
tribution for their skill level. In particular, conditional on the mean wage, a high-skilled
individual who is likely to draw wage oﬀers from the upper quantile of the wage distribution
has a higher expected wage in regions where wage dispersion is greater across skill groups.3
It follows that high-skilled individuals have incentives to move to regions that reward their
human capital investments, whereas less-skilled individuals tend to move to regions with less
income inequality in order to reduce the penalty attached to their lack of these skills.
In addition to these pecuniary factors that determine the expected utility of moving to k,
aik captures the value of all non-pecuniary beneﬁts or costs that arise from living in region k.
In particular, every location oﬀers a set of natural (e.g. climate), consumer (e.g. the variety of
consumption goods and activities) and public goods amenities (e.g. school quality), but also
3This only holds if an individual ranks equally in the skill distribution across all regions. In the case
of Germany, this assumption may be problematic if formal skills that have been acquired in former East
Germany are less valued in western than in eastern Germany.
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comes with disamenities (e.g. lack of housing space, pollution, crime rates). Recent research
suggests that high-income or educated individuals tend to consume a disproportionate share
of consumer amenities and may thus have higher amenity valuations (Brueckner et al., 1999;
Glaeser et al., 2001). If amenity valuations rise with skill level, amenity-rich regions should
be more frequent destinations for migrants with higher skill levels.
Finally, the costs of moving from the origin region o to region k ciok may be negatively
related to human capital (Chiswick, 2000; Bru¨cker and Tru¨bswetter, 2004). This may be
a reasonable assumption, if high-skilled individuals are more likely to be compensated for
migration costs by their new employer. Migration costs may also be lower due to geograph-
ically broader social networks that reduce the information or psychological costs associated
with migration. As a consequence, the skill level of internal migration ﬂows might increase
with migration distance.
One important insight of this framework is that the proportion of high-skilled individuals
moving to k may be aﬀected by skill-speciﬁc employment opportunities in region k, the
level of amenities, the degree of wage inequality across skill groups and the migration costs
involved in moving to region k. In line with these predictions, Hunt and Mueller (2004) ﬁnd
evidence in favour of higher amenity valuations among high-skilled migrants in the US and
Canada. Based on a nested logit model of destination choice, their ﬁndings also conﬁrm
lower migration costs for high-skilled migrants and the implications of the Roy model that
high-skilled individuals tend to move to regions with high skill premia.
The objective of this paper is to test these predictions in a German context. As an exten-
sion, the paper hypothesises that the skill composition of migration ﬂows may be modiﬁed
by diﬀerent destination choices of job-to-job movers and job movers after unemployment
since the proportion of job-to-job movers varies across skill groups. For one thing, job-to-job
movers may be more likely to make use of career networks and other professional contacts to
ﬁnd a new job. Job-to-job movers may consequently experience favourable job ﬁnding condi-
tions αik even under generally unfavourable job-ﬁnding conditions as reﬂected, for example,
in high unemployment rates. By contrast, such general job-ﬁnding conditions may be more
important for post-unemployment job movers who are less likely to have access to career
networks. Secondly, I hypothesise that job-to job matches are likely to be mainly voluntary
and career-oriented and aim at better job matches. Destinations with good income prospects
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and attractive amenities thus may be particularly popular among job-to-job changers. By
contrast, the main migration motive for job movers after unemployment should be to re-enter
the labour market whereas regional amenity diﬀerentials are likely to be of secondary impor-
tance only. The following empirical analysis thus examines destination choices not only by
skill level but also by type of job move in order to shed some light on what determines the
skill composition of migration ﬂows and thus the allocation of human capital across space.
5.3 Data
The analysis is based on the IAB employment subsample 1975-2001 - regional ﬁle (IAB-
R01).4 This register data set contains spell information on a 2 % sample of the population
working in jobs that are subject to social insurance payments. As a consequence, the sample
does not represent self-employed individuals and tenured civil servants. The data contains
spell information on periods for which the individual received unemployment compensation
from the Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit) such as unemployment
beneﬁts UB (Arbeitslosengeld), unemployment assistance UA (Arbeitslosenhilfe) and main-
tenance payments during further training MP (Unterhaltsgeld). Thus, employment histories
including periods of transfer receipt can be reconstructed on a daily basis.
Moreover, the IAB-R01 includes the microcensus region of the workplace such that in-
terregional mobility can be identiﬁed for job movers by comparing the workplace location
of the previous and the current job. Since I only observe workplace locations, any choice
of regional boundaries to distinguish between intraregional and interregional mobility en-
tails a possible measurement error if individuals commute across these boundaries. In order
to reduce these measurement errors, I deﬁne 27 aggregated planning districts (Raumord-
nungsregionen). Planning districts in Germany are deﬁned according to commuting ranges
and thus comprise labour market regions that are relatively self-contained. Since using the
97 planning districts for the destination choice model is not feasible, I reduced the number of
alternative choices by aggregating planning districts according to an algorithm that reduces
the remaining external commuting linkages between these regional planning districts. For
details on the procedure see Appendix A. Based on the resulting regional classiﬁcation, I
deﬁne the origin and destination region of each job move. According to the deﬁnition used
4See Hamann et al. (2004) for a detailed description of the IAB-R01.
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in the analysis, a job move occurs if there has been a change in employer5 and the reason
for ending the previous spell of employment is denoted as ”end of employment”. Moreover,
no job move is assumed if the next spell of employment indicates the same employer and
this new period of employment occurs within 90 days. This restriction ensures that recalls
linked to seasonal work are for the most part not counted as job moves.
Distinguishing between job-to-job moves and job moves after unemployment poses some
problems. This is because the IAB-R01 does not allow for identifying registered unemploy-
ment but only contains information on the receipt of transfer payments. While all unem-
ployed individuals who have previously been employed for at least 12 months are entitled
to receive unemployment beneﬁts for a restricted time period, a subsequent time-unlimited
entitlement to unemployment assistance is means-tested and thus only applies to individuals
who lack other ﬁnancial resources. This means that it is not possible to distinguish between
those who have left the labour force and those who are still unemployed but not receiving
unemployment assistance. I therefore distinguish between job-to-job moves and job moves
after unemployment by using a proxy for registered unemployment (Fitzenberger and Wilke,
2004; Lee and Wilke, 2005). The resulting types of job moves are deﬁned as follows:
1. Job-to-job change (JJC): The job move occurs within 90 days after the last job
ended and there has been no intermediate transfer receipt.
2. Job change after unemployment (UJC): A UJC occurs if there has been a preced-
ing transfer receipt that terminated less than 90 days before the start of employment.
Gaps between previous periods of transfer receipt are no longer than four weeks and
transfer receipt started within four weeks after the last spell of employment ended.
Since a voluntary job quit entails a suspension of unemployment compensation of at
least four weeks, this last restriction ensures that UJC mostly excludes voluntary un-
employment.
3. Job change after all other states (REST): REST comprises two types of job
moves: (1) Job moves without any intermediate transfer receipt but a gap of more
5Hunt (2004) suggests that high-skilled individuals are quite likely to be interregionally mobile while
staying with the same employer. I deliberately exclude this type of migration because these movements are
largely determined by site locations of the employer and not by a decision-making process that considers all
alternative locations.
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than 90 days between both spells of employment. (2) Job moves with intermediate
transfer receipts that does not fulﬁll the UJC deﬁnition due to longer gaps before,
during or after transfer receipt. In both cases, long gaps in the employment history
may be due to other unobserved labour market states (e.g. self-employment, out-of
labour force).
For the subsequent analysis, I use only JJC and UJC since the remaining job moves
(REST) are a very heterogeneous sample for whom the intermediate labour market status
and thus also the intermediate whereabouts are rather unclear. Moreover, due to the data
limitations, the analysis mainly excludes graduates who enter the labour market for the ﬁrst
time unless these individuals have been recorded in the IAB-R01 due to some previous em-
ployment relationship that has been subject to social contribution payments. Furthermore,
I restrict the sample to job moves occurring between 1995 and 2001 since prior to 1995 there
have been dramatic changes in the demarcation of eastern regions that complicate any re-
gional analysis. In addition, I restrict the sample to prime-age males aged 25 to 45 years in
full-time employment in order to receive a relatively homogeneous sample. Despite a growing
literature regarding the substantial east-west migration of women in Germany (Kro¨hnert et
al., 2006), I exclude women from the analysis due to data restrictions. In particular, the
IAB-R01 does not include information on marital status and single and married women
cannot therefore be separated. Since these two groups are likely to behave quite diﬀerently,
with married women often being tied movers, I decided to restrict the analysis to male
job movers. All these data-driven sample selections should be borne in mind for the later
analysis as they limit the generalisability of the empirical ﬁndings to other excluded labour
market segments. Still, examining destination choices among male direct job movers and job
movers after unemployment should yield some interesting insights into the factors that drive
the skill composition of migration ﬂows in Germany. For this analysis, I distinguish between
high-skilled job movers with a college or university degree and less-skilled individuals who
are either unskilled or have a vocational training.6 In Germany, unskilled individuals with
only a high-school degree comprise less than 10% of all individuals. Based on these deﬁni-
6I address the problem of inconsistencies in the education variable in the IAB-R01 by using the IPI
imputation rule that has been proposed by Fitzenberger, Osikominu and Vo¨lter (2005). This imputation
rule assumes that educational degrees do not get lost and that missing values may be overwritten by previous
information on the education level if available.
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tions, I observe 116,978 JJC and 85,066 UJC by 26,457 high-skilled and 175,587 less-skilled
individuals in the period from 1995 to 2001. Moreover, 72% of all individuals experience
more than one job move within the seven year period.
5.4 Background and descriptive evidence
In order to give some descriptive evidence regarding diﬀerences in spatial job matching
patterns by skill level and type of job change, I consider job matching between four macro
regions (north, mid, south, east) as shown in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1: Four German macro regions
Table 5.1 shows average economic conditions in these regions between 1995 and 2001.
There are strong disparities among the three western regions (north, mid and south) with
regard to unemployment rates. While the south has unemployment rates which are much
lower than the national average, the north and to a lesser extent the mid are characterised by
much higher rates of unemployment. Eastern Germany still lags behind economically with
unemployment rates around twice the average rate of the three western regions. Moreover,
eastern wages continue to be one-quarter below the western wage level despite a remarkable
wage convergence during the 1990s. The observed downward trend in east-west migration
from an initial peak in the early 1990s has mainly been attributed to this wage convergence
(Hunt, 2000; Burda and Hunt, 2001). Wage dispersion continues to be less pronounced in
the eastern than in the western regions despite growing wage inequality in eastern Germany
since the 1990s. According to the Roy selection model, this should contribute to a positive
selection of east-west migrants.
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Table 5.1: Average economic conditions in four German macro regions, 1995-2001
Indicatora East North Mid South
Median daily wage in euros 60.2 81.4 83.0 83.7
Wage variance indexb 0.84 1.17 1.06 1.01
Unemployment rate 17.9 11.0 10.4 7.5
Employment growth in % -1.5 1.2 1.1 1.7
a For details on the data sources and deﬁnitions of indicators see Appendix B and C.
b An index of < 1 indicates below average wage variance. See Appendix C for details.
Bearing these regional disparities in mind, Table 5.2 shows job matching patterns by
origin and skill level between these macro regions. Note that an interregional job move
can occur within the same macro region since each of these regions consists of several sub-
regions. Consistent with the migration literature, high-skilled individuals are much more
likely to experience an interregional move than less-skilled individuals. More importantly,
destination choice patterns also diﬀer by skill level. While high-skilled job changers are, for
example, two to four times as likely to move to the south than their less-skilled counterparts,
the likelihood of moving to the east is similar across both skill groups.
Table 5.2: Mobility pattern by origin and skill level, IAB-R01, 1995-2001
Destination (in %)
Origin Skill level Obs. Stay Home East North Mid South
East Less-skilled 49,935 84.0 6.7 2.6 3.3 3.4
High-skilled 4,862 69.1 12.1 4.2 8.7 6.0
North Less-skilled 28,009 82.1 3.5 6.9 5.9 1.7
High-skilled 3,913 58.2 5.2 13.2 16.0 7.4
Mid Less-skilled 56,085 79.5 2.1 2.8 12.4 3.2
High-skilled 10,364 58.4 3.3 5.7 23.0 9.6
South Less-skilled 41,558 83.3 2.5 1.0 3.8 9.4
High-skilled 7,318 62.1 2.6 3.3 12.4 19.6
Note: Less-skilled individuals with high-school degree or vocational training;
High-skilled individuals with tertiary education.
According to the theoretical framework of the previous section, diﬀerent destination
choices by skill level may partially reﬂect diﬀerent spatial job matching patterns of job-to-
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job moves and job moves after unemployment since skill groups are not evenly distributed
across these types of job mobility. Figure 5.2 thus displays destination choice patterns of
interregional job moves not only by skill level but also by type of job move. According
to Hotelling test statistics, diﬀerences across skill groups remain highly signiﬁcant after
controlling for the type of job mobility. Moreover, destination choice patterns also diﬀer
signiﬁcantly between JJC and UJC when controlling for skill level. This suggests that the
skill composition of job matching ﬂows in Germany may also be aﬀected by diﬀerent job
matching patterns of job-to-job changers and job changers after unemployment.
Figure 5.2: Destination choice pattern by skill level, origin and job status, IAB-R01, 1995-
2001
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Table 5.3 looks at the resulting skill composition of job matching ﬂows between the
four macro regions. In particular, it shows the share of high-skilled individuals among job
movers between the four regions. On average, 24.5% of all interregional job moves accrue to
high-skilled individuals, but there are large diﬀerences in the skill composition of particular
migration paths. The skill level of ﬂows to the east and the north, for example, is lower
than average, while the skill level of ﬂows to the south and the mid region is above the
average. Interestingly, regions with high-skilled inward migration also tend to have high-
skilled outward migration and vice versa.
The skill composition of inward and outward ﬂows does not say much about the implied
net ﬂow of less-skilled and high-skilled individuals. Table 5.4 therefore looks at net migration
ﬂows and the induced net employment change by skill level for the four macro regions.
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Table 5.3: Share of high-skilled individuals among interregional job movers between the four
regions, IAB-R01, 1995-2001
Destination
Origin East North Mid South All
East 13.6% 20.4% 14.7% 16.5%
North 17.2% 27.5% 37.8% 26.5%
Mid 22.5% 27.3% 35.7% 29.8%
South 15.5% 36.8% 26.5% 30.6%
All 18.7% 24.0% 28.6% 28.4% 24.5%
Apparently, both the east and the north experience net losses of human capital. In line with
Bu¨chel et al. (2002), the descriptive evidence thus points towards a continued brain drain
from eastern to western Germany. Moreover, the east not only loses high-skilled migrants to
the south and the mid, but also experiences an even larger net loss of less-skilled migrants. By
contrast, the mid and especially the south have positive net ﬂows for both skill groups. For
the south, the employment change that is induced by these net ﬂows is larger for high-skilled
than for less-skilled individuals.
Table 5.4: Net migration ﬂows and induced net employment change by skill level, IAB-R01,
1995-2001
Region Net migration Net emp. change
LS HS LS HS
East -1447 -183 -1.40% -1.17%
North 175 -83 0.24% -1.25%
Mid 337 29 0.20% 0.17%
South 935 237 0.67% 1.75%
Note: Employees by skill level are computed based on the IAB-R01
at the beginning of the observation period (01/01/1995).
The job-matching ﬂows thus indicate a re-allocation of population from the east to the
west and a re-allocation of human capital from the east and the north to the south mainly.
The descriptive evidence suggests that destination choice patterns diﬀer by skill level and
type of job move. The following econometric analysis thus examines destination choices of
heterogeneous labour in order to identify the factors behind these observed sorting processes.
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5.5 A partially degenerate nested logit model
Following the well-known random utility approach to discrete choice problems (McFadden,
1981), the probability that individual i with origin o chooses destination d can be written
as:
Piod = P [Viod + iod > Viok + iok] ∀ k 	= d (5.2)
with Vioj denoting the observed utility for individual i of moving to region j=d,k. ioj is the
unknown stochastic part. Assuming independent, identically extreme value distributed error
terms between all destination choices yields the logit speciﬁcation which has been used by a
number of recent destination choice studies (Davies et al., 2001; Schu¨ndeln, 2002). Since the
simple logit representation is inappropriate if choices are related due to unobserved utility
components, I choose a nested logit speciﬁcation that slightly relaxes the independence
assumption of the logit speciﬁcation by allowing for some correlation among non-origin
regions.7 More speciﬁcally, I use a partially degenerate nested logit model that distinguishes
between two upper-level branches: staying in the local area (s) and migrating (m). At
the lower-level, the branch m distinguishes between all destination regions while for the
degenerate branch s, the origin region is the only choice. This model thus allows for the
case that all choices that involve residential mobility are related due to some unobserved
migration cost, but still assumes independence between all non-origin regions in branch m
conditional on all observed factors, i.e. the the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
assumption has to hold with branch m.
The nested logit model can be decomposed into the product of the marginal probability
of choosing branch m or s (Pil with l = m,s) and the conditional probability of choosing
alternative k conditional on choosing the branch (Pik|l). The conditional probability for the
non-degenerate branch m can be written as
Pik|m =
exp(γ′zik)∑
k∈m exp(γ
′zik)
(5.3)
while Pio|s = 1 for the degenerate branch. γ denotes a parameter vector. zik are covariates
that vary across non-origin regions. The upper level marginal probability of migrating can
7A less restrictive multinomial probit that allows for correlations between all alternative choices is in-
feasible due to the computational burden that results from 27 alternative choices and the large sample
size.
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be written as follows:
Pim =
exp(β′mwi + ζmivim)
1 + exp(β′mwi + ζmivim)
. (5.4)
with
ivim = ln[
∑
k∈m
exp(γ′zik)]. (5.5)
βm is a parameter vector that measures the eﬀect of each individual-level characteristic wi
on the probability of migration. ivim refers to the inclusive value which links the upper with
the lower model. In particular, ζmivim may be interpreted as the expected utility individual
i derives from choosing among all non-origin regions, i.e. from migrating. Moreover, the in-
clusive value parameter ζm reﬂects the degree of independence among all non-origin regions.
Since ζm = 1 has been rejected for all estimations in the following section, the alternative
choices cannot be considered fully independent such that the nested logit model turns out to
be an appropriate speciﬁcation. I estimate a non-normalised nested logit (NNNL) for which
the utility of the lower level model has not been rescaled by the inverse of the inclusive
value parameter (Daly, 1987). The normalised utility maximising nested logit (McFadden,
1978) is typically preferred for its consistency with utility maximisation if 0 < ζm < 1. The
NNNL speciﬁcation is consistent with utility maximising behaviour only if no coeﬃcients
are common across branches and ζm lies within the interval [0; 1] (Koppelman and Wen,
1998; Heiss, 2002; Hensher and Greene, 2002). Since both conditions are fulﬁlled in the
subsequent estimations, using the NNNL speciﬁcation is a feasible approach. I estimate
the NNNL sequentially by estimating the lower level model and the inclusive value before
estimating the upper level model. This sequential estimation is less eﬃcient than simul-
taneous estimation by full information maximum likelihood (FIML). Moreover, due to the
inclusive value estimate, the standard errors of the upper level model may be biased down-
ward (Amemiya, 1978). Thus, FIML is clearly preferable but comes at the cost of diﬃcult
numerical maximisation since the log-likelihood function is not globally concave. Moreover,
FIML was computationally infeasible for the complete sample. Since the main focus of the
paper is on lower level estimates for which both point estimates and standard errors are con-
sistent, I therefore decided to use the sequential estimation method. Both point estimates
and standard errors for upper level covariates were quite similar when comparing sequential
estimates with FIML estimates for some sub-samples. This suggests that the sequential
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estimation bias may be negligible. For all estimations, I further impose standard errors that
are robust to clustering at the regional level in order to avoid downward biased standard
errors (Moulton, 1990).
Upper level covariates wi consist of individual-level characteristics that may be expected
to aﬀect individual mobility decisions. In particular, these covariates encompass age, pre-
vious job status, previous sector of activity, previous type of occupation and wage income
in the job prior to the job move. Unfortunately, the IAB-R01 does not include important
household characteristics such as home ownership and marital status which repeatedly have
been shown to aﬀect the propensity to be mobile. Instead, the data set allows for cap-
turing the individual employment history (e.g. previous average tenure, previous recall by
the former employer, total duration of all previous non-employment periods) which should
at least reduce some of the unobserved heterogeneity among individuals. I also include an
indicator for individuals of East German origin to capture diﬀerences in the propensities to
be mobile that may be related to the diﬀerent relevance of geographical mobility in both
parts of Germany. Moreover, since all observed job moves between 1995 and 2001 are pooled
for the analysis and individuals may experience more than one job move during this period,
an additional indicator for multiple job moves should control for major diﬀerences between
multiple job movers and individuals with only one job move. In addition, I include origin
ﬁxed eﬀects in order to capture diﬀerences in the propensity to be mobile across origin re-
gions as has been shown in Table 5.2. Appendix E contains summary statistics for all upper
level covariates.
Lower level covariates zik vary across non-origin regions and are intended to capture
observed utility diﬀerences between alternative destinations as suggested by the theoretical
framework in section 5.2. As an indicator of regional job-ﬁnding conditions for individual
i, I use the regional unemployment rate8, regional employment growth in individual i ’s
skill group and the share of high-skilled employed in region k . While the unemployment
rate indicates general job-ﬁnding conditions, higher employment growth in individual i ’s
skill group indicates improving employment prospects. Moreover, a region with a high
level of qualiﬁed jobs as reﬂected by a high share of high-skilled employees should oﬀer
8Unfortunately, no regionally disaggregated unemployment rates by skill group are available.
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favourable job-ﬁnding conditions for high-skilled job movers. zik also includes the median
wage in individual i’s sector of activity as an indicator of interregional diﬀerences in the
wage level9. Moreover, I use the ratio between the 80th and 20th wage percentile in region
k as an indicator of the regional wage dispersion across skill groups.10 According to the
theoretical framework, higher wage levels should attract migrants irrespective of skill level
while a higher degree of wage inequality should attract mainly high-skilled individuals. In
addition to income diﬀerentials and job-ﬁnding conditions, I also try to capture a number
of non-pecuniary regional diﬀerences. Unfortunately, there are only few indicators that may
be considered to capture such non-pecuniary aspects for which a time series is available
for the study period. In particular, I include population levels as a proxy for urban-scale
related consumer amenities as suggested by Herzog und Schlottmann (1993). Moreover, I
include the population density as a measure of agglomeration eﬀects as suggested by Ciccone
and Hall (1996)11. While urban-scale related amenities should be attractive for migrants,
especially high-skilled ones, a denser agglomeration for a given urban scale may also capture
disamenities such as pollution or lack of housing space.12 In addition, I use hotel capacities
per resident as a proxy for the general attractiveness of the region as proposed by Glaeser et
al. (2001). Moreover, I include regional child care facilities as an indicator of the availability
of a speciﬁc type of public goods. In order to capture also a speciﬁc source of disutility,
I include regional crime rates. Regional land price diﬀerentials are used as a proxy for
interregional cost of living diﬀerentials. In addition, the model includes the distance between
origin and destination region as a measure of migration costs that may be related to distance
such as psychological costs.
Estimation results based on this speciﬁcation may be biased if covariates such as employ-
ment growth and population size are endogenous due to a simultaneity issue. In order to
mitigate this problem, I use lagged values for all covariates zik for which such a simultaneity
9When using the regional wage level across all sectors, estimates turned out to be weaker. Apparently,
interregional diﬀerences in the sector wage level appear to be more relevant for mobility decisions.
10Both income indicators control for diﬀerent regional compositions of the labour force such that diﬀerences
in these indicators reﬂect diﬀerences in labour prices only. Appendix C includes a short description of the
methodology which is based on Hunt and Mueller (2002).
11In fact, Ciccone and Hall use employment density as a measure of agglomeration economies, but popu-
lation densities should also be an appropriate indicator.
12Positive agglomeration eﬀects such as higher productivity levels due to closer proximity of workers and
lower transportation cost, should mainly be captured by the regional wage distribution.
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issue is likely to arise (see Appendix B). Even lagged values, however, can be endogenous due
to the persistence of unobserved regional characteristics over time. For this reason, I include
ﬁxed eﬀects for each destination region at the lower level of the model in order to avoid biases
from omitting relevant destination-speciﬁc factors. Unobserved characteristics of a partic-
ular migration path such as the cultural proximity between origin and destination region
may, however, continue to bias estimation results. Since it is not possible to include ﬁxed
eﬀects for each origin-destination pair, I only include ﬁxed eﬀects for movements across the
former inter-German border and for movements between northern and southern Germany.
Moreover, in order to measure a possible reluctance of individuals to cross the former inter-
German border, the dummy variable for movements from western to eastern Germany only
applies to individuals born in West Germany, while the dummy for the opposite direction
only applies to individuals born in East Germany. For migration between the north and the
south of Germany, the data set does not include the information to restrict the dummies to
individuals born in these parts. The dummies thus apply to all individuals living in these
regions. Including lagged covariates, regional ﬁxed eﬀects for destination regions and ﬁxed
eﬀects for some major migration path should clearly reduce potential biases compared to
earlier studies that do not consider any ﬁxed eﬀects such as Hunt and Mueller (2004).
Except for the distance measure, all continuous lower level covariates zik are deﬁned
as diﬀerences between the standardised values for the destination and the origin region,
i.e. zik = z˜ik − z˜io. This reﬂects the notion that destination choices are typically made
by comparing potential destinations with the current region of residence. As a drawback,
however, this imposes the restriction that responses to changes in the origin or the destination
region are symmetric.13 Appendix B and C lists the exact deﬁnitions and data sources of all
lower-level variables, while Appendix D gives the corresponding summary statistics.
Marginal eﬀects Due to deﬁning lower level covariates as diﬀerences between standard-
ised values, marginal eﬀects measure the eﬀect of an increase in the diﬀerence between origin
and destination region by one standard deviation. Thus, marginal eﬀects of a change in zik
on the conditional probability of moving to region k are comparable for these covariates and
13A less restrictive speciﬁcation with origin-speciﬁc characteristics in the upper-level model proved quite
unstable such that I decided to stick to the more restrictive use of destination-origin diﬀerences.
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have been computed as follows:
∂Pik|m
∂zik
= γzPik|m(1− Pik|m) (5.6)
For dummy variables, marginal eﬀects have been calculated instead as 
Pik|m/
zik =
Pik|m,zik=1 − Pik|m,zik=0. For the upper level model, marginal eﬀects of a change in wi on
the marginal probability of moving to region d are given as
∂Pim
∂wi
= βwPim(1− Pim) (5.7)
for continuous covariates and as 
Pim/
wi = Pim|wi=1 −Pim|wi=0 for dummy variables. For
both lower and upper level marginal eﬀects, the delta method has been applied to calculate
standard errors. Marginal eﬀects and standard errors shown in the subsequent tables always
refer to the average eﬀects in the sample population (Train, 2002).
5.6 Estimation Results
Following the sequential estimation procedure, this section discusses the lower level model
of destination choice of interregional job moves before brieﬂy discussing the upper level
estimates for the decision as to whether to change a job intra- or interregionally. Based on
these results, I then examine the implied change in the mobility pattern of job moves in case
of an economic convergence between eastern and western Germany.
Lower level estimates Table 5.5 shows estimated marginal eﬀects on the conditional
probability of moving to destination k by skill level for the pooled sample of job-to-job
moves and job moves after unemployment. Speciﬁcation A includes neither destination-
speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects nor dummy variables for speciﬁc migration paths while speciﬁcation B
includes these additional covariates. Comparing both speciﬁcations in Table 5.5 suggests
that including a number of regional amenity indicators in speciﬁcation A does not suﬃce
to prevent biases from unobserved time-invariant interregional amenity variations. In par-
ticular, the eﬀect of the wage level seems to be downward biased while the impact of the
unemployment rate is upward biased. These biases are consistent with the notion that higher
local amenities compensate for lower wages and higher unemployment rates. In this case, the
interregional wage diﬀerential is negatively related to the unobserved interregional amenity
diﬀerential, while the unemployment diﬀerential should be positively related to the amenity
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diﬀerential (Elhorst, 2003). Moreover, the amenity indicators also seem to be biased due
to unobserved region-speciﬁc factors. As an example, speciﬁcation A indicates that higher
crime rates attract individuals, while no such evidence can be found for speciﬁcation B. To
sum up, the ﬁndings indicate that estimates without destination ﬁxed eﬀects may be biased.
Speciﬁcation B also seems to be more reliable than speciﬁcation A when it comes to test-
ing the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption by running a Small-Hsiao test14
(Small and Hsiao, 1985) for excluding each of the 27 regions, respectively. Table 5.5 shows
how many of these 27 test statistics suggest that the independence assumption is incorrect.
The Small-Hsiao test conﬁrms the iia assumption at least for model B for almost all regions.
This can be seen as some positive evidence that the nested logit model is well speciﬁed.
For the subsequent analysis, unless stated otherwise, I restrict the discussion of covariate
eﬀects to the more reliable speciﬁcation B. In order to examine whether the type of job move
matters for the spatial pattern of job matches, Table 5.6 thus displays estimation results by
skill level and type of job move for speciﬁcation B only.15
Economic conditions As expected, interregional job changers tend to move to regions
with higher wage levels in their sector of activity. Interestingly though, the last column in
Table 5.5 suggests that this eﬀect is signiﬁcantly stronger at a 5% signiﬁcance level for high-
skilled than for less-skilled interregional job movers. While for less-skilled individuals a one
standard deviation increase in the sector wage level in region k increases the probability of
moving to k by only 0.5pp, the corresponding eﬀect for their high-skilled counterparts is
four times as large. Consistent with higher labour supply elasticities among high-skilled as
compared to less-skilled individuals16, high-skilled individuals thus have stronger preferences
for high-wage regions. Consistent with the theoretical notion discussed in section 5.2 that
income prospects may be more important for career-oriented job-to-job moves than for job
14As discussed in Small and Hsiao (1985), the Small Hsiao test should be preferred to other test statistics
such as the Hausman test because it avoids the computational and inference problems of the Hausman test
that arise if the inversion of the diﬀerence between two similar parameter matrices is not positive deﬁnite
or close to being singular. Indeed, the results from the Hausman test do not seem to be very reliable as the
test statistic is often not positive deﬁnite depending on sample choice and included covariates. I therefore
rely on the Small-Hsiao test instead.
15Results for speciﬁcation A are available from the author upon request.
16Arntz et al. (2006a) estimate labour supply elasticities by skill groups for Germany based on the ZEW
microsimulation model and ﬁnd that labour supply elasticities for high-skilled individuals exceed labour
supply elasticities for less-skilled individuals.
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moves after unemployment, point estimates in Table 5.6 further suggest that the wage level is
a more important determinant of destination choice for job-to-job movers than for job movers
after unemployment. Diﬀerences between the two types of job movers are not signiﬁcant
though (p-value for high-skilled: 0.23).
There is no signiﬁcant evidence in Table 5.5 that high-skilled job movers prefer regions
with a high wage dispersion, while there is some evidence that their less-skilled counterparts
avoid such regions. Controlling for the type of job move in Table 5.6 does not alter this
result. Consistent with the extended Roy model, this ﬁnding may thus be suggestive of
some weak skill sorting based on interregional diﬀerences in wage inequality. Compared to
the U.S. study by Hunt and Mueller (2004), however, the impact of wage inequality is very
weak.17 This may be because interregional diﬀerences in wage dispersion are much smaller
in Germany than in the US with the exception of east-west disparities. Such disparities,
however, may be of minor importance compared to the strong east-west diﬀerences in wage
levels. In this case, a selection based on interregional diﬀerences in wage dispersion may
not be a major determinant of the skill composition of interregional job moves in Germany.
Instead, interregional wage level diﬀerences not only aﬀect the level of inter-state migra-
tion in Germany as suggested by Burda and Hunt (2001) but also strongly aﬀect the skill
composition of these ﬂows.
The skill composition of interregional job ﬂows is also aﬀected by interregional diﬀerences
in employment opportunities. More speciﬁcally, Table 5.6 shows that irrespective of the type
of job move there is signiﬁcant evidence that less-skilled individuals tend to move to regions
with low unemployment rates, while no signiﬁcant evidence can be found for for their high-
skilled counterparts. By contrast, signiﬁcantly positive eﬀects of employment growth can be
found for job-to-job movers only. Consistent with the hypotheses in section 5.2, generally
favourable job-ﬁnding conditions as reﬂected by low unemployment levels, are important for
less-skilled job movers who are less likely than their high-skilled counterparts to make use
of interregional career networks and may thus experience strong job competition in regions
with high unemployment levels18.
17The stronger U.S. ﬁndings may also reﬂect speciﬁcation issues since Hunt and Mueller (2004) do not use
standard errors that are robust to clustering at the regional level.
18Unfortunately, the unemployment rate by skill group which would be more informative on this issue is
not available in Germany on a regionally disaggregated level.
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Table 5.5: Lower level marginal eﬀectsa
∂Pid|m
∂zid
by skill level for a pooled sample of JJC and
UJC in percentage points (pp), IAB-R01 1995-2001
Model A Model B
Variable LS HSb LS HSb p-valuec
Median sector wage 0.057 1.364∗∗ 0.532∗∗ 2.061∗∗ 0.031
Wage variation -0.222∗ -0.029 -0.382† 0.029 0.239
Unemployment rate -0.453∗∗ -0.153 -1.265∗∗ -0.591 0.290
Employment growth 0.638∗∗ 0.179† 0.130 0.217† 0.572
Share of HS employment 0.703∗∗ 1.293∗∗ 0.634 -0.573 0.176
Log(Distance) -6.446∗∗ -4.664∗∗ -6.131∗∗ -4.317∗∗ 0.089
Population size 1.271∗∗ 1.365∗∗ 0.393∗ 0.483∗ 0.543
Population density -0.222∗∗ -0.314∗ -0.228∗ -0.183 0.589
Crime Rate 0.292∗∗ 0.384∗∗ -0.045 0.097 0.417
Hotel capacity 0.252∗∗ 0.206∗ -0.972∗ 0.533 0.144
Child care facilities -0.091 -0.088 0.054 0.570∗∗ 0.206
Land prices 0.121 0.175 -0.135 -0.266 0.571
East-West migration 5.048 -2.048 0.681
West-East migration -3.495∗∗ -2.708∗∗ 0.249
South-North migration 0.384 0.479 0.903
North-South migration -0.095 0.257 0.787
Destination dummiesd No No Yes Yes
LL (Lower level) -86646.9 -28762.9 -85348.5 -28369.7
# of regional moves 31,465 10,225 31,465 10,225
IIA failse(Small-Hsiao) 9/27 4/27 0/27 1/27
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
a Marginal eﬀects and standard errors have been calculated as sample averages.
b LS: Less-skilled individuals with high-school degree or vocational training; HS: High-skilled indi-
viduals with tertiary education.
c P-values refer to test of diﬀerence between marginal eﬀects for high- and less-skilled.
d Additional 27 destination dummies that are not shown, but available from the author upon request.
e Number of regions (out of 27) for which IIA fails at a signiﬁcance level of 5%.
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We can conclude that interregional economic diﬀerences aﬀect the skill composition of
interregional job ﬂows for two main reasons. Firstly, higher wage levels disproportionately at-
tract high-skilled migrants, especially high-skilled job-to-job changers, whereas interregional
diﬀerences in wage dispersion, if at all, contribute only weakly to skill sorting across space.
Secondly, unemployment diﬀerentials only exert a strong and signiﬁcant eﬀect on less-skilled
job movers. Although the diﬀerence between both skill groups is not signiﬁcant (p-value:
0.29), this ﬁnding is suggestive for the greater meaning of general job-ﬁnding conditions
among less-skilled than among high-skilled job-movers.
Amenities and rents Compared to the impact of interregional income and job-ﬁnding
diﬀerentials, amenity diﬀerentials as captured by the previously discussed proxies do not seem
to have a strong impact on destination choices according to speciﬁcation B in Table 5.5. To
some extent, however, this may reﬂect that region-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects soak up most amenity
diﬀerentials. In a speciﬁcation without such ﬁxed eﬀects, some amenity indicators such as
the population size have a rather strong impact which may suggest that the relevance of such
amenity factors may in fact be larger than suggested by speciﬁcation B. On the other hand,
speciﬁcation A is likely to be biased due to unobserved regional heterogeneity. Speciﬁcation
B may thus be considered to give a less-biased, but also a rather conservative picture of the
relevance of amenity diﬀerentials for the destination choices of job movers.
As regards diﬀerent preferences for amenities between skill groups, parameter estimates
for speciﬁcation B in Table 5.5 are not contradictory to the idea that high-skilled individuals
may have higher amenity valuations, but also do not present strong evidence in favour
of this notion. Point estimates for the urban scale eﬀect of higher population levels, for
example, are indicative for higher valuations of consumer amenities among high-skilled job
movers. Moreover, the availability of child care facilities as a speciﬁc type of public good
signiﬁcantly attracts only high-skilled job movers (+0.6pp). Table 5.6 suggests, however,
that the already weak evidence in favour of higher amenity valuation among high-skilled
movers vanishes when controlling for the type of job move. In particular, point estimates
for the urban scale eﬀect of higher population levels are twice as large for JJC than for UJC
irrespective of skill level and are highly signiﬁcant for JJC only. What is more, only job-to-job
movers irrespective of skill level are signiﬁcantly attracted to regions with a favourable child
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care infrastructure. Although diﬀerences between JJC and UJC are not signiﬁcant19, these
ﬁndings may weakly indicate that JJC have higher amenity valuations than UJC. Since JJC
are relatively well-educated on average, such preferences may then also aﬀect the skill sorting
across space as weakly indicated in Table 5.5. Additional indicators such as regional crime
rates or land prices do not signiﬁcantly aﬀect destination choices of job movers. Similarly, a
higher population density seems to be a comparable disamenity for all sub-groups and thus
also leaves the skill composition mainly unaﬀected.
Migration cost As expected, the likelihood of moving to a region signiﬁcantly de-
creases with distance for all skill levels. Moreover, consistent with the theoretical frame-
work, migration costs associated with migration distance are higher for less-skilled than for
high-skilled job changers at a 10% signiﬁcance level. In order to keep the probability of
moving to region k constant if migration distance marginally increases from 100 to 101 km,
the hourly wage level in k has to be 0.02 euros higher for high-skilled and 0.12 euros higher
for less-skilled individuals.20 Thus, the proportion of high-skilled following a particular mi-
gration path clearly increases with distance. According to Table 5.6, this ﬁnding is robust if
the type of job move is controlled for.
For individuals born in West Germany, moving to the eastern part of the country is
associated with a strong and signiﬁcant disutility and thus additional migration costs while
there is no additional utility assigned to the opposite direction for former East Germans.
These costs may partially reﬂect economic disparities between both parts of Germany that
are not captured by other covariates. Since no other migration paths yield any signiﬁcant
utility or disutility, however, covariates already seem to capture major regional disparities.
Therefore, the disutility of moving to eastern Germany is likely to reﬂect some reluctance
to cross the former border that is not explicable by observed regional disparities. Such
reluctance has also been found by Bu¨chel et al. (2002) in a study of migration intentions
among West Germans. According to this study, only one third of those who are willing to
change residential location are also willing to move to eastern Germany while more than
19In fact, for almost all parameters, establishing signiﬁcant diﬀerences across skill groups turns out to be
diﬃcult due to imprecise estimates for at least one group.
20The change in wages that keeps the probability of moving to k constant if distance (km) increases is
given by: ∂wage∂km =
∂wage
∂log(km)
∂log(km)
km . Coeﬃcient estimates are not shown, but are available from the author
upon request.
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50% are willing to leave the country. Thus, at least for individuals born in West Germany,
the former border still seems to exist in their minds.
Table 5.6: Lower level marginal eﬀectsa
∂Pid|m
∂zid
by skill level and type of job mover in percentage
points (pp), IAB-R01 1995-2001
Less-skilled High-skilled
Variable JJC UJC p-valueb JJC UJC p-valueb
Median sector wage 0.62∗ 0.36 0.39 2.22∗∗ 1.42∗∗ 0.23
Wage variation -0.24† -0.49∗∗ 0.28 -0.06 0.35 0.32
Unemployment rate -0.93∗∗ -1.17∗ 0.56 -0.60 -0.60 0.95
Employment growth 0.49∗ -0.15 0.15 0.24† 0.15 0.59
Share of HS employment 0.22 1.26∗∗ 0.21 -0.89 0.10 0.38
Log(Distance) -6.07∗∗ -6.25∗∗ 0.70 -4.22∗∗ -4.68∗∗ 0.47
Population size 0.56∗∗ 0.23† 0.19 0.57∗∗ 0.22 0.37
Population density -0.24∗ -0.23† 0.78 -0.19† -0.17 0.82
Crime Rate 0.02 -0.15 0.34 0.18 -0.20 0.30
Hotel capacity -0.66∗ -1.16∗∗ 0.16 0.37 0.95 0.48
Child care facilities 0.34† -0.19 0.30 0.70∗ 0.23 0.35
Land prices -0.08 -0.28 0.44 -0.28 -0.23 0.77
East-West migration 3.95 6.91 0.88 -2.18 -1.60 0.76
West-East migration -3.31∗∗ -3.63∗∗ 0.17 -2.77∗∗ -2.43∗∗ 0.57
South-North migration 0.53 0.17 0.91 0.53 0.24 0.84
North-South migration -0.12 -0.03 0.92 0.47 -0.39 0.84
Destination dummiesc Yes Yes Yes Yes
LL (Lower level) -53615.7 -31591.5 -22410.0 -5930.1
# of regional moves 19,906 11,559 8,093 2,132
IIA failsd(Small-Hsiao) 1/27 2/27 0/27 0/27
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
a Marginal eﬀects and standard errors have been calculated as sample averages. See previous section
for details.
b P-values refer to test of diﬀerence between marginal eﬀects for high and less-skilled.
c Additional 27 destination dummies that are not shown, but available from the author upon request.
d Number of regions (out of 27) for which IIA fails at a signiﬁcance level of 5%.
CHAPTER 5. WHAT ATTRACTS HUMAN CAPITAL? 197
Upper level estimates Table 5.7 shows marginal eﬀects on the marginal probability of
leaving the local region, i.e. the probability of experiencing an interregional instead of an in-
traregional job move. The estimates include the inclusive value estimate iˆvim from the lower
level speciﬁcation B. This inclusive parameter reﬂects the expected utility that an individ-
ual derives from migration. The corresponding parameter estimate ζ indicates whether pull
factors are important in determining mobility decisions. According to a test of equal param-
eters across sub-groups, high-skilled job-to-job changers are signiﬁcantly more responsive to
pull factors than other sub-groups. As a consequence, the share of interregional movers who
are high-skilled slightly increases if other labour markets gain in attractiveness. Apart from
the inclusive value, there are a number of additional upper level covariates that signiﬁcantly
aﬀect the decision to change a job interregionally. Across all sub-groups, younger, better
skilled and previously well-earning job changers are more likely to be interregionally mobile.
The latter two ﬁndings may both reﬂect higher migration propensities among high-ability
individuals since the previous wage income is likely to capture some heterogeneity in ability
that is unexplained by formal education. Among the employment history indicators, having
previously been recalled dramatically reduces the likelihood of changing a job interregionally
because these individuals tend to be recalled locally again and may simply not be looking for
jobs elsewhere. Longer average tenure also reduces the probability of leaving the local region,
probably due to the regional attachment that comes with a long job tenure. Furthermore,
migration levels increased during the observation period from 1995 to 2001. This is in line
with Heiland (2004) who ﬁnds that increasing migration levels coincided with a period of
stagnation in eastern Germany in the mid to late 1990s. Finally, the estimates suggest a
much higher probability of changing a job interregionally for less-skilled East Germans as
compared to West Germans. This may mainly reﬂect unfavourable employment conditions
that force especially less-skilled individuals in eastern Germany to look for jobs in alternative
locations.
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Table 5.7: Upper level marginal eﬀectsa ∂Pim
∂wi
for speciﬁcation B by skill level and type of job
move (in pp), IAB-R01 1995-2001
JJC & UJC JJC UJC
Covariates LS HS LS HS LS HS
Age 25-30 0.86∗ 5.15∗∗ 1.23∗∗ 4.61∗∗ 0.27 5.19∗∗
Age 30-35 1.08∗∗ 4.15∗∗ 1.29∗∗ 3.37∗∗ 0.80∗ 6.81∗∗
Age 40-45 -0.07 -3.90∗∗ -0.11 -4.62∗∗ -0.07 -2.08
UJC -1.92∗∗ 4.66∗∗ n/a n/a n/a n/a
Unskilled -2.07∗∗ n/a -2.32∗∗ n/a -1.51∗ n/a
Born in East Germany 9.27∗ -3.26 9.08† -3.36 9.26∗ -2.60
2nd wage quintile 0.17 -6.27∗∗ 0.01 -7.44∗∗ 0.25 -2.48
3rd wage quintile 2.02∗∗ -2.02∗ 2.69∗∗ -3.31∗∗ 1.29 2.13
4th wage quintile 5.70∗∗ 3.87∗∗ 6.41∗∗ 2.70† 4.27∗∗ 7.54∗∗
5th wage quintile 12.9∗∗ 9.51∗∗ 13.66∗∗ 7.58∗∗ 14.6∗∗ 18.1∗∗
Average tenure -0.75∗∗ -0.87∗∗ -0.78∗∗ -1.05∗∗ -0.67∗∗ 0.22
Mth. non-employed -0.13 -0.50∗ -0.28∗∗ -0.37 -0.05 -0.70∗∗
Prev. recall -16.41∗∗ -20.70∗∗ -3.17∗∗ -6.66∗ -16.3∗∗ -35.5∗∗
Multiple job changes 1.03∗∗ -1.07 1.92∗∗ -0.77 -0.09 -2.16
1996 -1.00∗ -0.45 -0.44 1.09 -1.18∗ -5.30
1997 -0.43 1.88 -0.18 2.74∗ -0.16 -0.48
1998 0.55 2.38∗ 0.41 2.68∗∗ 1.19† 2.21
1999 0.44 2.69† 0.85 2.93 0.45 2.66
2000 2.06∗∗ 1.82 2.24∗ 1.52 2.49∗∗ 5.14∗
2001 1.86∗∗ 3.29∗ 2.35∗∗ 3.22† 1.93∗∗ 5.17†
Other covariatesb X X X X X X
ζm
c 0.31∗∗ 0.47∗∗ 0.28∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.29∗∗
LL (upper level) -77495.2 -16892.4 -47106.2 -13473.5 -29812.4 -3335.4
# of job moves 175,587 26,457 95,938 21,040 79,649 5,417
Signiﬁcance levels : † : 10% ∗ : 5% ∗∗ : 1%
a Marginal eﬀects and standard errors have been calculated as sample averages.
See previous section for details.
b Includes 13 sector of activity dummies, 9 types of occupation dummies, 27 origin dummies.
Full estimation results are available from the author upon request.
c Displays coeﬃcient estimate instead of marginal eﬀect.
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Simulation Results Based on the preceding estimation results, this section simulates
how the level and skill composition of job matching ﬂows changes in a scenario of economic
convergence between western and eastern Germany. This is an interesting case to study
because of the continued regional employment and wage disparities between both parts of
Germany and the resulting loss of population and human capital in eastern Germany that
has been discussed in section 5.4. As a drawback of the job-changing framework, however,
any such simulation can only capture the changing spatial job matching pattern of those who
move jobs, but abstracts from induced job mobility. Still, looking at the spatial job matching
pattern of job movers should yield some insights into which factors may, for example, help
in attracting human capital to eastern Germany. I therefore simulate job matching patterns
for a scenario of economic convergence based on speciﬁcation B in Table 5.5. I simulate
mobility patterns by using the observed wage level, wage variation, unemployment rate
and employment growth for all western regions while adjusting the corresponding values for
eastern regions according to the following formula:
z˜se = z˜e + (
1
Nw
∑
k∈w
z˜w − 1
Ne
∑
k∈e
z˜e) (5.8)
where z˜se refers to the simulated standardised value
21 for the eastern region and Ne (Nw)
denotes the number of eastern (western) regions. This simulation results in higher wage
levels, increasing wage variation, lower unemployment rates, increasing employment growth
for high-skilled and slightly increasing employment growth for less-skilled individuals in
eastern Germany. Moreover, this mean convergence maintains regional disparities within
eastern Germany. Appendix F shows average observed and simulated values for eastern
Germany.
Table 5.8 shows the predicted mobility pattern based on speciﬁcation B in Table 5.5 for
less-skilled and high-skilled individuals. Note that the predicted mobility pattern strongly
resembles the observed pattern in Table 5.2 which suggests some explanatory power of the
econometric model. Table 5.9 shows percentage point diﬀerences between the predicted and
the simulated mobility pattern in case of an economic convergence. Due to much higher
responsiveness to pull factors among high-skilled job-to-job movers than among other sub-
21As discussed in section 5.5, lower level covariates zik refer to the diﬀerence of standardised values.
The simulated standardised z˜se are thus used to calculate the diﬀerences in case of a simulated economic
convergence.
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groups, the probability of leaving the local region strongly increases for high-skilled indi-
viduals in western states and strongly decreases in eastern states compared to much weaker
reactions for their less-skilled counterparts. More importantly, economic convergence at-
tracts job movers of all skill levels and from all regions to eastern Germany. Pull factors are
again much stronger for high-skilled than for less-skilled individuals however. In fact, the
probability of moving to the eastern states more than triples for high-skilled individuals, but
less than doubles for less-skilled individuals.
Table 5.8: Predicted job matching pattern by skill level, IAB-R01, 1995-2001
Destination (in %)
Origin Skill level Obs. Stay Home East North Mid South
East Less-skilled 49,935 84.0 8.2 2.6 2.6 2.6
High-skilled 4,862 69.1 14.8 4.6 6.2 5.4
North Less-skilled 28,009 82.1 2.7 7.5 5.9 1.8
High-skilled 3,913 58.8 5.1 12.8 16.0 7.4
Mid Less-skilled 56,085 79.5 1.2 2.8 12.5 4.0
High-skilled 10,364 58.4 2.3 5.5 22.9 10.8
South Less-skilled 41,558 83.3 1.5 1.0 4.4 9.8
High-skilled 7,318 62.1 2.5 3.4 13.2 18.8
As a consequence, economic convergence aﬀects net job ﬂows between both parts of Ger-
many and changes the skill composition of west-east and east-west ﬂows as can be seen in
Table 5.10. Besides looking at the eﬀects of a full economic convergence as described above,
Table 5.10 also identiﬁes the main sources of the simulated change by looking at the ef-
fects in case of an isolated convergence of wage levels, wage dispersion, unemployment rates
and employment growth, respectively. As suggested by the previous estimation results, the
increasing skill level of west-east ﬂows from 23.5% to 39.6% in case of a full economic con-
vergence is mainly driven by increasing wage levels in eastern states. Higher wage inequality
in eastern regions also increases the skill level of west-east ﬂows. This is due, however, to
an increasing net outﬂow of less-skilled job movers. By contrast, converging wage levels not
only strongly increase the share of high-skilled west-east migrants, but also substantially
raise net migration as has also been suggested by Burda and Hunt (2001).
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Table 5.9: Simulated change in the spatial pattern of job movements by skill
level in case of an economic convergence between western and eastern Germany,
IAB-R01 1995-2001
Destination (pp change)
Origin Skill level Obs. Stay Home East North Middle South
East Less-skilled 49,935 1.38 2.15 -1.18 -1.18 -1.18
High-skilled 4,862 5.27 6.41 -3.31 -4.47 -3.91
North Less-skilled 28,009 -0.85 2.58 -0.92 -0.61 -0.21
High-skilled 3,913 -4.97 14.92 -3.61 -4.23 -2.10
Mid Less-skilled 56,085 -0.39 1.42 -0.17 -0.62 -0.24
High-skilled 10,364 -2.55 8.69 -0.90 -3.49 -1.75
South Less-skilled 41,558 -0.47 1.58 -0.08 -0.31 -0.72
High-skilled 7,318 -2.86 9.03 -0.63 -2.27 -3.27
In case of full convergence, it is mainly lower unemployment levels that further raises the
number of net migrants, mainly due to an increased net migration of less-skilled job changers.
Thus, while higher wage levels turn out to be an eﬀective means of attracting human capital
to eastern Germany, the net outﬂow from eastern to western regions can only be reversed
by a combination of higher wage levels and lower unemployment rates.
Table 5.10: Net job ﬂows and induced net employment change by skill level and share
of high-skilled migrants for various scenarios, IAB-R01 1995-2001
Net migration Net emp. change Share HS migrants
LS HS LS HS east-west west-east
Observed -1,447 -183 -1.4 % -1.2 % 16.5 % 18.7 %
Predicted -1,847 -154 -1.8 % -1.0 % 16.7 % 23.5 %
Isolated convergence of
Wage level -376 1,675 -0.4 % 10.7 % 8.9 % 41.9 %
Wage variance -2,812 -134 -2.7 % -0.9 % 14.7 % 27.8 %
Unemployment rate 1,505 247 1.5 % 1.6 % 21.1 % 18.5 %
Employment growth -1,803 -99 -1.7 % -0.6 % 16.4 % 24.2 %
Full convergence 2,096 2,559 2.0 % 16.4 % 9.2 % 39.6 %
Note: Employees by skill level are computed based on the IAB-R01 at the beginning
of the observation period (01/01/1995).
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5.7 Conclusion
This paper has identiﬁed major determinants of the skill composition of internal job match-
ing ﬂows in Germany by looking at destination choice patterns of heterogeneous job movers.
Since regional economic prospects critically hinge on the skill composition of internal migra-
tion ﬂows, the analysis provides some insights into how policy may contribute to convergence
and integration. Such insights are of particular value in light of the continued brain drain
from eastern to western Germany. As an extension to previous studies concerning the rela-
tionship between destination choices and skill level, this study has examined whether diﬀer-
ent destination choice patterns of job-to-job changers and job changers after unemployment
contribute to skill-sorting across space. Moreover, the analysis takes account of unobserved
regional heterogeneity which proved important to avoid biases arising from the omission of
unobserved regional characteristics. Using a partially degenerate nested logit analysis, this
paper comes to the following main conclusions:
• Interregional income diﬀerentials aﬀect the skill composition of job matching ﬂows
mainly because high-skilled job movers are much more responsive to interregional vari-
ation in the wage level than their less-skilled counterparts. By contrast, there is only
weak evidence that wage inequality induces some skill sorting as shown for the US by
Hunt and Mueller (2004). This comparatively weak ﬁnding in favour of the extended
Roy selection model may reﬂect that central wage bargaining in Germany leaves little
scope for local wage agreements.
• Interregional unemployment diﬀerentials only exert a signiﬁcant eﬀect on less-skilled
job seekers. This ﬁnding is suggestive for a greater meaning of general job-ﬁnding
conditions among less-skilled than among high-skilled job movers that may aﬀect the
skill composition of job matching ﬂows.
• Amenity valuations only seem to contribute weakly to skill sorting across space. More-
over, if at all, skill sorting seems to be induced by higher amenity valuations of job-
to-job changers compared to job changers after unemployment. There is no evidence
in favour of higher amenity valuations among high-skilled individuals when controlling
for the type of job move.
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• High-skilled job movers face lower migration costs such that the proportion of high-
skilled migrants strongly increases with migration distance.
• High-skilled job-to-job movers are more responsive to pull factors than all other sub-
groups. Improving destination conditions thus disproportionately mobilise this group
which aﬀects the skill composition of internal job matching ﬂows.
These ﬁndings imply that rising wage levels in eastern Germany during the 1990s have
been an eﬀective means of preventing a stronger brain drain. However, wages have risen
at the cost of higher unemployment levels which mainly boosted east-west migration of
less-skilled individuals. A simulated economic convergence between eastern and western
Germany shows that higher wage levels are the most eﬀective means of attracting human
capital to eastern Germany, but that the net loss of population can only be reversed by lower
unemployment rates. If maintaining the future viability of eastern Germany is a pronounced
policy objective, the ﬁndings in this paper thus advocate policies that foster wage convergence
without further increasing eastern unemployment levels. For this purpose, policy measures
that help in closing the productivity gap between eastern and western Germany may be a
ﬁrst choice.
Finally, the study points to a number of upcoming research tasks. First of all, although
speciﬁcation tests suggest that the nested logit approach is well speciﬁed, a less restrictive
speciﬁcation such as a mixed logit may be used as an alternative approach in future research.
Secondly, the job-matching framework of the analysis does not allow to endogenously model
the job mobility decision. Thus, the paper explains the spatial distribution of job matches
conditional on changing a job without taking into account that certain labour market con-
ditions may induce or retard job mobility. Moreover, to the extent that labour market
conditions aﬀect the composition of job movers with respect to the type of job change, for
example, spatial job matching patterns and thus also the interregional competition for jobs
may diﬀer across the business cycle. Extending the analysis to endogenously model the
job mobility decision thus is an important future research direction. Finally, due to data
restrictions, the analysis leaves out highly mobile and important labour market segments,
namely single females and ﬁrst time job entrants such as university graduates. Future re-
search should examine destination choice patterns of these segments because they strongly
aﬀect the skill composition of internal job matching ﬂows.
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Appendix
A – The deﬁnition of regional boundaries for the analysis
Regional boundaries for the destination choice analysis are based on the 97 planning regions.
These regional entities have been delineated by the Federal Oﬃce for Building and Regional
Planning (Bundesamt fu¨r Raumordnung und Bauwesen) according to commuting ranges such
that the majority of commutes occur within a planning region. For a feasible estimation of
the destination choice model, the number of destination regions had to be reduced. For this
purpose, an algorithm was used that lumps together planning regions by minimising external
commuting linkages between adjacent planning regions subject to the constraint that no
more than ﬁve regions may be lumped together and that western and eastern regions remain
separated. The latter restriction ensures that ﬂows between western and eastern Germany
can still be identiﬁed. External commuting linkages between the planning regions have
been provided by the Federal Oﬃce for Building and Regional Planning for the year 2003.
Although commuting linkages may change over time, I assume that linkages from 2003 are
still quite similar to the relevant commuting linkages during the observation period 1995
to 2001. Using the described aggregation algorithm results in the following 27 aggregated
planning districts:
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B – Deﬁnition and data sources of lower-level covariates
Variable Deﬁnition 1 yr Lag Data Sourcea
Covariates with area and individual variation
Median sector wage Median wage in individual i’s sector of ac-
tivity l (l = 1..13)
No A
Sector employment
growthb
Biennial employment growth in individual
i’s skill group
Yes B
Covariates with area variation
Wage variance index Regional wage percentile ratio divided by
aggregate percentile ratio
No A
Unemployment rate Average yearly unemployment rate Yes C
Share HS employment Share of high-skilled employment Yes B
Log(Distance) Log of average distance between all county
capitals of any two regions
- D
Population size Number of residents in 100,000 Yes E
Population density Number of residents (in 100) per km2 Yes E
Crime Rate Total oﬀenses per 100 residents No F
Hotel capacity Number of hotel beds per 1000 residents No E
Child care facilities Places in day care for children and youth
per 1,000 residents
No E
Land prices Land prices in 100 euros per m2 No E
a A - Own calculation based on IAB-R01 1995-2001. See Appendix C for details on the calculation.
B - Own calculation based on IAB-R01 1993-2001
C - Federal Employment Agency (Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit)
D - Own calculations based on the grid position of county capitals
E - Federal Statistical Bureau (Statistisches Bundesamt)
F - European Regional Crime Database, Entorf and Spengler (2004)
b I distinguish between employment growth for high-skilled individuals with a tertiary education and less-skilled individuals.
C – Estimating moments of the regional wage distribution
The observed regional wage distribution reﬂects interregional diﬀerences in both skill prices
and skill mix. For this reason, Hunt and Mueller (2002) control for interregional diﬀerences
in the skill mix by estimating key parameters of a standardised regional wage distribution
that is comparable across regions. Mainly following their methodology, I separately estimate
Mincerian-type wage equations for each region k based on the IAB-R01. Since wages in the
IAB-R01 are top-coded at the income level above which there is no obligation to be socially
insured, I estimate a tobit model. I restrict the estimation to prime age males who are full-
time employed on January 1st and include educational attainment, experience, occupation
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type and sector of activity as covariates. I predict the standardised wage distribution for
region k by using the entire sample of prime age males and the coeﬃcient estimates for region
k. Since the same sample is applied to each region, this procedure controls for interregional
diﬀerences in skills and experience levels and thus yields a standardised wage distribution.
Due to the censoring in the data, it is not possible to consistently estimate the moments of
this standardised distribution. For this reason, I use percentiles which are unaﬀected by the
censoring of the data to appropriately measure interregional wage diﬀerences. Therefore, I
estimate the median wage by sector of activity as an indicator of interregional diﬀerences in
the sector-speciﬁc wage levels. As an indicator of the wage variance in region k, I calculate
the diﬀerence between the 80th and 20th wage percentile based on the standardised wage
distribution for region k and divide it by the corresponding percentile ratio of the wage
distribution when pooling all regions. If this wage variance index is larger than 1, the wage
inequality in region k exceeds the average wage inequality.
D – Sample averages for lower level covariates by sub-sample
JJC UJC
Covariates LS HS LS HS
Median sector wage 0.104 0.055 0.139 0.110
Wage variance index 0.066 0.013 0.085 0.034
Unemployment rate -0.114 -0.057 -0.146 -0.137
Employment growth 0.026 0.028 0.038 0.043
Share of HS employment -0.009 0.028 -0.009 0.125
Log(Distance) 5.163 5.307 5.209 5.276
Population size 0.012 0.014 0.022 0.050
Population density 0.014 0.003 0.041 0.032
Crime Rate -0.051 -0.020 -0.066 -0.060
Hotel capacity 0.010 0.002 -0.019 0.012
Child care facilities -0.048 0.006 -0.062 -0.050
Land prices 0.094 0.071 0.122 0.205
# of interregional moves 19,906 8,093 11,559 2,132
∗ Except for log(distance), all covariates refer to the diﬀerence between the standardised
value for the destination (d) and the origin (o) region. Thus a value of 1 indicates a
diﬀerence of one standard deviation between d and o.
∗∗ JJC - Job-to-job changer; UJC - Job changers after unemployment; LS - Less-skilled; HS
- High-skilled
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E – Sample averages for upper level covariates by sub-sample
JJC UJC
Covariates LS HS LS HS
Migrant 0.21 0.38 0.15 0.39
Age (Reference: Age 30-35)
25-30 0.29 0.15 0.27 0.13
30-35 0.29 0.37 0.27 0.32
40-45 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.26
Wage quintile in previous joba(Reference: 1st wage quintile)
2nd 0.25 0.08 0.31 0.18
3rd 0.16 0.09 0.17 0.15
4th 0.10 0.19 0.07 0.17
5th 0.07 0.39 0.02 0.19
Employment history and other covariates
Born in East Germany 0.21 0.13 0.33 0.22
Multiple job changesb 0.73 0.71 0.85 0.73
Prev. average tenure (yrs.) 2.91 2.44 1.74 1.76
Months prev. non-employed 1.04 0.76 2.24 1.97
Prev. recall by employer 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.03
Previous sector of activity (Reference: Agriculture and Fishing)
Primary industry 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.04
Invest. goods/engineering 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.07
Invest. goods/vehicles 0.07 0.11 0.04 0.07
Cons. goods/ food process. 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.04
Construction 0.17 0.05 0.37 0.10
Wholesale trade 0.08 0.07 0.05 0.07
Retail 0.07 0.03 0.05 0.04
Transport/Communication 0.10 0.03 0.06 0.03
Financial services 0.17 0.32 0.09 0.22
Domestic services 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.03
Social services 0.04 0.15 0.05 0.22
Public authorities 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.04
Previous type of occupation (Reference: Agricultural work)
Blue-collar work 0.51 0.05 0.66 0.12
Salesmen 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.06
Technical work 0.06 0.35 0.03 0.29
Clerical work 0.06 0.11 0.03 0.10
White-collar work 0.05 0.26 0.02 0.16
Health-related/Teaching/Consulting 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.18
Other service jobs 0.20 0.05 0.16 0.07
Year of job move (Reference: 1995)
1996 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.14
1997 0.13 0.12 0.17 0.15
1998 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.15
1999 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.15
2000 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.13
2001 0.15 0.18 0.13 0.13
# of job moves 95,935 21,040 79,649 5,417
a Wage quintile of the wage distribution of all full time employees observed on January 1st of each year (Data: IAB-R01).
c Indicator whether an individual contributes two or more observations (i.e. job changes) to the sample.
d The duration of the previous spell refers to the previous job tenure for JJC and to the unemployment period for UJC.
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F – Average observed and simulated unemployment rate, wage
level, wage dispersion and employment growth for eastern Ger-
many
Indicator 1
Ne
∑
k∈e z˜
s
e
1
Ne
∑
k∈e z˜e
Median wage in agriculture 0.50 -1.75
Median wage in primary ind. 0.49 -1.73
Median wage in inv. good/engineering 0.49 -1.70
Median wage in inv. goods ind./vehicles 0.48 -1.69
Median wage in cons. goods/food process. 0.50 -1.74
Median wage in construction 0.52 -1.80
Median wage in wholesale trade 0.48 -1.68
Median wage in retail 0.47 -1.70
Median wage in transport/communication 0.48 -1.69
Median wage in ﬁnancial services 0.50 -1.76
Median wage in domestic services 0.42 -1.47
Median wage in social services 0.50 -1.76
Median wage in public authorities 0.47 -1.66
Wage variance 0.46 -1.62
Unemployment rate -0.46 1.60
Emp. growth for less-skilled jobs -0.39 -0.56
Emp. growth for high-skilled jobs 1.02 0.25
Note: Average simulated values for eastern regions correspond to the ob-
served average values for western regions, i.e. 1
Ne
∑
k∈e z˜
s
e =
1
Nw
∑
k∈w z˜w.
Concluding Remarks and Outlook
Levels of internal migration in Germany are relatively low in international comparison and
may contribute to lower overall employment levels, lower economic growth and persistent
regional employment disparities. Increasing levels of internal mobility may thus be a means
of realising potential welfare gains. Against this background, the main objective of this
thesis was to shed light on the determinants of mobility for heterogeneous labour market
segments and to identify the scope for policy makers to raise mobility levels. In particular,
the thesis focused on mobility decisions of unemployed jobseekers because the willingness
and ability of unemployed individuals to be interregionally mobile should be of particular
importance if geographic mobility is to contribute to higher overall employment levels and to
an accelerated regional convergence. By looking at unemployment experiences and mobility
decisions of unemployed jobseekers, this dissertation provides a number of interesting insights
concerning the responsiveness of unemployed jobseekers to regional labour market conditions
and the extent to which labour market institutions such as the unemployment compensation
system create obstacles to the mobility of unemployed individuals. While the details of the
individual results in each preceding paper is to be found in the corresponding conclusions,
there are a number of main ﬁndings that echo through all of these papers and that are highly
relevant from a policy perspective.
First of all, the ﬁndings from paper (2) and (3) indicate that unemployment experiences
and the geographic mobility of unemployed individuals are clearly dominated by individual
characteristics such as education, age, but also the employment history. In addition, there
is some heterogeneity among unemployed jobseekers in the responsiveness to regional labour
market conditions. While skilled men and well-earning singles respond to a relatively weak
local labour demand by higher migration probabilities, unskilled men, low-earning individu-
als and women have been found to stay in regions despite unfavourable job-ﬁnding prospects.
These latter groups thus constitute a rather immobile labour market segment that is partic-
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ularly dependent on local labour market conditions. A regional labour demand shock thus
prolongs unemployment and builds up an increasing level of regional long-term unemploy-
ment, especially among these immobile labour market segments. Hence, the contribution
of geographic mobility to regional convergence is likely to be rather limited which is in line
with ﬁndings by Mo¨ller (1995) that adjustment processes after region-speciﬁc shocks tend
to be slow in Germany. Moreover, paper (3) indicates that many of these rather immobile
individuals are likely to end up in subsidised employment. Since leaving the labour force is
likely to be another important option for many immobile individuals, modelling transitions
out of the labour force would certainly be an interesting extension, but the available ad-
ministrative data unfortunately does not allow for observing such transitions. If such data
became available, we could examine at the micro level what macro-oriented studies have
already pointed at, namely that a region-speciﬁc shock often increases the non-participation
among the local labour force (Decressin and Fata`s, 1995).
Papers (2) to (4) provide some evidence that labour market institutions22 may at least
provide a partial explanation for low mobility levels and the weak responsiveness to regional
labour market conditions among many unemployed jobseekers. In particular, passive labour
market policies appear to have an impact on the duration of unemployment and the prob-
ability of leaving unemployment via migration. For all groups of unemployed individuals,
papers (2) and (3) indicate that being entitled to receive unemployment beneﬁts (UB) for
an extended period is associated with lower migration probabilities. Since these ﬁndings
need not be interpretable as a pure causal eﬀect of UB receipt, paper (4) re-examined these
ﬁndings by exploiting the variation in entitlement length from a labour market reform in
1997. The results from paper (4) are again suggestive for the mobility-reducing eﬀect of
unemployment beneﬁts, at least among high-skilled individuals for whom the shortening of
UB receipt entails the strongest income loss. The missing reaction to the 1997 reform among
low-skilled individuals, however, cannot be interpreted as a missing evidence for the impact
of the unemployment compensation system on the unemployment experiences of this group.
This is because individuals with low pre-unemployment earnings often receive social beneﬁts
in addition to unemployment compensation and thus reach income replacement rates up to
22Since the empirical results in this thesis have all been obtained in a period prior to the latest Hartz
reforms, labour market policies refer to the previous institutional setting.
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or even exceeding 100% that are independent of whether receiving unemployment beneﬁts
or unemployment assistance. The 1997 reform that cut the length of UB receipt should
thus have much weaker eﬀects on low-earning individuals despite strong disincentives to
seek employment and be interregionally mobile. The evidence from this natural experiment
in favour of a mobility-reducing impact of unemployment beneﬁts among those for whom
the threat of entitlement loss after the exhaustion of UB entitlements is likely to be strong
suggests that the barrier to mobility caused by the unemployment compensation and welfare
system may actually be quite severe for individuals with extensive income replacement rates.
The ﬁndings in papers (2) and (3) concerning an extremely long duration of unemployment
and extremely low migration rates among groups of unemployed who are likely to receive
increased income replacement rates are consistent with this notion. The available admin-
istrative data does not contain suﬃcient information to identify additional welfare receipt
and actual income replacement rates. This points towards the need to re-examine the link
between the level of basic income support and mobility if such data became available in the
future.
Limited disincentives to mobility also stem from active labour market programs (ALMP).
At least for women and married men, papers (2) and (3) present some evidence in favour
of a limited regional locking-in eﬀect in regions with an extensive provision of active labour
market programs. Apparently, active labour market programs are a substitute for leaving
the region that distracts rather immobile groups of jobseekers from job search in the regular
labour market. The research ﬁndings thus indicate a limited scope for increasing mobility by
a reduction of ALMP. On the other hand, the eﬀect of participating in ALMP on mobility
has been found to depend on the type of program and may be positive for certain training
programs (Lindgren and Westerlund, 2003). A concluding assessment to what extent a
reduction of ALMP may contribute to higher internal migration in Germany thus calls for
additional research on the eﬀects of participating in ALMP on geographic mobility in order
to complement the ﬁndings from this thesis.
The thesis has thus identiﬁed some scope for policy makers to increase mobility among
unemployed jobseekers. In particular, the ﬁndings indicate that a reduction of transfer
receipt in the case of unemployment is likely to foster migration and to shorten the duration
of unemployment among unemployed jobseekers. Since a certain minimum level of income
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support in case of unemployment is both legally deﬁned and societally desired, however,
there are limits to the reduction of unemployment compensation as a means of promoting
geographical mobility. In particular, a reduction of the basic income support is politically
conceivable only in combination with in-work welfare programs such as the negative income
tax credit in the US or the working tax credit in the UK (see e.g. Kaltenborn and Pilz,
2002). Alternatively, workfare programs that require individuals to work to be eligible
for income support might also improve not only work incentives, but also the willingness
to be interregionally mobile. The eﬀect of such programs on the geographical mobility of
unemployed jobseekers, however, is vastly understudied which points towards future research
needs. Moreover, the likely limits to a reduction of basic income support also highlight
the need to take account of alternative ways how to promote mobility among unemployed
individuals but also among the employed workforce. Additional barriers to mobility are, for
example, likely to also stem from housing policies. Social housing policies as well as high
transaction costs incurred when selling and buying real estate have been found to reduce
geographic mobility among its tenants in Germany (Barcelo, 2003). Research on the impact
of such housing policies may thus help in identifying additional scope for increasing internal
migration in Germany.
Although removing obstacles to geographic mobility is an important policy issue in order
to realise the potential welfare gains from a higher level of geographic mobility, there are
a number of possible downsides of a higher level of geographic mobility. Welfare losses
in the form of adjustment costs, a loss of social capital that may even result in reduced
fertility, an increasing social and spatial segregation if weaker social groups are displaced
from certain areas, or a possible divergence of the regional system due to the selective nature
of migration call for some compensating social and economic policies to mitigate the possible
negative consequences of higher mobility levels. Although a comprehensive assessment of the
negative consequences of geographic mobility and possibilities to cushion such eﬀects clearly
goes beyond this thesis, another contribution of this dissertation was to provide insights on
how to cushion one particular downside of a higher level of geographic mobility, namely its
potentially divergent eﬀect on the regional system.
For this purpose, the last part of this dissertation looked at the destination choices of
diﬀerent skill groups because the composition of migration ﬂows with respect to productivity-
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related characteristics may aﬀect whether geographic mobility rather fosters convergence or
divergence. The last paper thus examined the mechanisms that result in a sorting of skill
groups across space and suggests that the composition of migration ﬂows to some extent can
be shaped by policy. In particular, paper (5) indicates that a continued brain drain from
eastern to western Germany that is likely to reinforce the existing employment and wage
disparities between both parts of the country may be mitigated or even reversed by means of
increasing wage levels in eastern Germany. However, the ﬁndings from this paper also suggest
that increasing wage levels in eastern Germany in order to attract high-skilled individuals
may likely boost west-east migration of less-skilled workers if higher wages widen the gap
between productivity and wages and thus cause rising unemployment. In addition to raising
regional productivity levels, one way of increasing wages for high-skilled individuals in eastern
Germany without widening the gap between wages and productivity for less-skilled labour
market segments thus is a regionally tailored level of wage inequality. The current system of
collective wage bargaining in Germany, however, limits the scope for regionally tailored wage
agreements (OECD, 2005). An insuﬃcient wage ﬂexibility at the regional level may thus
limit the scope for attracting human capital to eastern Germany. In addition, a resulting gap
between productivity and wage levels in depressed regions also limits the stimulation of new
labour demand and thus contributes to the persistent nature of east-west unemployment
disparities in Germany (de Koning et al., 2004).23 Removing barriers to the mobility of
labour demand by increasing the scope for regionally tailored wage agreements may thus be
an important supplement to policies that remove barriers to labour supply. Such a policy
approach may help in raising mobility levels while at the same time counteracting a possible
divergence of the regional system. In an increasingly ﬂexible and mobile world, the relevance
of a comprehensive policy approach that also considers the possible downsides of geographic
mobility and takes account of the heterogeneous incentives and disincentives that determine
individual mobility behaviour cannot be overemphasised. As its major contribution, this
dissertation has identiﬁed some scope for designing such policies.
23A similar mechanism has been considered to lead to persistent regional employment disparities between
the north and the south of Italy (Brunello et al., 2001).
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